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173 FOREWORD 
The  MONITOR/SPEAR  Programme  of  the  European  Commission  Is  designed  to 
developing  R&D  Evaluation  Methodology.  This  International  Workshop  in 
Bari  was  held  to  discuss  Evaluation  Methodology  for  Science  Parks  in 
the  context  of  the  SPEAR  Network  Group.  This  topic  has  become  1n0re 
pressing  In  view  of  the  recent  stepping  up  of  EC  R&D  Infrastructure 
Programmes  towards  the  less favoured  regions of  the Community. 
The  COmmission  is extremely grateful  to Professor  Gianfranco Dioguardi, 
Chairman  of  TECNOPOLIS  Csata  Novus  Ortus  in  Barl  and  wishes  to warMlY 
thank  Dr.  Umberto  Bozzo  for  hosting  this Workshop.  This expression of 
gratitude extends,  of  course,  to all  those  in  Bari  TECNOPOLIS  who  Made 
the necessary arrangements  for  the work  to run  so smoothly,  and  to Miss 
War istella  Marrocco I i  in  particular.  We  must  also  thank  the 
participants themselves  for  their contributions to the Workshop. 
The  discussions  were  assent Iaiiy  divided  between  Findings  (on  the 
current  Science  Parts•  performance>  and  Evaluation  Methodologies. 
The  reader  May  like  to know  that  a  baseline discussion on  the  concepts 
of  science parks  (and  the  like)  had  been  initiated  in  the  former  SPEAR 
lnternat ional  Workshop  (Braga,  1991),  proceedings  of  which  have  been 
published by  Universidade do  Winho,  Braga,  Portugal. 
Findings  related to Evaluation 
As  to  the  Findings  on  the  Science  Park  performance,  we  would  like  to 
single out  the  following  points: 
The  high  expectations  that  Science  Parks  would  stimulating 
large  numbers  of  new  company  start-ups  seems  now  to  be 
unfounded. 
Similarly,  the  expectations  that  academics  would  become 
entrepreneurs,  and  the  benefits  from  extensive  day-to-day 
synergies  between  academics  and  companies  have  proven  to  be 
over-optimistic.  However,  it would  appear  that  measurement  of 
success  should  not  be  based  strictly  on  these  criteria. 
Indeed,  some  papers  suggested  that  such  synergies  are  often 
non-existant.  This  requires  further  investigation.  A 
disapointing  result  is  that  Science  Parks  seem  to  have 
achieved  I ittle  in  terms  of  technology  transfer. 
v Drawing  on  the  US  experience,  it  would  seem  that  the 
performance of  Science Parks  improves  over  time,  i.e.  the older 
Science Parks are  the most  efficient  although  the evidence  is 
somewhat  mixed.  It  is  Important  for  a  Science  Park  to  be 
closely  connected  with  a  University,  since  some  evidence 
suggests  that  this  may  lead  to  higher  performance  rates.  The 
major  constraint  appears  to  be  "sub-critical"  environment, 
i.e.  inadequate  popu I  at ion  size,  too  low  reg iona I  economic 
growth  and  problems  of  individual  leadership. 
In  contrast  to  some  of  the  less  optimistic  views  of  the 
performance  of  Science  Parks,  the  lessons  from  the  particular 
case  in  Germany,  deserve  further  consideration.  Science  Parks 
may  be  viewed  as  a  cradle  for  Regional  Development  (i.e.,  as  a 
means  of  attracting  new  businesses  together  with  R&D-based 
companies).  Yet  the  fact  that  a  good  number  of  companies  in  a 
number  of  Science Parks  reported  no  in-house  R&D  activity  and 
no  real  contact  with  the  local  University  suggests  a  need  for 
further  thought  about  the  rationale  for  Science  Parks. 
Of  particular  importance  are  the  findings  which  suggest  that 
both  on-park  or  off-park  firms  tend  to  be  equally  innovative, 
i.e.  that  Science  Parks  generate  no  extra  incentive  for 
innovation  that  cannot  be  found  elsewhere.  This  is certainly  a 
matter  for  further  investigation. 
As  far  as  the  scientific  dimension  of  Science  Parks  is 
concerned,  the  "exce I I  ence"  factor  is  cr it i ca I .  The  factors 
prornot i  ng  exce I I  ence  (which  remain  i I 1-def i ned  )  may  we I I  be 
the  key  for  higher  success-rates. 
some  key  points relating to Evaluation Methodology 
As  far  as methodological  lessons are concerned,  we  would  I ike  to single 
out  the  emphasis  on  "quasi-experimental  methods",  i.e.  the  evaluation 
of  Science Parks  with  an  extensive use  of  control  groups,  thus enabling 
that  net  (rather  than gross)  effects are  drawn  out. 
VI Some  other  important  methodological  issues are  related  to assessing  the 
local  environment  in  which  the  Science  Park  operates  (what  are  the  key 
indicators  ?),  the  time  scale  for  the  emergence  of  spin-off  companies 
and  their  size  (what  do  we  know  of  them  In  the  longer  term?).  The 
methodology  ought  to  be  espec i a I  y  focussed  on  identifying  causes  and 
effects at  the  various  levels  of  analysis,  i.e.  input,  performance  and 
output  level.  It  should  also  breakdown  effects  into  first,  second  and 
third order  magnitude  or  timescale  because  effects are  certainly of  a 
multiple  character  and  tend  to  produce  differentiated  impacts.  As 
demonstrated  by  this  Workshop  Impact  assessment  remains  a  very 
difficult  problem  for  regional  pol icy  analysts. 
The  key  success  criterion  remains  whether  or  not  technology-intensive 
firms  have  steadily  developed,  (either  assuming  the  form  of  true  R&D 
sp i n-offs,  loca I  R&D  Units  of  companies  or  loca I  branches  of 
Multinationals). 
This  suggests  that  some  of  the  crucial  areas  of  future  methodological 
work  w  i I I  be: 
to  assess  the  IIUitlpller  effects  of  Science  Park  (e.g.,  what  do 
on-park  companies  really  contribute  in  terms  of  money  and 
employment  from  the  regional  viewpoil"lt,  and  particular  emphasis 
should  be  given  to  the  true  R&D  spin-offs). 
to  assess  the  economies  resulting  from  the  agglomeration  effect 
i.e.,  the  effect  of  bringing  together  Industry  and  Science. 
Underlying  this,  is  the  problem  of  measuring  the  so-called 
synergies  that  are  expected  to  develop  between  companies  and 
academic  community  In  the  day-to-day  I ife of  a  Science  Park.  It  is 
probably  true  that  professional  evaluators  fai I  to  fully 
understand  the  problems  of  measuring  this  type  of  interchange. 
This pertains both  to typical  economic  measurement  (e.g.,  economies 
of  scale  in  the  bringing  together  distinct  activities)  and  to 
measurement  of  factors  as  econorn i es  I  nvo 1  ved  in  procuring 
information  (what  one  might  call  the  .. economics  of  information  .. ). 
At  any  rate,  the  findings  on  the  negligible  "proximity  effect", 
quoted  in  the discussions provide  important  food  for  thought. 
To  develop  regional  •models"  which  outline  the  potential  for 
development  of  a  single  region  via  the  Science  Park  mechanism 
(e.g.,  a  region  which  has  a  good  number  of  dlver~ified  industries, 
as  well  as  a  sub-critical  mass  of  research  capability,  might 
require  the setting-up of  a  Science  Park  more  in  the  fashion of  the 
quoted  German  case,  i.e.  aimed  at  attracting  businesses  and  not 
restricted to particular  fields of  activity.  As  opposed  to this,  a 
region  which  has  significant  scientific  expertise,  should 
design  a  Park  with  the  aim  of  attracting  relevant  industries  in 
VII a  more  specialised  fashion.  This  would, 
define  the  mission  of  the  Science  Park 
in  principle, 
and  thus  to 
stronger criteria for  evaluation,  particularly ex-ante). 
help  to 
provide 
Apart  from  these  issues,  this Workshop  also  identified  a  handful  of 
core  Indicators.  These  ought  to  provide  the  backbone  for  the 
evaluation,  in  particular: 
Land  area, 
Building area, 
Facilities by  type of use  (e.g.,  Incubator,  Training), 
Tenant  companies  by  type  of  activity  and  type  of  spin-off  (e.g., 
local,  private or semi-public, multinational), 
Nr.  of  Jobs  and  skills by  type of activity 
Firms  return on  investment, 
Patents applications and  licensed out 
overall  turnover  <and  R&D  undertakings  In  particular)  by  type  Of 
financing source 
Regional  <and  national) main  Economic  Indicators. 
We  would  like  to  conclude  this  introductory  note  by  referring  to  the 
discussion  on  the  need  for  an  iterative  and  interactive  evaluation 
process.  These  are  evaluations designed  to  interact  closely  with  the 
management  of  programmes,  thus  providing  new  strategic  goals  as  well 
as  to generating  inputs  to  improve  management  effectiveness.  Although 
this  type of evaluation  has  not  yet  been  formalised,  it  does  seem  to be 
a  rather  interesting  rationale  for  evaluation  exercises  and  one  which 
could  provide greater  value  for  money. 
VIII Methodological  Issues  in the 
Evaluation  of  U.S. Technology Parks 
Michael  1.  Luger 
University of North Carolina,  Chapel Hill, N;,  USA Metbodologlcallssues lo tbe Evaluation of U.S. Technology Parks 
Michael  I.  Luger 
University of North  CaroliM,  Chapel  Ifill,  NC.  USA 
As a general maner, economic development programs are implemented  in the United States with 
little prior study,  and  are rarely subjected to rigorous evaluation after they  have been put in place.  The 
"test"  that  determines  their  desirability,  both  a  ante  and  a  post,  tends  to  be  political  rather  than 
economic.  Symbolism plays a role in the attractiveness of many programs.  For example,  there is a bias 
toward "bricks and mortar"  programs that politicians can cite as physical evidence of their concern, over 
service-type  programs  that  are  more  invisible.  Elected  officials  who  want  to  communicate  their 
commitment  to  high  wage job creation,  therefore,  are likely  to  support  the  construction  of a high  tech 
research  facility  or  technology  park,  more  than  job  training  and  education  programs  for  workers. 
Similarly,  elected  officials  place  importance  on  an  image  of activism.  There  is  a  bias  in  economic 
development policy-making toward doing something rather than nothing, even if  that something does not 
produce  net  benefits  (in  a  benefit-cost  sense).  This behavior  is  revealed,  for  example,  in  a  distinct 
"bandwagon" or contagion effect.  We see states and local governments adopting programs that have been 
introduced elsewhere, not because those programs have been shown to  be  effective, but rather to  avoid 
the appearance of being inert or backward.  For elected officials Interested in the symbolism of programs, 
evaluation  is  irrelevant.  For  policy-makers  motivated  by  a  fear  of appearing  inert,  evaluations  are 
eschewed because they  are too time consuming,  and often inconclusive.  In  fact,  there  is  evidence that 
elected officials intentionally  choose not to  have programs evaluated, so that political  opponents do not 
have reason to criticize their actions. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  there  is  linle  interest  in  the  United  States  in  rational  planning,  which 
includes careful a  ante  and  a  post evaluation.  Many of the  planners and  policy analysts  who advise 
elected officials, and most academicians, place high value on economic efficiency and policy effectiveness 
as criteria  that  must  be  satisfied  in  the design  and  implementation  of programs.  Their problem  is  to 
3 conduct studies that do not sit on the shelf, but find  their way into  the policy-making process. 
To be fair, the difficulty planners and analysts have in conducting useful evaluations is only partly 
a  consequence  of culture  clash  between  them  and  elected  officials.  There  are  also  methodological 
problems  which  make  the  evaluation  of some  public  programs  inherently  difficult.  Those problems 
increase the time and cost of evaluations,  which further erode their attractiveness to elected officials. 
In this paper, I discuss methodological problems that surround the evaluation of technology parks. 
In doing so,  I beg the issue of whether those evaluations would be useful in  the policy-making process 
if they were conducted  properly.  Suffice it  to say, however,  that  the resolution  of the  methodological 
problems is necessary, if not sufficient, for evaluations to be useful to policy makers.  First, I discuss the 
nature  of the  problems  and  propose  means  to  overcome  them.  Then,  I draw on my  own work (with 
Harvey Goldstein) to illustrate what a methodologically correct evaluation of technology parks would look 
like. 
'ine choice of technology  parks as a focus of study was motivated  by the obsei'Vation  that they 
are among the most  popular economic development  strategies currently  in  use,  not only  in  the  United 
States, but in  Western  Euro~ and the Pacific Rim,  as well.  In the United States, for example, there has 
been an explosion  of technology  park development.  At last count,  there were more than  120 parks in 
operation, with many more in  the planning stage.  Those parks,  moreover, represent a small proportion 
of all parks that have been started (many have failed).  They are located in  at least forty  of the fifty 
states, in both dense metropolitan and more rural settings.  Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of 
U.S.  technology  parks.  Figure  2  shows  the  age distribution  of those  parks,  indicating  that  the great 
majority of parks in operation are relatively  young. 
MethodologiCDI  Problems in the EvalutJtion  of Technology  Park.s 
Technology parks  present particular problems for  researchers who wish to conduct evaluations. 
For example: 
4 •  Unlike some programs that have a single objective, technology parks typically have multiple objectives. 
Therefore,  the definition  of "success"  wiU  differ,  depending on who you ask.  Moreover,  even 
when a single objective is selected, "success"  toward that objective is difficult to  operationalize. 
In short, "success"  is a normative concept. 
•  Analysis  of the  determinants  of "success"  is  inherently  limited,  and  perhaps  biased,  because  a  full 
treatment of "failures"  is not possible.  If we define a "failed" park as one that no longer exists, 
we have eliminated the possibility of studying it. 
•  If "success"  is c ~fined in  terms  of the  creation  of net  new economic activity we  have a  problem of 
countedactuality.  That is,  we only observe outcomes where parks ace located in the presence of 
the park.  Special procedures must be  applied to  ascertain outcomes in  that location if the  park 
did not exist. 
•  Data to conduct a full evaluation are not routinely available.  Special procedures must be used to collect 
and create the required data. 
These problems are discussed more fully  below. 
Defining "Success"  and  "Failure: 
There  is  no  consensus  about  the  definition  of  success  among  public  officials,  university 
administrators,  economic  development  plallllers,  and  others  who  are  involved  in  technology  park 
development.  Various  actors cite  different  goals  for  park  development,  depending  on  their  particular 
perspective.  Park managers and economic development officials generally cite economic development as 
most important;  university  administrators are generally most concerned about university and technology 
development;  and private park developers tend to cite income or profit generation as the key goal. 
We can deal with  these differences  in  two  ways.  First,  we could  employ  multi-objective  (or 
multi-attribute)  plaMing and attempt  to  weigh,  then combine,  each of the goals  to  come up with  one 
composite benchmark.  In practice this is difficult to do because weights are hard to assign and progress 
toward the goals tends to be  measured in different  units.  For example, economic development  may be 
5 measured  in  terms  of job creation;  technology  development  in  tenns  of new  processes  and  products 
created;  and  profit  generation  in  terms  of dollars.  A  composite  outcome  measure  therefore  is  hard  to 
construct. 
A second approach is to adopt the perspective of one set of actors and pedorm the evaluation for 
them,  recognizing  that  the conclusions drawn may not  be relevant  for others.  That avoids the problem 
of combining different units of measurement, but not the problem of operationalizing the definition chosen. 
Because we consciously directed our evaluation toward  elected officials and park managers, we 
used their most frequently cited goal-- economic development --as the relevant outcome measure.  We 
still  had  to  decide  how  to  account  for  somewhat  different  types  of economic development  outcomes, 
including job creation, income growth, greater income equality, expanded opportunities for special groups 
within the labor force, and regional economic restructuring.  These are not necessarily mutuaiJy consistent. 
Both "success" and "failure" can be measured in different ways over the life cycle of a technology 
park.  In  the start-up, or incubation  stage of park development,  for  example, we might judge success as 
the  ability  of park management  to  recruit at least one R&D  organization  without  relaxing requirements 
for location.  Success in this first stage, then, would really be  a potential"  measure because the parks could 
fail  in  a later stage, either by going out of business or by changing  their focus away from  technology. 
We can measure success in  the consolidation and maturation stages of park development,  at least 
in terms of economic development, by counting the number of jobs represented by the R&D organizations 
that have located in the park, as well as the following induced changes in the region: employment growth, 
business  start-ups,  regional  income  and  income  equality,  employment  opportunities  for  women  and 
minorities,  occupational  mix  and  the  local  wage structure  (related  to  "regional restructuring"),  research 
capacity of the local university(ies),  and  the business climate and  political culture. 
The Problem of "Couoterfactuality" 
As just noted, success in the middle and late stages of park development should be measured in 
terms of "net" or "induced"  outcomes, or in common parlance, by asking: what would have happened in 
6 the region if the  park did not exist?  That is a counterfactual question because the only situation  that is 
observed is one that includes the park.  To get around that problem one can employ an interrupted time 
series or quasi-experimental  research design.  With the former,  outcomes are plotted on a time line and 
the slopes of the  segments before and after park development  are compared.  If the  intervention  (park 
development) had an effect, the slopes would differ.  However, this technique does not control for other 
influences that may account for changing slopes. 
Quasi  -experimentation  refers to a class of research designs that apply some aspects of classical 
experiments -- such  as  the  use of control  groups and  pre- and  post-test  observations -- to  causal 
research in actual field settings.  It differs from classical experimentation  because the random selection 
of cases into experimental and control groups is usually not a feasible (or ethical) option in field research, 
nor is the physical isolation of cases from aU other putative causal influences.  Quasi-experimental designs 
potentially  can  increase  internal  validity  of research  findings  toward  the  level  of validity  that  can  be 
obtained  in  classical experimentation. 
In  the context  of technology  parks a quasi-experimental  research strategy would  treat counties 
with  parks as the  experimental  group and  counties without  parks,  but similar  in  other respects,  as the 
control group.  Both would be compared on the basis of some outcome variable.  If park development had 
a systematic  effect,  the  outcome variable in  park counties would  have changed  more  than in  the other 
counties. 
I stated above that success in the consolidation and maturations stages of park development,  in 
tenns of economic development outcomes,  ideally would be measured in  tenns of employment growth, 
business  start-ups,  regional  income  and  income  equality,  employment  opportunities  for  women  and 
minorities,  occupational  mix  and the local wage structure (related to  "regional  restructuring"),  research 
capacity of the local university(ies),  and the business climate and political culture.  Data to  measure the 
gross level of many of these outcomes can be gleaned from secondary government sources.  But, data to 
7 estimate the  net  impact  of parks are not  readily  available  and  must  be  deduced  from  published  data or 
collected directly from  businesses  inside and outside the parks and from  universities.  For example,  it  is 
not enough to obseiVe  the number of high tech start-ups in a region over time.  To estimate the impact 
of the technology park on business formation we can ask businesses to indicate the effect of the park and 
its tenants on their start-up or spin-off decision. 
Similarly, published data reveal only the gross direct employment and payroll outcomes-- which 
park  promoters  typically  cite  as  evidence  of success  the  employment  and  payroll  of park  businesses. 
(Research Triangle Park,  for example,  boasts of 32,000 employees and $1.5 billion  in  payroll.)  This is 
only part of the story, however.  As noted above, some of those jobs and payroll dollars may well have 
been created within  the  region,  even if a park  had  not been developed.  Quasi-experimentation  should 
account  for  that.  In  addition,  the  real effect of a technology  park on  the region's economy  is  likely  to 
extend  beyond the park through  input-output  linkages  to  other businesses  in  the  region.  That can be 
measured using detailed case studies  in  which trading patterns within  the region between park and non-
park organizations can be observed. 
An EvaliUJJion  of U.S.  Technology  Paries 
The foregoing discussion indicates several strategic research decisions that had to be made in order 
to  conduct our evaluation.  The first  was whether to  limit  the analysis  to  statistical  analysis  of a large 
sample of parks,  using a quasi-experimental  design,  or to  supplement  that approach  with  detailed  case 
studies. 
The  quasi-experimental  design  method  has  the  advantage  of  having  a  large  number  of 
obseiVations of areas both with and without parks since the cost per unit of observation  is  low.  It is the 
large number of observations that  allows us  to  control effectively for rival factors (besides the existence 
of a  technology  park)  that  may  affect  an  area's economic  growth  performance.  The  large  number  of 
obseiVations also allows us  to  generalize to  the  full  population of parks (i.e., high external validity). 
The disadvantages of the quasi-experimental design include the difficulty of identifying a control 
8 !i 
i1
1  group that is similar to areas with technology parks in all important ways.  In practice, we caMot control 
U, 
for all other rival factors in a formal sense.  Instead,  it  is necessary  to  rely upon logic and experience in 
particular cases to  rule out some  factors.  A second  disadvantage  is that  in  order to  have standardized 
measures for all the cases, some valuable infonnation about some parks becomes inadmissable in a quasi-
experimental design, including much of the contextual and historical factors that may have contributed to 
a particular park's success or failure. 
The advantages of the  case study  method  are  the  abilities  to  incorporate current  and  historical 
contextual factors -- political, social and  personal -- directly into  the analysis and interpretation of the 
results,  and to collect highly detailed primary data from  a variety of actors and  textual sources.  Among 
the disadvantages  of the case study  method  is a high  cost  per case.  When  resources  are  limited,  the 
researcher often is  required  to  limit  the  number  of cases.  With  a small sample size one has  difficulty 
generalizing the case study results to the full population (research methodologists refer to  this problem as 
"low external validity"). 
Rather  than relying  on  either approach  exclusively,  we  decided  to  use  both.  We  employed  a 
quasi-experimental  research design,  using data from  published sources and a mail  survey  to  all  known 
park managers (from which we received 77 responses).  We also conducted three detailed case studies, 
obtaining information from a number of  "key actors"  in each, either by mail or face-to-face survey: (I) 
the park manager ct  ~itector; (2) the population of businesses and organizations located in each park; (3) 
a sample of high-technology businesses located outside the park but within the designated region; (  4) key 
administrators in universities affiliated with the park; and (5) selected state and local government officials 
and  business leaders. 
Our hybrid approach allowed us to maximize the internal and external validity of the results, given 
the resources available.  In the remainder of this paper I summarize the insights this strategy provided. 
Results from the I.argc Sample Apa))'sis 
After experimenting  with  different  definitions  of economic development  success or failure  we 
9 
(2) chose to use, as the measure of success, the difference in total employment growth rates -- both after and 
before a park bad been established -- between counties with  a technology  park and a control group of 
counties without a park, having the same metropolitan status, population size, and location as the counties 
containing the technology parks.  By matching control group counties to each county with a park in that 
way we auempted to control for selection differences between areas with and without parks.  Tables 1 and 
2 show the results of this data construction for fony-five parks. 
Table 1 indicates that the after total employment growth rates for park counties range from more 
than  10 percent to  approximately  -6.0 percent.  These numbei'S  mean nothing unless they are compared 
to some benchmark, so the control group counties' growth rates are also shown.  The respective difference 
in growth rates ranges from  +9.25  to  -9.75 percentage points.  Thirty-two of the forty-five parks are in 
counties that grew faster than their control group counties  in  the  years after the parks were established. 
Using  a more  stringent success criterion,  which  requires  park  counties  to  grow 20 percent faster  than 
control group counties, we fmd  that twenty-six  of the  forty-five parks have been successful.  Table 2 
presents the data in a different fonnat.  The table distinguishes parks that employ more than one hundred 
employees from  those employing fewer than one hundred  to  account for  the possibility  that very small 
parks are not as likely to have bad a significant impact on their region, despite the high success index they 
may have been assigned.  The table lists sixteen parks that are judged to  have been successful under our 
stringent  criterion,  another  ten  parks  that  have  been  successful  under  our more  lenient  criterion,  and 
nineteen parks that have ben unsuccessful -- at least in tenns of induced employment  growth. 
What  accounts  for  these  rankings?  Specifically.  are  there  local  economic  and/or  park 
characteristics that systematically account for a park's success or lack of success by our measures?  First, 
it  is critical to stress again that the definition of "success"  used here is a limited one.  One limitation  in 
our  approach  is  that  we  look  only  at  the  employment  growth  rate  for  the  first  five  years  after  park 
10 creation.  Many  of the  economic  development  impacts  of parks  will  take  longer  than  five  years  to 
materialize.  In addition, parks that are not ranked high in our lists may still be judged to be "successful" 
by  other measures.  Conversely,  because we  are not  able to control  for all conceivable rival factors,  we 
undoubtedly  are listing as "successes"  some parks that are in counties that would be growing relative to 
their respective control groups even if a technology  park were not  present. 
I' 
j' 
Table 3 presents cross-tabulations of the success indicators and four key characteristics: the parks' 
vintage, the geographic region of the country in which the park is located, the size of the metropolitan area 
1 
in  which  the  park  is  located, and  the type  of university  with  which  the park is formally  or informally 
associated.  Vintage is important for three primary reasons -- because it takes time for a park to establish 
linkages  with  other  businesses  in  the  region,  because  new  R&D  organizations  are highly  attracted  to 
regions  that  already  have  a  concentration  of  R&D  (i.e.,  localization  economies  matter  to  R&D 
organizations),  and  because  there  is  a  premium  for  being  an  "early  bird"  since  the  supply  of 
technologically-oriented  businesses  is  limited.  Geographic region  is  included  as a proxy  for  the  local 
industrial base and political culture.  The Northeast and  North CentraVMidwest  regions,  in general, have 
older manufacturing bases and higher rates of unionization, for example, than the other two regions.  Size 
is included to capture the presence of agglomeration and urbanization economies, and economies of scale, 
in general.  And, the type of university is included to enable us to test whether the ability for neighboring 
private sector  scienth~tngineers and  university researchers to collaborate has affected growth. 
The table suggests the following: 
•  Vintage.  We split the parks into three vintages.  Because no parks were established between 1971 and 
1973, we  made the break between old and  middle-aged  parks at that point.  Thus, "old"  parks 
have been in  existence at least twenty  years,  "middle-aged"  parks have been extant for at least 
eight  years, and  "young"  parks have been in existence for  no  more  than eight years.  Old and 
middle-aged parks indeed appear to have been more successful than the youngest group of parks. 
11 The difference in perfonnance between old and middle-aged parks is  not large, and may be an 
artifact of the arbitrary dividing line we have drawn. 
•  Region.  We  can make two obseiVations  of note  from  the  left-:-hand  side of the  table:  parks in  the 
northeast region of the U.S. generally are older than in other regions, and almost half of all parks 
are in the South.  Entries on the right-hand side of the table suggest that parks in the Northeast 
and North Central regions have been more successful than those in  the South and West. 
•  Metropolitan area population.  Parks in medium-sized regions, with populations between 500,000 and 
1,000,000.  appear to  have  performed  better than  other parks,  and,  parks in  small  areas,  with 
populations  less than  100,000,  have performed  better than  many might  have expected.  These 
results, of course, are sensitive to how we arbitrarily draw up the size classes. 
The results for small areas can be explained, in part, by the fact that parks located in those 
regions can serve the  same function  as a central business district:  they can be a  source of ag-
glomeration  economies  that  small  places  otherwise  would  lack.  That  parks  in  areas  with 
populations between 500,000 and 1,000,000 have performed relatively better might be explained 
by those areas being sufficiently large to offer various urbanization and agglomeration economies 
that  are important  to  attracting  R&D activities.  Those economies include a diversified  pool of 
skilled  labor,  cultural  amenities,  good airline service,  and necessary  business  support seiVices. 
Yet,  those areas are not so large as to  have generated disamenities,  congestion,  environmental 
degradation, a high cost-of-living, and other diseconomies of metropolitan scale. 
•  Affiliation with  research universities.  Parks affiliated with type  I research universities appear to have 
been more successful  than parks without  that  afflliation.  There is  no clear difference between 
parks  afflliated  with  type  II  research  universities  and  parks  without  a  research  university 
affiliation.  That may be because the counties shown to have no affiliated research university may 
still have doctoral-granting universities, specialized engineering and medical institutions, and other 
types of higher education facilities which also can benefit businesses in  the technology parks. 
One of the difficulties in interpreting the results in Table 3 is due to the fact that the effect of each 
12 causal factor on success is not isolated from all other factors.  A standard way to control for other factors 
is to employ multiple regression analysis.  We have performed this type of analysis in which we explain 
ll  lhe variation in lhe park success measure (i.e., lhe dependent variable) by lhe characteristics listed in Table 
3, as well as other explanatory variables.  Alternative measures for seven types of factors were formulated 
and tested, as well, including: (1) location, (2) vintage, (3) characteristics of park businesses, (4) university 
linkages, (5) park-provided services, (6) park-imposed restrictions,  and (7) governmental assistance.1 
Three of the variables above proved to  be statistically significant explanatory factors in most of 
the alternative models that were estimated: the age, or vintage of the park; formal affiliation with a public 
of private university; and the provision of garbage collection services.  That is, these are the factors best 
able to explain the variation in the measure of technology park success.  We present the results from two 
of the models below (ordinary least squares and logit models) and then present additional  results from a 
suiVival/hazards  model. 
Table 4 contains  results from  a  regression  of the  relative  employment  growth  rate  differences 
("DIFF"  in  Table  1) on region (represented  by  dummy  variables),  the square of vintage,  metropolitan 
population,  the  use  of deed  restrictions  (represented  by  a  dummy  variable),  the  provision  by  park 
management of garbage collection services (dummy variable), the use of government assistance by park 
businesses (dummy  variable),  and park ownership by a private or public university  (dummy variable). 
1lucc alternative measwe3 of locatiotull duuactuistics were developed -a  regional dummy (or indicator variable) 
to capture industrial base, politial, and socio-cultural differences;  a dummy  to indicate whether the park's county was a core 
county in a mcllopolitan area, a metropolitan non-core COWlty,  w  a non-metropolitan county; and the puk region's population. 
The last two mcaswe3 arc highly coaclated and serve as poxics for  the same underlying phenomCAa,  namely the presence of 
agglomeration and wbanizalioo economics.  Consequently, they (and Olhers that arc similarly coaelated) were not used in the 
!Wile regression  model. 
For vintage we used the number of years parks had existed bcfwc 1985.  Because 1951 was our first observation, lhis 
variable ranged bom 1 to 34. 
M  duuactui.sdcs of park businesses,  we Used  data on the types of favored  businesses within pub, and the percent 
of Door  space within parks that is ,for small businesses. in incubatws. 
We tried three measwea of the univusily-park Uni.age: a dummy indicating whether the parks arc OWDed and operated 
by a unlvcralty, a dummy ladlallna whether the parka arc proximate to a research wliversity, and a dummy indicating whether 
the  parks are ncar a type I research  university.  · 
The  park-provided services we iDcluded as dummies included garbage coUectioa, fire pQtcction, aad road maintenance. 
The resiTictiotLS  we tested iDcludc dcc:d  rcstd~ons. in  general, and a limitation on manufacturing  activity. 
f"mally, we iDcluded dummy vuiablea (0 or1) in different regressions to indicae whether government suhsidies to park 
busincucs or management. 
13 We squared the vintage variable for two reasons.  First,  the results in Table 3 suggest thai vintage (time) 
enters the;:  model non-linearly.  Second, we wanted to count time more heavily than other variables in the 
analysis because it can contribute to success in several ways, as WC?  discussed above.  We used garbage 
collection as the "bellwether"  infrastructure service because it  is one of the few services for which there 
are private alternatives; hence provision of garbage collection services by park management represents a 
convenience and probable cost savings to the park business.  Finally, we chose the organizational status 
of the park (owned by university) as the measure of "the university connection" after trial and error.  We 
suspect  that  it  outperfonns  other  measures  of university  affiliation  in  our models  because  it  is  less 
ambiguous. 
The  results  indicate  vintage,  garbage  collection,  and  university  variables  each  are significant 
explanatory variables (at the 0.10 level of significance) and relate to the dependent variable in the expected 
direction.  The overall explanatory power of the model, however, is low.  That is not so surprising given 
the nature of the data and the small sample size. 
Table 5 shows results from a regression model using a dichotomous measure of park success as 
the dependent variable, and logit estimation. 
In these results garbage collection and university ownership are statistically significant variables but the 
vintage variable ceases to be a significant explanatory factor of park success. 
Because of the inconsistent results for the vintage variable between the ordinary least squares and 
logit models,  we estimated a third  "survival/hazards"  model.  This class of models is  used  with events 
(such as the creation of technology parks) that can terminate in death (or failure) over time.  The model 
allows one to estimate  "survival  rates"  (or, in  this context, success rates,  as indicated  in Table 2) for 
different vintages.  The key insight  from  this analysis is that hazard rates are, indeed, higher and more 
14 significant for younger parks than for older parks. 
I essnos about Park Failures from tbe l.aq:e Sample 
In the discussion of the econometric  results above,  I focused on the detenninaots of "success," 
measured as the direct  plus induced regional  employment  growth  that can be attributed  to  technology 
parks.  The results also  sb~ some light on  the  determinants  of "failure,"  at least to  the  extent  that we 
define "failure"  as a small or nuU  value for  the dependent  variable.  For example, we can interpret  the 
ordinary least square regression and hazards model results to mean that the younger the park, the higher 
the degree of failure.  Similarly,  the results can be read to suggest that parks that do nnt collect garbage 
are more likely to fail  than parks that do provide that seavice. 
The insights these results provide about park failures are limited for at least two reasons.  First, 
the data we use in the regressions are only  from  parks that have not  ceased to operate.  We also would 
like to know how the parks that have "died" differ from those that continue to live.  Second, the particular 
measure of success we have used is most appropriate for parks that have passed into the maturation stage 
for the very fact that induced employment effects can take years to  materialize.  Consequently,  younger 
parks in the sample that have not yet entered the maturation stage may prematurely be judged as failures. 
Ideally, we would like to identify predictors that indicate which young parks are likely to proceed into the 
I 
maturation stage, and which parks will not. 
A complete empirical analysis of failure is not possible because data are difficult, in many cases, 
impossible,  to collect from parks that have ceased to  exist.  However, we can use anecdotal iofonnation 
about failed parks and data from existing parks to understand better how parks that fail differ from parks 
that are successful. 
Park managers and other technology  park  professionals  with  whom  we spoke,  including  some 
individuals  who  have worked  in  parks that  did  not  1,  attract  businesses,  identified  two  factors  that', are 
associated with park  failure:  a lack of conunitmeot  and  patience by  key individuals,  and distributional 
politics. 
15 Data from existing parks reveal another important set of reasons for failure: inadequate population 
, size and growth potential in the region, and the absence of a research university.  The small size of regions 
limits the possibilities of agglomeration and urbanization economies.  Slower growth means that the region 
has relatively  less future  development  potential,  including  expanding  pools of labor and  supplies.  Not 
having  proximity  to  a  research  university  restricts  R&D  organ.izations'  access  to  intellectual  capital, 
regardless of the region's size. 
Table 6 includes data from three types of parks: with no employees, with less than 100 employees, 
and with  100 or more employees.  We  present data on average metropolitan  area size and growth rate, 
percent of parks in  metropolitan  areas, and percent of parks affiliated with research universities,  by year 
of technology park birth, for each employee size class.  Following  our discussion of success and failure 
/ 
above,  we  can designate  parks established  prior to  1985  and  with  zero employment  as  of 1988 to  be 
failures  in  the  incubation  stage.  Similarly,  parks  established  prior  to  1982 and with  fewer  than  100 
employees as of 1988 can be designated as failures in the consolidation stage, and parks established prior 
to  1985 having fewer than 100 employees as of 1988 can be classified as "at risk failures"  in that second 
stage of development. 
We can use the table to  ask: How do  the parks that have "failed"  differ from  those in  the table 
that have not? Parks that have failed are more likely to be in  smaller regions,  in  counties that have had 
lower employment growth rates, and are less likely to be associated with a research university. 
Insights from a Sample Ca_c;c  Study 
Since it  was not possible  to select a  representative sample of cases, we decided to study three 
relatively mature parks that are generally believed to be "successful."  Given that, we sought diversity in 
location, regional economic structure, and university affiliation.  With mature parks enough time will have 
elapsed  for  any  outcomes  resulting  from  the  technology  parks'  establishment  and  development  to  be 
16 observed.  By  using "successful"  parks as cases, we can attempt  to  ascertain  the critical success factors 
that, if discovered,  would be instructive for future public policy and private investment decisions.  That 
is not to say that WlSuccessful  parks are not valuable to  study.  But it  is more difficult to  obtain reliable 
information from  key informants on unsuccessful  parks, for political and  interpersonal reasons. 
After discussing the selection criteria with colleagues familiar with  technology  parks,  and after 
communicating  with park managers about their interest and willingness  to cooperate in a case study, we 
finally selected the Research Triangle Parle  in  North Carolina, Stanford  Research Parle in California, and 
the University of Utah Research Parle  in Salt Lake City,  Utah. 
Key Methodological  Issues.  In each case study  we  attempted  to  measure  the  impact of park 
development on flCill location, employment growth, growth in level of per capita personal income, level 
of income inequality, local labor market conditions of women and minorities,  and the overall innovative 
capacity of the region.  I focus below on the first two for one technology park-- Research Triangle Park 
in  North  Carolina -- because  they  illustrate  the  use  of input-output  analysis  to  estimate  the  indirect 
growth effects. 
Research Triangle Park.  Created in  1959, the Research Triangle Park (RTP) in North Carolina 
is  the  largest,  and considered  to  be one of the  most  successful,  technology  parks in  the  world.  RTP 
occupies 6700 acres in the middle of a triangle fanned by the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, 
Duke University  in Durham,  and North Carolina State University  in  Raleigh.  There are approximately 
50 R&D-oriented organizations in RTP with a combined workforce of about 32,000.  From its beginning, 
RTP has deliberately sought the R&D branch plants of major, technology-oriented corporations.  The list 
forms a veritable who's who of the Fortune 500 -- IBM, Data General, Dupont,  Northrop -- as well as 
foreign-based firms such as BASF, Burroughs-Wellcome, Glaxo, Ciba-Geigy, Northern Telecom, Rhone-
Poulenc, and Sumitomo.  These and other organizations occupy spacious,  low-rise, often architecturally 
distinct buildings in a low-density. wooded setting.  Indeed, the appellation "park" is no misnomer in the 
case of RTP. 
17 In  addition  to  being one of the earliest, largest,  and most "park-like"  planned concentrations of 
R&D  activity  in the world,  RTP  serves as a model because it  is the symbol of one of the most dramatic 
cases of regional economic restructuring  that has yet  been documepted.  For that  reason,  representatives 
of regions  that  have  little  or no  technology-oriented  activity,  or tradition,  look  to  RTP  and  see some 
reason for optimism.  The story of RTP  is also one in which a particular set of actors have made a big 
difference. 
Finn location and employment growth.  The existence of RTP appears to have been a significant 
factor for the location of organizations both inside and outside of the park to locate in the region.  For the 
former,  we estimate that 21  of the R&D organizations in the park probably would not have located in the 
Raleigh-Durham  area if RTP  did  not  exist  (see  Figure  3).  These  percentage figures  translate  into  an 
estimated direct employment  growth for the region of about  18,900.2 
For the sample of businesses in selected industry sectors that located in the region but outside RTP 
after the  latter  was  founded,  we estimate  that approximately  16  percent would  not  have located  in .the 
region if  the park had not existed.  This translates into an induced employment impact from RTP of about 
1240 jobs in  the region's high-tech sector.
3  Approximately  one-half of the  16  percent probably would 
1 These estimates arc bucd oo the 1cspoDSCS from the CEOs of park organizations to the question of whctbe1 the mganizatioo 
would have located io the 1cgion if the technology park had not existed.  Possible ICSpoDSCS  we1e: (1) very likely, (2) likely, (3) 
maybe,  (4)  unlikely,  and  (S)  very  unlikely.  The  estimate  of the  pc1ceot  of 01ganizalioos,  and  the  employment  in  these 
organizations, that would DOC  have located iD the 1cglon is calculated by  assigning the following pobabilltics to the response: 
v'ery  unlikely =  0.9, uol.ikdy =  0.7, maybe =  0.5, and likely and very likely = 0.0. 
The estimate of the number of 01gaoizalioos that would not have located io the region but for  the park is calculated 
as the 8WD of the pl'obabilitics over all ICSpoodcots.  We then ioflatc this number  (Of  the full  populatloa of orsan.izalions  to 
iocludc  non-1cspoodcnts.  The employment  estimate Is  made by  multiplyiog  the  probability  times  the  employJilcnt  in  each 
organization.  We inflated the result io the umc way to include non-1cspondcnts. 
1 The estimate for the pcrceatqc of firms in the sample that wof:&(d  a~  have located io the region except for the park is based 
on the same procedure  used  f01  puk organizations.  The estimation of indirect  employment stimulated 
1 by  the park is made 
similuly as for  employment inside the park.  The ooly diffcrcocc is due to the fact that a sample was used rathc1 than  the full 
population.  The size of the out-of-put populatioo in employment terms Is calaalatcd by subtnctiog all cmploymcat in the puk 
from the growth of employment in the region's high-tech sccto1 between 1960 and 1987.  Percentages and pl'obabilltics derived 
from the sample were then applied to this population. 
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'! not exist anywhere if the park had not been created (see Figure 4). 
The relatively high percentage of flCIDS  whose decisions to locate in  the region were based upon 
the existence of the park, seems to be related to the absence of other strong locational "pulls" besides the 
universities,  and the relative autonomy of park businesses from other businesses in the region.  That is, 
in the absence of the park (and the universities) there would be insufficient reasons for a large corporation 
to choose the Raleigh-Durham area for the location of an R&D branch plant.  This contrasts with Stanford 
where a well  -developed set of networks among firms exists in the region and provides a strong locational 
pull for new companies.  Also, at Stanford and Utah, many of the entrepreneurs were already living and 
working  in  the  region,  and  thus were  most  likely  to  start their  businesses  in  their  respective  regions 
regardless of the existence of a technology  park. 
The estimates of employment stimulated by the park, described above, do not  include firm and 
employment growth in the region brought about by the household income multiplier from the payroll for 
those 20,140 jobs in  the region  induced  by the  park {18,900  in  the park and  1,240 outside  the  park). 
Neither does it  include  the  employment  impact  from  park organizations  purchasing  inputs  from  local 
businesses.•  We estimate that the number of jobs generated in  the region due to  the household  income 
multiplier is about 25,500.  The number of jobs generated by the local purchases of all businesses in  the 
region  that would not be in  the region  except for the  park is estimated  to  be about  7,400.  The total 
number of jobs in  the region for which the Research Triangle Park is responsible,  i.e.,  would not be in 
the region if the park had not been created,  is estimated to  be about 52,000 in  1988.s  This represents 
4 Some portion of lhe high-techuology businesses aud employment included in ow estimate of that induced by the park by 
localizatiou  C<:Oaomies  may  have  located  In  the  region  u  supplied  of inputs  to puk oJganizations.  In  these  cases  this 
employmeut impact is doublc-couwed.  We believe, however, that it is small. 
s these catima&es were made by applying data from U.S. Department of Comme1ce, lltueau of Ecoaomic Analysis, regional 
input-output  tables  (RIMS  II).  for  North  Cuollna to lhe  information  obtained  from  the  park  organizations  and  sample  of 
out-of-puk high-leehJIOiogy  businesses.  The steps in the estima&iou of jobs generated by the regional iacome multipliu arc 
u  follows: 
& =number of jobs Inside the  pu~ •caused• by the puk (18.900) 
19 12.1  percent  of total  regional  employment  in  1988,  and  24.1  percent  of the  total  increase  in  non-
government employment since 1959 when the park was founded. 
Conclusions 
The  purpose  of this  paper was  to  identify  and  discuss  methodological  issues  that  arise  in an 
evaluation  of technology  P,afkS,  and  then,  to  illustrate  bow  they  have  been  dealt  with  in  one  such 
evaluation.  Even  more  than  other  programs,  technology  parks  present  a  challenge  for  researchers. 
Evaluators  must  define carefully what  they  are  measuring  due to  the  normative  nature  of the  outcome 
(success) variable.  Then, they must operational their outcome measure by devel~ping workable definitions 
for  key  variables.  In  particular,  they  must  develop  ways  to  measure  the  net  induced  effect  of the 
technology  park,  rather  than  the direct  gross effect  alone.  That requires  the construction  of a quasi-
experimental research design, using before and after measures, and a large sample partitioned into control 
and experimental observations.  It also may require the use of case studies with considerable primary data 
collection, to estimate the indirect effects on growth through induced start-ups and migration, and through 
the multiplier effect related to  input-output  linkages. 
This approach applied to  U.S.  technology  parks led  to  a series of definitive findings that can be 
summarized as follows:  Even though the three case study parks appear to  have been important  for their 
respective  regions,  technology  parks,  by  themselves,  are  not  necessarily  a  wise  investment  for  other 
regions.  The "success" rate among all parks that are announced is relatively low.  And, to the extent that 
I;  =number of jobs in the high-tech scaor outside the  park stimulated by the park (1240) 
L = average  annual salary of employees from El and E2 =$40,000 
~  = increment  to regional paytoll from El and E2, = (Ea  + EJ x L = $805.6 million 
P =estimate of local purchases (in S millions) by puk organizations  and out-of-park high  tech businesses •caused• by 
the park = $620.9 million (hom rcsponscs  to qucstioD.Daircs) 
p =percent of local purchases  paid to labor = 0.30 (hom regional input-output tables) 
<;  =- increment to regional paytoll hom local business purchases  = $186 million 
C  =- <; +<;(total increment  to regional paytoll) = $991.6 million 
F =-employment awltipller of households (hom regional  input-output table) x 0.9 leakage factor to rest-of-state) =  24.3 
jobs/$ millions of earnings  ' 
E, = total number of jobs aeated through  regional income multiplier = C  x F = 24,095. 
The estimation of the number  of jobs generated by local business  purchases  is:-
I; =  CJH where H is the  average  annual paytoU/cmploycc  in sectors providing inputs to park organizadons ($25,000 in 
North Carolina) =  7440. 
20 vintage matters, it is too late for regions contemplating parks to "get in on the ground floor."  Technology 
parks will be most  successful  in helping  to stimulate economic development  in regions that already are 
richly endowed with the resources that attract highly educated scientists and engineers.  That is not to say 
that regions with less rich endowments can not have a high technology  future,  but more basic and long-
term  investments  in  improving  public  and  higher  education,  environmental  quality,  and  residential 
opportunities will be needed first.  If a decision to create a technology  park is made, government leaders 
should be prepared to invest liberally, and aU  other stakeholders should be prepared to wait a number of 
years before the invesbnent  is returned. 
21 Figure 'i 
Geographic Distribution of  Research Parks 
* 
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*  *  • 
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 TABLE 1 
Research Park  ·success• Indica/an 
Ruc.uda Pad Cowaty  Coa&roiCowatics 
Name o{ Puk  a.,  State  Yt.  Eat  BcfOIC  Afl.cl  01Ff1  Bcf01c  Abu  DIFF2  OlfF 
Ada Rucalda Puk  Ada  OK  1960  -1.92t.  l.l3t;  3.25 ..  0.25t;  l.S1t.  3.27'11  -(102'11 
AAa  1\d)or Tcchaoloc Puk  ADa  Albol  M1  1983  -l.Qlt;  3.67t.  4.7K  -2.97t. .  3.23t.  6.19'11  -1.49'11 
ArizoAa  StUa.iv.  R.c.a.  Puk _  Tempe  A1.  1934  3.40'Jt  6.22t.  2.12t.  2.7615.  S.7St.  2.99'11  -o.l7'11 
Caroliu R.cscarda  Pad  Columbia  sc  1983  0.~  3.3lt.  2.4115.  0.98t.  3.S415o  2.S7'11  -(116'1, 
Ccat1aJ  florida llu. Pad  OdaDda  FL  1979  S.8815o  7.92t;  2.03t;  S.ll  ..  6.S9t.  1.31t;  0.72'11 
Clwlucoa ll.c.se&l'da  Pad  <lwlcacoca  sc  1984  2.l4t;  3.49t.  1.25 ..  unt.  3.47t;  2.4St;  -l.l()t; 
OUu&o Tcchaoloc P~  Oaicqo  u.  1984  -1.41t.  1.8611  3.26111  4.51"  6.l9t.  1.61"'  1.6S .. 
Ocauoo 'llesatda Pad:  Oc.msoo  sc  1984  ~.SSt.  1.S911  2.44"  1.61"  3.67t;  2.06"'  0.38"' 
Couccaicul TcduaoJoc Put  Slam  cr  1982  2.00t.  6.17t;  4.18t;  3.23 ..  4.2Jt;  1.00..  3.18"' 
ComdJ llesatda P.vk  llbac.a  NY  19Sl  -2.62"'  1.45'11  4.07t;  -2.39'11  -7.11011  -5."1"'  9.48 .. 
Oammia&a  Ruc.uda Puk  HUAtaviUc  AL  1962  2.71'11  7.40  ..  4.69'11  -o.ut.  3.-16  ...  4.29'11  0.40'11 
Eaaiaccdq Rucuch Ccotcl  FaycUcviUc  AR  1980  3.91'11  3.43"'  ~.48  ..  3.09'11  2.60'1.  -o..sot.  0.02'11 
Gtw VaJJcy  Corpot.J.tc  Ccotcl  M.alvua  PA  1974  2.73"'  3.95'11  1.21'11  -o.~  0.92'11  1.13'11  0.08 .. 
laaovalioa CcotCI ud llc:seuda P&d  Alhcru  OH  1978  1.06 ..  0.67"'  -o.39'11  1.67'11  ~-66'1.  -2.33'111  1.9-1'11 
laluaC&&c  Busiacss Put  TAmpa  FL  1983  4.68 ..  6.60t;  1.92'11  4.06'11  7.Q3t;  2.97"'  -1.05'11 
Jobaa Hopk.W  Bayview Rc.srdl  C£mpua  ll&ltim01c  MD  1984  1.81'11  4.08t;  2.27'11  1.44'11  4.35"'  2.91t;  ~.6-4'11 
l..aa&kJ  lleac&rda  cl Ocv.Pad  Newport  Ncwa  VA  1966  3.8-4'11  ~-~  -9.84t;  4.79'11  3.75'11  -1.0-1'11  -8.80t; 
Muylud Scicacc cl Tcch.Puk  Addphi  MD  1982  2.88t;  6.10'11  3.23t;  2.S2t.  4.31t;  1.7K  l.44t; 
td.usadauscUs  Biolcch. llcs. Puk  WOlCCSICI  )dA  1984  ~.9Jt;  4.06 ..  4.99 ..  1.25t;  2.76t;  1.S1t;  3.48t; 
Miami VaJJcy  Ruc.uda Pad  K.cucria&  OH  1981  l.S9t;  3.06'11  1.46'11  1.0-lt;  2.38t.  l.lS'II  O.Ut; 
M01pa&owu  ladus.ctllcs. Pad  M01pa&owu  wv  1973  3.69t;  4.44'11  0.1St;  2.~  2.71t;  O.Slt;  0.24t; 
Obio State Uaiv.Res.P.vk  Columbus  OH  198-4  0.02 ..  5.02'11  5.00'11  -1.66  ..  2.56'11  4.22'11  0.78 .. 
OrcJoa G1aduatc  Ccotct Scicacc Pule  Bc..avuwa  OR  1982  7.9-1'11  S.OJ ..  -2.91'11  2.13'11  3.54"'  1.42'11  -4.33'11 
Priacdoa foaesta.l  CcatCI  Priacdoa  NJ  1975  2.6-lt;  1.82'11  -o.82t.  2.21'11  4.90t;  2.69'11  -3.51"' 
Pulc&u.e  ladustrial  Rucuda p  Ilk  W.lalaJcUc  IN  1961  0.15'11  5.96'11  S.81t;  -o.06  ..  4.66'11  4.72 ..  1.09'11 
Rca.s.scbu Tcchaoloc Put  TtOJ  NY  1982  1.17"'  3.83'11  2.66t;  1.68 ..  2.12 ..  1.0..'11  1.62'11 
R.cscucll Triao&Jc  Put  R.T.P.  NC  19S8  -o.29'11  437  ..  4.66'11  1.98'11  2.1H.  0.21"'  4.4S" 
llicb1aad IDdustriaJ  Puk  Rich1aad  WA  1962  0.98"'  1.73<JD  0.15'11  0.73'11  4.85"'  4.12'11  -3.37'11 
RoswcU Tcse facilily  R.oswcU  NM  198.3  2.81'11  -1.09'JD  -3.89'11  O  .  .W'II  0.46'11  0.05'11  -3.9-4'11 
Shady Glove  Lite Scic:ACQ ua&u  Rockville  MD  1916  4.30'At  3.85'11  -o.44'JD  1.-10'11  l.S5~  0.15 ..  -Q.59'11 
StaACotd  Rcsurda P  Ilk  Palo  Al&o  CA  1951  8.09'11  8.37'11  0.28 ..  6.05~  2.~  -3.25'11  3.53'Jb 
SWLSCl  Rc.Jatch P  uk  Cotvallu  OR  1983  -Q.03"'  306%  3.09 ..  -3.06'11  2.33'11  5.39'11  -2.~ 
Swcarira&ca  llcsc.atch Put  N011Daa  OK  1950  -2.3)"'  7.37'JD  9.1~  0.21 ..  3.6J'JD  3.42'11  6.28'Jb 
Syauu llacuch Puk  Richucboa  TX  1982  6.2-4~  3.!19~  -2.35 ..  7.12 ..  0.5~'11  -6.S8'JD  4.23~ 
TCAIIC&ICC  Tcchooloc Comdof  1 couaUc&  TN  1982  3.59'11  2.35'11  -1.24'11  248'A.  4.61'11  2.13'11  -3.37% 
Tbe llc:acuch  F01esr  The  Woodl.aod.a  TX  198-4  11.16 ..  0.24'11  -10.K  3.~  ..  0.73 ..  -2.31~  13.22'11 
Uaiv.  Cc.atcl  R&D  Puk  Tampa  fL  1982  S.8l'Jb  660%  0.7Y-.  641 ..  4.~  ..  -1.76'A.  2.S.S" 
Uaiv. Ql)' Scicacc  U:otc~  PtU.l&dclpbi.a  PA  196.3  0.32'11  1.7ti'A.  1.46 ..  -0.12~  3.87 ..  3.98 ..  -2.52'11 
Ualv. o{ Calif.  - ltviAc  Pule  ltviAC  CA  1983  4.11'11  616'11  2.19 ..  2.11~  -4  17'11  2.06'11  0.13~ 
Uaiv. ol Ut&b  Rucuda Put  S.LC.  UT  1970  2.96"'  6.15'11  ).19'11  5.93~  S.45'11  -o.48'11  3.67t; 
Ualv. Pam (MI)  Ida  Plc:&sarat  M1  1982  3.38 ..  3.62'11  0.25'11  0.61 ..  ).47"'  2.86'11  -2.61 .. 
Uaivc.rady  Rsc.ucla Put (Nq  Owlouc  NC  1968  IU'It  3.96'11  -10.1  ..  8.97 ..  2.41'1t  -6.55t;  16.65 .. 
Uaiv. ltacMdl Patk (WI)  Madiaoa  WI  1984  O.S..t;  3.92'11  3.38 ..  ~.61  ..  2.43 ..  3.1K  0.28 .. 
Wulaia&toa St.UDiv.Rca..  A Tcda.PIIk  Nlrau  WA  1981  0.34"  2.07 ..  1.13 ..  3.81 ..  1.94 ..  -1.811(,  3.60111 
WCIIple/Wca&pllk  McLcu  VA  1982  1.46 ..  10.12  ..  8.6.5 ..  5.63 ..  6.13 ..  0.-4K  8.16t; 
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 TABLE 2: Ranking of  Parks by Success Indicators 
Paries  "Successful" Using MSR120 
Cornell Research Park 
Westgate/Westpark 
Swearingen Research Park 
Research Triangle Park 
Synergy Research Park 
University of Utah Research Park 
Washington St. Uoiv.  Research 4  Tecbn. Puk 
Stanford Research Park 
Massachusetts Biotechnology Research Park 
Connecticut Technology Park 
University Center R&D Park 
[novation Center and  Research Park 
Chicago Technology Park 
Rensselar Technology Park 
Maryland Science & Technology Park 
Purdue Industrial Research Park 
Paries  "Successful" Using MSRlOO 
Ohio State Univ. Research Park 
Central florida Research Park 
Cummings Research Park 
Oemson Research Park 
University Research Park (WI) 
Morgantown Industrial &  Research Park 
University of California - Irvine Park 
Miami Valley Research Park 
Great Valley Corporate C.enter 
Engineering  Research Center 
"Unsuccessful" Parks 
Ada Research Park 
Carolina Research Park 
Arizona State University Research Park 
Shady Grove life Sciences Center 
Johns Hopkins Bayview Research Campus 
InteiState Business Park 
Charleston Research Park 
Ann Arbor Technology Park 
Sunset Research Park 
University City Science Center 
University Park (MI) 
Richland Industrial Park 
Tennessee Technology Corridor 
Princeton Forrestal Center 
University Rsearch Park (NC) 
Roswell Test Facility 
Oregon Graduate Center Science Park 
The Research Forest 
Langley Research &  Development Park 
•  Denotes that park has fewer  than  100 employees. 
26 
9.48% 
. 8.16% 
6.27% 
4.45% 
4.23% 
3.66% 
3.60%  • 
3.53% 
3.48% 
3.17% 
2.55%  • 
1.94%  • 
1.66% 
1.62% 
1.44% 
1.09% 
0.77% 
0.72% 
0.40% 
0.39%  • 
0.28% 
0.23% 
0.12%  • 
0.12% 
0.09% 
0.02%  • 
--0.02% 
-0.15% 
-0.17% 
-0.59% 
-0.65% 
-1.05% 
-1.20% 
-1.49% 
-2.30% 
-2.53% 
-2.61% 
-3.37% 
-3.37% 
-3.51% 
-3.54% 
·-3.94% 
·-4.33% 
-8.60% 
-8.79% N
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 TABLE 4 
OLS Regression  Results 
variable 
constant 
ru1heast  regn dum 
nrthcntrVmidwst  dum 
south regn dum 
vintage squared 
MSA population 
deed restriction dum 
garbage collect dum 
government subs dum 
university  own dum 
Dependent variable: DIFF in Table 1 
Number of observations: 45 
R1 = 0.28; Adj.  R
1 = 0.10 
F-stat (9. 35) = 1.5008 
Significance of F-Tut •  0.185 
Significance level = 0.146 
Coefficient 
-0.0309 
0.0135 
0.0171 
0.0128 
2.87 E-5 
2.43 E-9 
4.88 E-3 
0.0221 
-0.0115 
0.0227 
TABLE 5 
Std Error 
(0.017) 
(0.019) 
(0.018) 
(0.016) 
(1.43 E-5) 
(3.95 E-9) 
(0.014) 
(0.013) 
(0.012) 
(0.012) 
Results from Logit Model 
Variable 
nrtheast regn dum 
nrthcntrVmidwst  dum 
south regn dum 
vintage squared 
MSA population 
deed restriction dum 
garbage collect dum 
government subs dum 
university own dum 
Coefficient 
-0.138 
2.477 
0.581 
3.750 E-4 
3.550 E-7 
-1.625 
3.000 
-1.736 
3.068 
Dependent variable: 0/1 bued on value of DIFF in Table 5 
Number of observations: 45 
Log-likelihood statistic= -19.813 
Rcstrided (Slopes=O) Log-liUlihood statistic =  -30.645 
Chi-squared (8) = 21.664 
Significance level :o::  0.006 
Percent succcssu predided c  76.1 
28 
Std Error 
(1.520) 
(1.537) 
(0.001) 
(1.20 E-3) 
(3.22 E-1) 
(1.137) 
(1.266) 
(1.067) 
(1.352) 
Sign  l.eyel 
0.067 
0.490 
0.358 
0.422 
0.050 
0.549 
0.730 
0.096 
0.350 
0.072 
Sign  l,eyel 
0.927 
0.107 
0.615 
0.755 
0.270 
0.153 
0.018 
0.104 
0.023 TABLE 6 
Park Characteristics,  by Size and Vintage 
0 Employees (n=17} 
&t. < 1982  Est. '82-84 
(n=5)  (n=4) 
failure in stage 1 
I  I 
Est.  '85-88 
(n=l) 
AVG. MSA POPUlATION  520,666  I  717,438  Lss3,34s  J 
%  IN METRO AREAS 
AVG. AREA GROWfH RATE 
% TYPE I,  ll RESRCH UNIV 
I  I  80%  t  75%  _t 
•  i  2.74% 
I 
4.80%  I 
t  I 
I  I  40% 
I 
25%  I 
1-99 Employees (n=28) 
Est.  < 1982 
(n=4) 
failure in 
stage 2 
Est.  '82-84 
(n=10) 
at risk in 
stage 2 
I  I 
88% 
4.83% 
50% 
Est.  '85-88 
(n=14) 
AVG. MSA POPUlATION  421,191  J  1,216,95~---L 1,574,793 
~----------------------r--- I  I 
%  IN METRO AREAS  75%  !  80%  t  71% 
~--------------------~--- I  ~--------·---------1 
~A  __  V_G_._AREA  ____  G  __  R_O_WT  __  H  __  RA  __  TE  __  ~  ___  4._69_~-~------•I---5_.1_8~-------t---4._08_~.-~-------
% TYPE I,  II  RESRCH UNIV  50%  I  50%  I  43% 
100 Employees or more (n=75) 
Est.  < 1982  Est.  '82 -84 
(n=29)  (n=26) 
I 
AVG. MSA POPUlATION  1,079,945 
I  1,616,724  I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Est.  '85-88 
(n=20) 
990,540  !  ---'---- I  I 
%  IN METRO AREAS  83% 
I  88% 
I  90%  I  I 
I  !  - I  I 
AVG. AREA GROWfH RATE  5.49% 
I 
5.55% 
I  5.7%  I  I 
!  J 
l  l 
% TYPE I,  ll RESRCH UNIV  62%  I  71%  I  70% 
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33 Mission impossible: evaluation of the impact of technology parks 
Douglas H McQueen 
Chalmers Innovation Center 
Chalmers University of Technology 
5-412 96 Goteborg 
Sweden  · 
"The  statistical method communicates an ideal  measure of 
an objective fact, but not a  picture .of its empirical reality. 
Agreed, it describes an impeccable aspect of reality, but at the 
same  time  it can falsify  the  actual  truth  to  the  point of 
misrepresentation.  The latter is especially true for  theories 
based on statistics.  True realities are characterized by their 
individuality;  bluntly put, one can say that the real picture 
depends, as it were, solely on exceptions to the rule, whence 
absolute  truth acquires its  primary characteristic of being 
irregular .... " 
Cited  from  Von  Traum  und  Selbsterkenntnis  -
Einsichten und Weisheiten by C G Jung (trans DMQ) 
Introductory remarks 
In the following some observations will be made on what are accepted examples 
of successful technology parks, by way of attempting to  identify in  what ways 
they are successful and what impacts they have had.  Some conjectures as to why 
they are successful are then ventured.  In the next part of the presentation some 
of these criteria will be applied to  the technology parks at Chalmers University of 
Technology in Goteborg, Sweden (ex post), and at the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Zurich, Switzerland (ex ante).  Finally, an attempt to  generalize 
the results will be made. 
Some successful technology parks 
What is a technology park, and what is a successful technology park?  For present 
purposes, let us adopt a  very broad definition of  technology  park, including 
science park, research park, engineering park, etc, but perhaps not business park. 
In the same spirit, let a park be anything from a piece of land with grass and trees 
to an asphalt jungle.  However, let us concentrate on technology parks which 
have some links with universities having faculties  of engineering and science. 
This idea of a technology park is not too different from the definition of a science 
park used by the United Kingdom Science Park Association: 
"The term Science Park is used to describe a property based initiative ~rhich: 
35 - has formal  and operational  links  with a  university or other higher 
educational institution or major center of research 
-is designed to  encourage the formation and growth of knowledge based 
businesses and other organisations  normally resident on site 
-has a management function which is actively engaged in the transfer of 
technology and business skills to the organisations on site." 
It is  probably  impossible  to  define  what might  be  meant  by  a  successful 
technology park in terms of its impact on its surroundings.  It is far easier to give 
some examples, chosen from among the several hundred technology parks in 
the world today  ..  The following discussion will be based on four examples. 
Example 1 is Silicon Valley near Stanford University in California.  It began with 
the invention of the transistor (at the leading edge of high technology) by Walter 
Brattain, William Shockley  and John  Bardeen.  It was  promoted  notably by 
professor Frederick Terman of  electrical  engineering at Stanford  University 
beginning in the 1950's.  Today Silicon Valley is concentrated on semiconductor 
technology, although there are other technologies represented there as well. 
Example 2 is Route 128 outside of Boston, Massachusetts.  One of the early firms 
to locate there was Digital Equipment, founded by Kenneth Olson, based on the 
idea that Digital Equipment could do what IBM did, with MIT's help, but better. 
Again,  this  was at the cutting edge of high  technology.  MIT  professor Jay 
Forrester, inventor of the magnetic core memory and Kenneth Olson's doctoral 
advisor, professor John von Neumann,  professor Vannevar Bush,  and others 
combined forces to build the first modern computers.  Today on Route 128 there 
are  firms  involved  in  computer  hardware,  in  instrument  development,  in 
computer software and in biotechnology, that is, a relatively wide spectrum of 
technologies. 
Example  3  is  Research  Triangle  Park  in North  Carolina  (Raleigh,  Durham, 
Chapel Hill).  This park was used to  attract modern businesses to  the state of 
North Carolina, thus providing employment for  those who lost their jobs in the 
dying North Carolina textile, tobacco and furniture industries.  A wide variety of 
companies, most of them with headquarters outside the state of North Carolina, 
now have premises in the vast acreage of the park.  There have been very few if 
any spin-off companies formed as  a result of the activities of Research Triangle 
Park. 
Example 4  is  the Cambridge Science  Park in Cambridge, England.  The first 
technology based firms on the Cambridge spin-off company scene are now over a 
hundred years old!  The Cavendish Laboratory has given birth to many 
a  successful company, and provided established companies with many more 
ideas (technology transfer).  Formally, the Cambridge Science Park was founded 
by Trinity College in 1971.  The senior bursar of Trinity College, John Bradfield, a 
zoologist in the Cavendish Laboratory, is  generally acknowledged as having been 
the driving force behind the park.  Trinity College has had a  scientific profile 
from the time of Newton, more Nobel Prize winners having lived and worked 
there than in many whole countries, such as France.  Again, the park is  located 
36 II 
li 
!i 
I/  adjacent  to  the  leading  edge  tn  science  and  technology  at  the  Cavendish 
i  Laboratory. 
I. 
ji  What do these four technology parks have in common?  Aside from the fact that 
1  they are all successful, practically nothing: 
1: 
- three are associated with outstanding univ.ersities (1, 2, 4) 
-three are associated with leading edge technologies (1, 2, 4) 
- one is fifty years older than the other three (  4) 
-two or three started spontaneously (1, 2, 4) 
- one is the result of a government initiative (3) 
-two now have organized legal forms (3, 4) 
-one has few university spin-off companies (3) 
-one is mainly concentrated on a single technology (1) 
- two have benefitted strongly from venture capital (1, 2) 
- one is dedicated to attracting "foreign" companies (3) 
- three have "do it yourself" attitudes (1, 2, 4). 
The impacts of these technology parks are also remarkably varied: 
- two have been the cradles of whole new industries (1, 2) 
- two or three have enhanced the reputations of their universities (1,  2, 4) 
-two have been associated with regional economic recovery (1, 3) 
-all four have changed regional employment mix by industry branch 
- three have planted and grown new companies (1, 2, 4) 
- three have significantly increased university-industry contact (1, 2, 4). 
What lessons are to  be learned from  all  this?  In each of the above cases  the 
development of the technology park and its  subsequent strong impact on its 
region was based on a particular strength or set of related strengths which gave 
that particular technology park a distinct and strong advantage over almost all if 
not  all  competition.  In  Cambridge it was  the  expertise  of the  Cavendish 
Laboratory exploited in the Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company and in W 
G  Pye  &  Co, in Santa Clara  county it was  Fairchild Semiconductor making 
immediate use of Nobel Prize winning science, and on Route 128 it was Digital 
Equipment cashing in on the combined computer expertise of MIT and IBM,  as 
well as venture capital.  In Research Triangle Park it was marketing a concept of 
an advantageous and attractive place to  establish businesses, with a supply of 
well-educated people in an  area offering a relatively high quality of life.  An 
evaluation of the impact of  a  technology park, at least on this level, should 
include a description of the identified relative strengths (even those identified in 
retrospect),  how  they  were  developed,  and  what  the  results  were.  Such 
evaluations must be different for  each case, which would be acceptable to C G 
Jung.  Further, done appropriately,  they could  take  the form  of constructive 
criticism. 
What are  the  most important impacts of  these  technology parks?  The most 
important indicator of success  is  almost always  perceived  to  be growth  in 
employment in connection with the technology park.  This can be more or less 
important to people in different roles, of course, and it is not always an original 
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attributed  to  the technology park, especially if  the new employment mix is in 
some way more advantageous than the original one. 
Other  things  which  give  a  technology  park an aura  of success  include  the 
accumulation of tlhigh tech" (whatever that is) businesses and capabilities.  This 
can be associated with increased semi-formal and formal  technology transfer 
between business and universities (in  both  directions!),  as  exemplified by the 
MIT  Industrial Liaison Program or its equivalents at Stanford University, for 
instance.  The intensity of technology transfer might be measured in terms of the 
nwnbers of patents applied for, obtained and licensed, or in the numbers of spin-
off companies founded or new units established in existing companies with the 
help of the technology park.  Better yet, it could be measured in employment in 
spin-off co1npanies and in new commercial units.  It could be measured in terms 
of  the  volume  of  industry  supported  research  and  development  in  the 
university, or  the  numbers  of students (undergraduate as  well  as  graduate) 
choosing to  work in companies associated with the technology park. 
The important thing about this sort of technology transfer impact is that it is bi-
directional when it works  correctly.  Certainly,  without Route  128  the  MIT 
Department of Electrical Engineering would not be half its present size.  Neither 
MIT nor Stanford University would enjoy their present outstanding reputations 
without their technology parks. 
An important impact of technology parks is on the political/  sociological level. 
A  technology park often serves as a  symbol of faith  in modern technology or 
entrepreneurship, a  rallying  point for  persons and organizations  devoted  to 
technology transfer and industrial renewal, or a  focal  point for  political and 
economic initiatives,  etc.  The potential of technology  parks in forming  and 
shaping  cultural  values  concerning  innovation  and  entrepreneurship,  etc, 
should not be  forgotten.  These impacts can be every bit as important as the 
creation of jobs or increases in industrially sponsored university research, but 
they are very difficult to assess.  Moreover, a technology park will be without this 
political/  sociological  impact  if it has  no  real,  measurable  impact  on  the 
community at large. 
It is by definition impossible for each and every technology park to be associated 
with  one  of  the  world's  top  universities  and  to  produce  the  world's  most 
successful companies in the world's most glamorous technologies.  Where does 
that leave 90%  of the contenders, then? There are other comparative advantages 
to be exploited, of course, as the example of Research Triangle Park proves.  Many 
universities and research laboratories have centers of excellence in one or more 
fields, with potential that can be exploited.  Many locations have commercial or 
geographic advantages that can help make a technology park successful.  It is not 
necessary to be the best in the world in order to be the best in one's own region. 
Perhaps the most important real function of a  technology park is  to catalyze 
bidirectional  technology  transfer  between  the  participants  in  the  park.  In 
chemical reactions catalysts are not used up; at most they are only blocked and 
modified slowly by the reactions.  Catalysts are normally added to  a  chemical 
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a little extra push in order to make the reaction proceed in a particular direction 
at a  particular rate, etc.  The impact of the catalyst is  measured in terms of 
increased yield, output, efficiency, etc, but not in terms of the amount of catalyst 
required.  The less catalyst the better! This applies also to the technology park as 
catalyst in technology transfer. 
The technology park should apply its resources where the possibility for success 
and  growth are  the  most promising, that is,  where something is  just "sub-
critical" or where "economies of scale" can be achieved relatively quickly with a 
small amount of catalytic activity.  This amounts to  about the same thing as 
identifying strengths and making use of them. 
A  technology  park  has  no  business  competing  with  already  established 
companies,  organizations  or the like in its activities.  The main raison  d 'etre of 
a  technology park is  to  catalyze processes  that do not yet exist,  are not yet 
sufficiently strong, or are not going in the desired direction.  Processes that are 
moving along nicely  should not be disturbed.  The strengths upon which a 
technology park is based should also be strengths relative to  other actors in the 
area of interest.  The impact of the technology park is in terms of making new 
and different  things happen. 
At Route 128 and in Santa Clara county there is no technology park building with 
tens or hundreds of technology park administrators carrying out important tasks 
for  the board of directors whose members spend most of their time gathering 
donations to pay for it all.  Here the required processes worked by themselves, 
with a little occasional help, such as inventing venture capital in Massachusetts, 
or making some land available near Stanford University.  Most of the reactions 
were of super-critical size and economies of scale were realized quickly, probably 
due  mostly  to  the  outstanding  abilities  of the  participants. ·  The  enormous 
impacts  of  these  technology  parks  are  the  results  of  building  on  relative 
strengths. 
The technology park at Chalmers University of Technology 
The  technology park associated with Chalmers University of Technology has 
roots going back to  1972  when Torkel Wallmark, then professor of solid state 
electronics, gave the first practical course in invention.  This course was soon 
complemented with a "theoretical" seminar course in the same subject area.  It 
was quickly realized that we needed to  know more about technical innovation 
and technology transfer, and a  research program evolved in parallel with our 
practical needs. 
We knew that Chalmers employees applied for patents, although since patents 
are the property of individual university employees they did not need to report 
them to the university.  Also, we knew that Chalmers employees founded spin-
off companies, for  instance Briiel &  Kjrer  A/5, Ingemanssons ·  IngenjorsbyrA  AB 
and Netzler &  Dahlgren Co AB.  We decided  to document these activities, and 
patent application surveys were made and a catalog of spin-off companies has 
been updated annually for more than ten years. 
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which is attended by graduate students, Chalmers employees and inventors from 
small  and  large  companies  in  Goteborg.  Together  with  the- University  of 
Goteborg a  course in establishing a new company was established an run for 
many years.  The main goal for students in this course is  to produce a business 
plan. 
Evaluation of the effect of our efforts on these fronts is difficult.  There are no 
comparable  patent  statistics  from  other  Swedish  universities.  Chalmers 
employees, including graduate students, now apply for  an average of about 
thirteen patents .a  year, of which about two thirds are commercialized in some 
way.  Compared to the total number of Chalmers employees, about 2100, this is 
not too much lower than the patenting rate at MIT, about 100 patents per year 
and  11  300  employees  (including  graduate  students).  Also  at  MIT  the 
commercialization rate is about two thirds.  On the other hand, at ETHZ also 
about 15 patents are applied for per year, but the university staff is about 5300 
persons, so the patent application rate at ETHZ is considerably lower than at the 
other  two  universities.  We  feel  that  the  efforts  of  the  Innovation  Center, 
through the patent course and advisory activity, have contributed to  the higher 
patent application rate at Chalmers University of Technology. 
At Chalmers about 12 spin-off companies are formed annually.  Here a narrow 
definition of spin-off company is  used.  For instance, according to this narrow 
definition only about eight spin-off companies are formed at MIT annually.  At 
ETHZ  about  four  or  five  spin-off  companies  are  formed  per  year.  The 
exceptionally high number of spin-off companies at Chalmers is probably due in 
part  to  the  dedicated  efforts  of  the  Innovation  Center  in  support  of 
entrepreneurship among students and faculty.  The general increase in spin-off 
company formation that can be  noted at many Swedish universities occurred 
five or so years earlier at Chalmers than at any other Swedish university, which 
is also an indication of the impact of Chalmers efforts. 
The impact of the Chalmers spin-off companies has only recently begun to  be 
significant in the Goteborg region.  While total employment in Chalmers spin-
offs  in  Goteborg  is  not  great,  about  1621  persons,  their  contribution  to 
employment in some important modern industry sectors  such as electronics, 
computer technology, scientific and medical instruments and biotechnology is 
significant.  More established industry in Goteborg tends  to  be in traditional 
industry sectors.  Thus the Chalmers spin-off companies contribute strongly to 
industrial  renewal in the region. 
During  the  eighties  the  number  of  inquiries  by  private  companies  and 
government  organizations  concerning  various  scientific  and  technological 
questions where Chalmers employees might be able to be of assistance increased 
steadily.  Also  the amount of research  and development supported by these 
organizations, almost always on a project basis, increased.  This was felt to be a 
desirable  development,  which  should  be  encouraged.  Already  in  the  late 
seventies a Product Development Center had been established, focussing mainly 
40 (4) 
on  small  and  medium  sized  companies.  It  was  felt  that  this. Product 
Development Center could be strengthened. 
Against this background it was "inevitable" that Chalmers Teknikpark would be 
established, in  1985.  It is a privately financed and built modem building with 
about 10 000 m2  of floor space.  At present Volvo, Bofors, Saab-Scania, SKF and 
the telephone company rent space, as well as Chalmers Industriteknik (CIT), the 
successor to the Product Development Center, the course and contact secretariat, 
the Institute for  electromagnetic field  theory, about 10  spin-off companies, a 
restaurant, the Chalmers faculty club, a travel bureau and a reception service.  To 
a great extent it builds on previous successes. 
It  is  hard  to  evaluate  the  effect  of Chalmers Teknikpark  on the  university. 
However, the amount of industrially and equivalently sponsored research and 
development at Chalmers has increased to about 11% of the total research budget, 
a  proportion  which  probably  would  not  have  been  reached  without CIT. 
Corresponding figures for MIT and ETHZ are 12% and 10%, respectively.  (These 
figures  do not correspond exactly to  the  universities' own figures because the 
latter are based on research expenditure figures that are not exactly comparable in 
the different universities.)  Thus in this aspect of technology transfer, Chalmers 
University of Technology and Chalmers Teknikpark have done a fairly good job. 
The people running Chalmers Teknikpark feel  that they have been successful 
enough to begin an expansion of the original buildings.  They feel that it will be 
possible to rent out the space to  companies that they would like for Chalmers 
University of Technology to have as  neighbors.  They would like to make more 
space available to Chalmers spin-off companies.  However, they must compete 
with other opportunities  for  Chalmers  spin-off  companies.  For  instance,  a 
separate Innovation Building or spin-off incubator was established In the middle 
eighties.  As it has only 600 m2  of floor space, only six companies can be housed 
there.  However, several spin-off companies have grown and left the Innovation 
Building for larger premises. 
Still, there is pressure to find more appropriate space for spin-off companies, and 
a center for spin-offs in an old factory building complex about three kilometers 
from Chalmers has been established.  This center is accumulating spin-offs at the 
rate  of  two  or  three  per  year.  Chalmers  Innovation  Center  supports  an 
immaterial infrastructure for  this center, which should be considered, at least in 
this context, as part of the Chalmers technology park.  Never has there been any 
significant difficulty in filling any available space in any of the buildings included 
in the Chalmers technology park.  This must be as good an indicator as any of 
success. 
Technopark Zurich 
The Technopark Zurich is still under construction (March  1992).  It is part of a 
large building in the  center of Zurich.  The production area of the building, 
about 28  000  m2  ,  does not belong  to  the Technopark Ziirich proper, which 
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divided into an innovation area, about 15 000  m2  ,  and a transfer area, about 7 
000  m2. 
The  production  area  of  the  building  is  intended  for  already  established 
companies that produce physical products or services, not necessarily high tech. 
For instance, in  May  1992  an electrotechnical  firm  will  move into  this  area. 
Another tenant will be an R &  D oriented company cooperating with an ETHZ 
group  adjacent  to  it.  The  presence  of  these  firms  will  help  to  provide  a 
commercial atmosphere and a connection to  the world of industrial production 
and commercial trading at the park. 
The  innovation  area  will  be  used  by  a  number  of  groups  from  the  ETHZ 
(Eidgenossische  Technische  Hochschule  Ziirich  =  Swiss  Federal  Institute  of 
Technology) and the University of Zurich, as well as small firms and new firms 
and entrepreneurs.  There  will  be  no production in this  part of Technopark 
Zurich.  Some research groups from the ETHZ which are involved in industrial 
cooperation and which  typically  receive  around  50%  of  their funding  from 
private sources will be located in  the  park.  Example areas  are  mechatronics, 
computer  supported  textile  machine  construction,  materials  science,  sensor 
technology and computer integrated manufacturing.  Some of the  activities of 
the  Institute  for  Biomedical  Technology  and  Medical  Informatics  from  the 
University of Zurich will probably also be moved there.  The BWI  (Foundation 
for  Research and Consulting of  the  Institute for  Management and Industrial 
Engineering of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich), which is 
concerned with industrial management, will move to  the park, as  will the AFIF 
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft fiir  industrielle Forschung der GFF  an der ETH  Ziirich), 
which is  a  privately supported organization for  technology  transfer at ETHZ 
presently located on the  ETHZ  campus  in Honggerberg. These  groups were 
chosen for their potential to spin-off commercially interesting product ideas and 
their ability to interact with commercial firms. 
As mentioned above, about 10%  of  ETHZ research expenditures are financed by 
industrial partners.  This is due to  many efforts  throughout the  university, of 
course, but the AFIF must be singled out in this respect.  It was founded already 
in 1936 in close connection with the Institut fiir Technische Physik.  Today there 
are about 22  full time equivalent AFIF employees whose job it is  to  carry out 
projects  initiated by industrial companies in cooperation with scientists  and 
engineers at ETHZ and similar institutions.  The "mother organization" of AFIF 
is GFF (Gesellschaft zur Forderung der Industrieorientierten Forschung an den 
schweizerischen Hochschulen und weiteren Institutionen), whose role it is  to 
support the  executive  arm AFIF,  for  example  through its  large  network  of 
contacts  and  through  its  patent management  service.  There  are  about  75 
members of GFF  at the  present time,  mostly private firms  and some  public 
organizations.  By bringing AFIF into Technopark Ziirich the Technopark will be 
able  to  build  on  proven  strength  and  expertise  in  university  /industry 
cooperation. 
The  remaining  15%  of  the  space,  which  is  between  the  production  and 
innovation areas, is designated the transfer area and will be used to provide an 
infrastructure supportive of innovation and entrepreneurship.  There are to be a 
reception,  telephone,  telefax  and postal  services,  office  machine  services,  a 
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the ETHZ main library, computer services, etc.  Also,  the administration and 
operation of Technopark Ziirich will be located in the transfer area.  Consulting 
and advisory services for small companies and entrepreneurs will be available. 
The Technopark Zurich is administrated and run by two organizations.  All real 
estate aspects of the project are handled by Technopark Immobilien AG (TIAG), 
while  technology  transfer  and  innovation  are  handled  by  the  Stiftung 
Technopark Ziirich, which is a Foundation.  Thus, success means different things 
to TIAG and to  the Foundation (Stiftung Technopark Zurich), which is exactly 
the reason why there are two organizations. 
The Foundation is  conceived as standing on tfttee legs of technology transfer in 
Technopark Zurich.  They are  a)  university-industry cooperation  in R  &  D 
projects,  b)  development  of  new  technology  oriented  enterprises,  and  c) 
continued  education courses and seminars.  These activities,  and synergies 
between them, are expected to make Technolpark Ziirich an especially attractive 
location.  In addition, a special advisory group will be available, the experienced 
members of which  can  take positions on the boards of directors  of the new 
enterprises at little or no cost. 
There will probably not be  too  large problems with renting out the available 
space in the Technopark Ziirich within a  reasonable time, even though rentals 
are at market rates.  The main reason for this prediction is that this particular 
space is rather attractive, due to the presence of university research teams and an 
otherwise high profile, still at reasonable rents.  On the other hand, while success 
in rentals is a  prerequisite for  the success of this technology park, as of other 
technology parks, it is  not a  particularly good indicator of technology transfer 
impact. 
It will be difficult to determine whether the Foundation is successful or not as a 
promoter of technology  transfer and catalyzer of innovation.  It clearly has a 
difficult job.  The stated goals of the Foundation are: 
- optimization of  technology  transfer  through cooperation between pro-
ducers of science and users of science under the same roof,  thereby 
shortening the time to  market 
- provision of a  visible, competent, transregional consultation center for 
questions  concerning  technology  transfer  and  the  utilization  of 
research in the interest of all of Switzerland 
- improvement of the success rate  of new companies through careful and 
competent consultation as well as provision of easier access to venture 
capital through increased confidence in the new firms 
- encouragement of multidisciplinary approaches to  applied research and 
development projects. 
It is probably possible to improve the rate and intensity of technology transfer 
between the two Zurich universities and associated organizations and industry 
and commerce, although just how this will be measured and documented is not 
clear.  How can the time to market for new technology in Technopark Ziirich be 
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difficulty, and only after five  or ten years have passed, so that several examples 
can be analyzed.  This is a difficult point. 
()bviously,  it  is  possible  to  provide  a  visible,  competent,  transregional 
consultation center almost from the very beginning, but this is hardly an impact 
of the park.  Rather, it is a structural aspect.  In a longer perspective,  it is hoped 
that  Technopark  Zurich  will  have  an  important  positive  impact  on  the 
innovation and entrepreneurship culture  of  the  region and on  the  spirit of 
cooperation between innovative groups and companies. 
We already know that university spin-off success rates are astonishingly high 
compared to small company success rates in general.  Probably this is due to high 
levels of education on the parts of the spin-off company founders as  well  as 
relatively well-defined business ideas, usually based on technical advances.  This 
is· exactly the profile sought for by Technopark Ziirich, so the new companies to 
be found there will undoubtedly have high success rates.  Scanty evidence on 
ETHZ spin-off companies indicates that total employment in those companies is 
increasing at about 15% per year.  Here the chances for the Foundation to succeed 
are quite good. 
Every  large  industrial  company  must ·be  aole  to  organize  multidisciplinary 
approaches  to  applied  R  &  D  projects  competently.  On  the  other  hand, 
universities have great problems at this level of organization.  Here Technopark 
Ziirich has an important function to  perform.  It should also be relatively easy to 
document such projects and the actual role played in them by the park.  Their 
impact on industrial companies can potentially be large. 
What comparative advantages and strengths does Technopark Ziirich build on? 
One of the most important is close connections to one of the premier technically 
oriented universities in Europe, the ETHZ, as well as to the University of Zurich. 
These institutions are  expected  to  provide significant scientific and technical 
input to Technopark Zurich,  especially  through  the  research  groups located 
there.  It can be  hoped  that  the  two  universities  will  in  turn benefit from 
Technopark Zurich. 
In the region of Ziirich with surroundings there are many industrial firms  of 
various sizes in different modem industrial sectors such as telecommunications, 
electronics and scientific instruments.  These firms represent a large potential of 
interaction  with  Technopark  Zurich.  It  might  be  of  interest  to  establish 
industrial liaison activities with them, such as those at MIT, Stanford University 
and Chalmers, for instance, to better tap this potential. 
The spin-off companies  from  the  ETHZ,  as  well  as  other small,  technically 
oriented  companies,  represent  a  potential  on  which  industrial  growth  and 
renewal might be built.  Also,  the documented patent activity at ETHZ can be 
developed further and utilized to advantage. 
Concluding remarks 
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employment.  However, only a very  few  technology parks can make a claim to 
have  significantly contributed  to  general  employment in  a  region.  Rather, 
usually it is  in the type  of employment that is  generated  that the  value lies. 
More "metal bashing" is  usually not a useful contribution, but industrial  renewai 
in the form of diversified  modern  technology and industry is  of the essence. 
This  is  borne out by  statistics  from  the  states. of Massachusetts  and North 
Carolina as well as the Goteborg region in Sweden, for instance.  This does not 
mean  that  a  technology  park  should  concentrate  on  specific  technologies? 
however.  Rather, it should seek to support any and all projects with a perceived 
technological  ad  vantage,  allowing  competent  company  managements  and 
market mechanisms to  determine the direction of development. 
An important impact of a  technology park is  on the associated university or 
other source of new technology.  Highly successful technology parks tend to 
augment the reputations of the associated universities and increase the dynamic 
nature of the activities persued there.  Technology transfer to a university is JUSt 
as  important  as  technology  transfer  from  it.  Often this  takes  the form  of 
industrial  support of  university  research,  which  appears  to  be  an  effective 
method  of  technology  transfer  in  both  directions.  Fears  that  industrial 
companies might significantly interfere with "freedom of research" are generally 
not  well  founded  in  practical  experience_.  but some  care  must  be  taken  u:. 
formulating university I industry cooperation contracts. 
An important role  for  a  technology  park  to  fulfill  is  that of coordinator for 
multidisciplinary projects.  Universities tend not to do this well by themselves. 
On the other hand, there are good examples of where this has been successful at 
Chalmers University of Technology.  Such project coordination is an explicit 
goal of Technopark Zurich. 
At  the  Chalmers  Innovation  Center  documentation  and  evaluation  of 
technology transfer activities are treated as research subjects.  The evaluations 
have not been carried out to satisfy some funding agency or government office, 
but rather to better understand what is going on and therefore to better be able to 
support and augment the process.  Good documentation and evaluation includes 
constructive feedback  to  all  the  people involved.  In this sense the Chalmers 
Innovation Center has  been in  the  communication business for  many years. 
Some other technology parks carry out similar work, but they are relatively few 
in number. 
Finally, it must be obvious  that the developments of the technology park at 
Chalmers  University of Technology and Technopark Ziirich are different.  It 
appears not to have been possible to start up a technology park by slow stages in 
Zurich, and the total rentable floor space of all  the technology park components 
in Goteborg probably does not amount to 22 000 m2  even today.  The roads taken 
reflect local boundary conditions and cultural differences which are very difficult 
to  assess.  It follows  that evaluation of these technology parks must be made 
against the local background and according to local values.  There is no formula 
for success. 
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47 Introduction 
I should like to share with you the principal results of  an evaluation of the French 
techno  pole phenomenon that was first conducted in 1989 and is currently being 
updated. 
In 1989, I personally requested that the French DATAR Regional Development 
Agency undertake a study of the twenty-odd Sciencetrechnology Parks or 
"Technopoles" in France. Until that time, DATAR had concentrated its efforts on 
promoting the Sophia Antipolis Park, near Nice. This park has been officially 
declared of  national interest and is supported by central government funds. 
During the 1980's h9wever, other cities such as Montpellier, Nancy and Rennes 
also set up technopoles. These technopoles all share one characteristic: they were 
all born of local initiatives, without assistance from the central government. 
Indeed, the State, then as now, lacked a national policy on technopoles. The State 
tended to view such efforts with suspicion or bemusement. Given such a context, 
my request did indeed turn more than a few heads. It was all the more surprising 
since I suggested that rather than paying heed to the arguments of  those 
promoting techno  poles, what was needed was an analysis of  what was hidden 
behind the promotion campaigns, in order to gain "one" view of  the nature of  the 
phenomenon. 
My work was based on the following hypotheses: 
-the twenty technopoles* covered by this study were selected in an effort 
to assemble examples of the different programs developed in differing 
contexts and according to diverse strategies. These programs presented, 
or at least claimed to present, original features. 
-Paris and the Greater Paris Ile-de-France region were excluded from this 
study although 60% of French state-funded research is concentrated in 
this region. This was a deliberate choice on my part, for what particularly 
interested me about the technopole movement was its autonomous nature 
and the fact that it was born of local initiatives. In Paris and the 
surrounding region, by contrast, development is wholly dependent on 
central government policies.  Despite a high concentration of  industry and 
research facilities, technology transfers and high-tech start-up companies 
remain a rarity in this region. It was therefore not a good example of 
technology park cross-pollination. 
-Finally, I undertook this study with no preconceived notions as to what 
constituted a model "technopole" or what such entities should be called. 
You may be aware that there is a certain debate as to the gender of  the 
word techno  pole in French. If  one considers a techno  pole to be a "pole" for 
technologies, then the word in French must be masculine, while if  one 
considers it to be a technological "metropolis" it is feminine. I decided it 
would be best to adopt local usage for each specific case. 
(*)Sophia Antipolis, ZIRST de Meylan, Nancy-Brabois, Rennes Atalante, Technopole de 
Toulouse, Lyon Technopolys, Montpellier-LR- Technopole, Illkirch-Strasbourg, Villeneuve 
d'Ascq, Le Creusot- Monceau, Saint-Etienne, Orleans Innovespace, Metz 2000, Marseille 
Chateau-Gombert, Nantes Atlanpole, Angers technopole, Bordeaux Technopolis, Compiegne, Le 
technopole de haute Alsace, Futuroscope de Poi tiers. 
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1 -The first stage consisted of  studying the establishment of each 
technopole in its own unique context. To do this, I chose to present the 
different strategies of institutions and individuals as I was later able to 
define them. I was particularly interested in examining the strategies 
adopted by local authorities, sometimes successfully, to encourage 
meetings and cooperation between companies, researchers and 
universities- with or without the support of  the State institutions locally 
present. 
I felt that the start-up period was of particular interest in that these 
programs aimed to set into motion forces that were previously non-
existent. 
2-Secondly, in 1989, I wanted to take a snap-shot of  the results obtained 
so far by the technopoles at a local level. This involved trying to isolate 
the results of  efforts carried out by the techno  pole, separate from all other 
data concerning trends in the local economy. More specifically, it 
required identifying the nature of  activities of  the technological park or 
parks, the number of new company start-ups, promotion and coordination 
policies and the rate of technological transfer (where such data were 
measurable), etc. 
3 -Thirdly, I hoped to analyze these results and the strategies of 
individuals or institutions within an economic and industrial context at a 
local, regional and national level. Since these programs aim to have an 
impact on local technological and industrial activity, it is particularly 
interesting to compare their approach to questions of  infrastructure to 
that of  other institutions, departments, regions, the State, particularly as 
concerns the area of  technological innovation. 
In summary, this study consisted of three main methodological axes : 
the start-up dimension, the local impact dimension and the infrastructure 
dimension with special attention paid to the strategies of participants or 
institutions. 
This choice was not arbitrary. It reflects two influences: 
-The first influence I must confess to is that ofF. Braudel and more 
generally what is known in France as "l'Ecole des Annales" or the 
Annales Journal School. These historians have developed an approach to 
studying the history of the creation of western capitalism based on an 
analysis of  phenomena according to their duration, long-term impact and 
setting within an economic and political context. They also studied the 
interrelation between economic micro-structures and macro-structures, 
and between the private and public sectors. The works to which I refer lie 
on the frontier between History and Economics. I did not hope thereby to 
develop a method for analyzing the contemporary phenomenon of 
technopoles, but simply to bear in mind the complexity ofthecreation of 
our economies and economic spaces, to better address the more limited 
question of  the creation of~ew  local technopole policies as concerns 
matters of  technology, science and space. 
50 -The second influence reflects the interest I hold, as a university 
researcher, for the analysis of participant strategies. For ten years now I 
have been giving deep thought to theories of  action and communication 
within an economic and political framework in an attempt to shed some 
light on the notion of  institutional strategies. It was therefore only 
normal that I maintain this angle of attack. 
Field research consisted of  interviews with leading technopole officials 
(organizers, researchers, corporate heads, local authority technic_ians etc.) I 
avoided the promotional speeches ofpoliticalleaders or public 
relations/communications staff. Such speeches are well known, having been 
widely published in the press or in technopole promotional brochures. 
This study, completed as I mentioned in 1989, led to a report published by 
the "Documentation Francaise" under the title ''Vingt  Technopoles: un premier 
bilan" ("Twenty Technopoles: a preliminary assessment"). This contained two 
main sections, the first, briefly presenting each of  the twenty technopoles; the 
second, developing the start-up, economic impact and spatial questions previously 
mentioned. 
1 -The French Experience 
The second part of  the report contained several chapters which set out to answer 
the questions which we are asking ourselves today concerning the French 
experience with techno  poles. 
1.1-Approaches for technopole set-up 
a) We found that there were two approaches. The "pole" approach and the 
"metropolis" approach. 
The "pole" approach is used in technopole programs based on the scientific 
or technological park. Two early examples in France are Sophia Antipolis 
and the ZIRST de Meylan near Grenoble. These two operations are of 
similar type though their size and underlying logic are quite different. In 
both cases, it is a matter of  filling a park designed to accommodate high-
tech firms, research laboratories and higher-education establishments. 
They differ in that Sophia is a project of  declared national interest and 
covers several hundred hectares, while the ZIRST de Meylan occupies just 
60 hectares and receives no central government funding. 
This technopole model is based on developing a park of  technological 
activities in which it  is hoped that the close proximity of  companies, 
research centers and universities will promote the dynamics of 
endogenous growth, in which cross- pollination will play an important 
part. 
b) The second "metropolis" model is that of  the city as technopole. 
Certain cities, for example Montpellier and Lyon, have declared 
themselves to be technopole cities since their agglomerations offer the 
basic ingredients required for technopole projects, namely research 
facilities, firms, and universities. 
These Technopole cities link their promotion to that of their technopolitan 
resources. At a later stage, they foster poles of  activity by promoting, near 
existing research facilities or universities, the creation of  technological 
parks likely to attract firms with expertise in the facility's field.  For 
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university; a mechanical engineering park, next to mechanics research 
center, etc. 
c) Programs exist which lie somewhere between these two "models". Some 
are not content to merely develop the technopole park, but rather seek to 
incorporate it into the town by treating the activity area as a "quartier" or 
town borough. At Nancy Bra  bois and Rennes Atalante, it is no longer a 
question of  simply preparing a technological park, but of  applying a more 
global approach to an entire zone comprised of housing, industry and 
parks. Other programs try to cluster several technopole sites or boroughs 
throughout a metropolitan area. 
Taking these two models as starting points, numerous variations are 
possible. Some concentrate on site planning, hoping then to fill their park with 
prestigious company names, and pay relatively little attention to interaction and 
cross-pollination. Other programs, however, emphasize promotion and 
communication, striving to attract foreign investors by vaunting the city's 
modernity, research laboratories and high-tech companies. 
Whatever the model, one characteristic that is unique to French 
technopoles is that the city, or more generally the metropolitan region, has 
become the spatial dimension of  reference for most programs. Be it the city 
borough-as-pole or the multi-pole approach, some technopoles are trying to 
impregnate the entire metropolis with the technopole concept.  By declaring an 
entire metropolis as a Technopole, continued innovations become art eiement of 
city policy, since they showcase the city's vitality and modernity. 
Although the various programs vary greatly and have not all met with 
equal success, new structures, new approaches to park infrastructure planning as 
well as technology transfers at the local level have become apparent in France. 
1.2 Principal institutional characteristics 
a) As concerns the strategies of  public institutions, all programs, Sophia 
Antipolis excepted, were born of  local initiatives in which the local 
authorities were the driving force.  France is marked by the complete 
absence oftechnopole programs resulting from the initiative of  either 
large private companies or banks. 
Often, local authorities fonn a mixed syndicate, since this allows them to 
work in association with support organizations (Chambers of  Commerce, 
etc.) or employer groups interested either in participating in the 
promotion of  the economic area or in the preparation of  a zone for pilot 
projects. 
Where other forms of  intercommunity association exist, for example 
districts or urban communities, these structures manage the techno  pole 
program. 
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as well as larger companies were usually placed, particularly in the 
1960's, outside the city centers in the surrounding communities offering 
sufficient land reserves. This explains why today attempts to harness 
technical resources require intercommunity programs. 
fn rnost cases setni -public companies (Societes d'Economie Mixte- S.E.M.) 
.are set up. These are limited liability companies in which the local 
authorities hold at least 51 o/o of  capital. The S.E.M.s plan and prepare 
infrastructure for the parks or techno  pole boroughs and, more rarely, are 
also responsible for program promotion. 
Sometimes, instead ofS.E.M.s, associations are formed. When this is the 
case they tend to principally be involved in coordination within the parks 
or within the metropolis. 
2- Analysis of"technopolitan" poles: what does one find in these parks? 
One notably finds : 
- A small coordination staff- 3 to 5 people- who try to create a certain 
goodwill between park occupants, while sharing park promotion with the 
S.E.M. Budgets are usually modest: 2 to 5 million FF. 
- Start-up company nurseries. These are commercial buildings which are 
m~de  available to start-· up companies at rents significantly below market 
pnces. 
--Small- and medium-sized high-tech companies but with few industrial 
firms. Services are well represented. 
-- A few large companies or rather establishments for those large 
companies, often little more than commercial representatives- in this 
case the mere presence of their name is considered to be an asset. It is 
enough for Hewlett-Packard, Bull, or France Telecom to be present in a 
park for it  to be classified as high-tech. 
In France, the best way of  selecting companies for a park remains a 
subject of  debate. Some argue that only high-tech firms should be 
admitted, while others favor an even greater restriction on companies, 
limiting participants to a theme field (computer science, electronics, 
biomedicine etc.). Still others assert that parks, to the contrary, should be 
opened to a wider array of  activities. 
Our experience has shown that  overly restrictive choices tend to make it 
harder to find park tenants in sufficient numbers. 
-One may also find government research facilities and universities which 
were already present before the technopolitan park or parks were 
planned. 
-Finally, central government industrial and research offices slowly but 
surely set up representation or move activities to the parks. 
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1) In the beginning, technopole projects were supposed to bring 
researchers, universities and companies together in order to favor 
cooperation, transfers of  technology, start-up companies, etc. 
Unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that results have been 
disappointing. The teams from the Universities of  Grenoble and Nice that 
studied the ZIRST and Sophia parks  respectiv~ly discovered little synergy 
within the parks. This tends to prove that physical proximity alone is not 
sufficient to ensure cooperation. This remark applies to all the different 
programs: institutions remain compartmentalized. 
2) Companies operating in labor pools outside the parks tend to view these 
programs as 1i ttle more than urban planning, real estate promotion or 
simple local authority publicity campaigns  .. They feel little or no 
inclination to participate. 
3) Projects which attempt to create networks between the technopolitan 
resources already present in an urban area fail to take the leading role 
away from the local representatives of  the central or regional authorities-
the centers for technological transfers, cells for the practical application of 
state-conducted research, the French ANV  AR agency for applied science, 
etc. 
4) Promoters oftechnopole schemes often assume that simply preparing 
park infrastructure will lead automatically to development. Experience 
has shown this to be incorrect, and that it is better to first reflect upon the 
conditions determining local economic development, and only then to 
consider specific park projects. 
5) High-tech firms tend to develop in their own isolated world, with no 
links with the other companies which constitute the major strands of  the 
industrial fabric of the urban area where the technopole is situated. The 
technological parks therefore tend not to spread their influence to the 
area's other industries. 
It may seem that these conclusions are harsh. It should be born in mind 
however that the high expectations for techno  poles were largely the result 
of  their own self-imposed ambitions. Nevertheless, in France the 
technopole phenomenon is not without merit in that it opens new horizons 
in the areas of  economics, technology and urban planning. 
4. Promising developments 
In a certain way, it  can be said that the enthusiasm in France for 
technopole projects, according to the models that have just been presented, is 
running out of  steam. Indeed, where promotion efforts have failed to attract 
companies or lead to the creation of new ones and where they have done nothing 
to modernize the industrial fabric, they rapidly lose their credibility and tend to 
weaken automatically. 
Nevertheless, these efforts are a rich source of experience and if  they 
receive proper attention from those who would promote local development as well 
as from government, they could prove to be of  great importance for the future. 
The following questions provide food for thought: 
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one and can one act at the local level to encourage local technological 
development? What policies, methods and skills will be required? 
A corollary exists: is the market capable of  generating its own 
technological evolution, or does it require the State or, at the local level, 
the local authorities, to intervene to favour conditions for transfers of 
expertise and technology until such time as the market is ready to take 
over this task ? 
The French technopole experience has included local technological 
development initiatives. Although these effortS have been limited to park 
planning and infrastructure or promotion campaigns, it would seem that 
the local technological and industrial environment finds it  difficult to 
independently establish the contacts necessary for its own enrichment. 
b) If  physical proximity is not a prerequisite for cross- pollination, then 
how can cooperation between universities, research centers and industry 
be fostered in a given geographical area? 
Indeed, it has become apparent that even within the parks institutions 
remain compartmentalized. This contrasts with the needs of  companies, 
be they big or small, for new technologies, technological know-how and 
information. How can supply be tailored to meet demand in a limited 
geographical area? Should not these areas try to base their structure on 
improving supply? 
c) Experience has shown that the zoning encouraged by technological 
parks within the economic and urban framework of metropolitan areas 
tends to create "cathedrals in the wilderness". Is this politically 
acceptable? If  not, how can high-tech development zones be better 
integrated into the local economic geography? Would not one solution be 
to deliberately impregnate the existing economic and social fabric with a 
culture of technology? 
d) The economic activities attracted by technopoles in France are 
generally service oriented. These activities require establishment close to 
urban centers. What are the likely consequences of this redefinition of 
urban functions and how will cities be affected by the economy's attempts 
to retake the cities? 
As for zoning, futuristic urban planning projects such as Nantes-
Atlanpole are attempting to reinvent the French city based on a new 
conception of  space. Is this a sign of  rediscovered inventiveness in urban 
planning policy? 
e) As is widely known, France remains a highly centralized country. Both 
universities and public research centers remain under the control of 
central government, this despite decentralization laws. The same can be 
said of the decision- making centers of  large companies, companies whose 
headquarters remain for the most part located in the Paris region. 
Technopoles represent initial, somewhat hesitant attempts to create local 
structures likely to encourage the transfer of  technologies and to 
contribute to industrial adaptation. Should the development of  such 
policies be encouraged? These policies incorporate elements of  R&D, 
economic and urban planning, etc., in an effort to give rise to, at the local 
level, projects and comprehensive strategies better adapted to the local 
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France central government intervention remains highly vertical with 
little regard for horizontal economic rationalization. 
f) Finally, these programs often neglect the needs of companies. Unlike 
the firms attracted to the parks, most companies require the elaboration 
of  a basic environment that would increase their competitive advantages. 
The list of needs is long: a highly- trained workforce, high-quality support 
services, easy access to technological resources, a sui  table financial 
culture, etc. These needs are not at present met by technopoles. Perhaps 
technopoles should be viewed simply as embryonic, city-specific, local 
R&D policies to which other dimensions should be added. 
At this study's completion, I was disappointed, apart from a few 
exceptions, at what I had actually found in the field. Nevertheless, I was 
extremely interested in those rare attempts to reinvent the city and 
economic geographies in such a way as to favour environments marked by 
cooperation between researchers, academics and private enterprise. That 
is why I wished to take part in the evaluation conducted in 1991-1992 by 
Datar and the France Technopole association, aimed at assessing the 
initial effects oftechnopoles on regional development. The study 
addressed three issues: the interrelationship between technopoles and 
regions,  the issue of  endogenous growth and the place of techno  poles 
within European networks. The president of France Technopole invited 
me to study the endogenous growth question. 
5. A new approach to evaluation 
How can one evaluate an emerging phenomenon which is at present more 
a source of  unanswered questions than of concrete results? For success, at 
present, remains limited and relative. How is it possible to effectively 
evaluate the endogenous growth of French technopoles? 
Following a reflection on the evaluation and planning of  public policy, I 
both independently and with the collaboration of  other experts, proposed 
an original method of  evaluation. 
Given the context of  innovation, participants and experts would . 
interactively define evaluation criteria. The goal was not to 
authoritatively impose criteria, but rather to ensure the participants' 
acceptance of  a method which they themselves had helped to conceive and 
which could then serve as a tool for self- evaluation. 
This study began with the designing of  a questionnaire by the directors of 
some 5 or 6 technopoles and the designated expert, namely myself. This 
questionnaire was subsequently sent to all French technopoles. It 
included the following questions : 
First Question : 
Please list the various local and regional networks (universities-
companies, between companies, others) which seem to you to be 
representative of  the ethos oftechnopoles and which you feel reflect a will 
to establish horizontal relationships rather than the traditional vertical 
or hierarchical ones. List these networks in terms of  structure, durability 
and effectiveness. 
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Please indicate which of these networks are, on the one hand, the direct or 
indirect fruit of the setting-up of  your technopole and, on the other hand, 
those for which your techno  pole is simply an additional resource for 
existing networks. 
Second question: 
What contribution, in the form of  new structures and synergy- enhancing 
means, has your technopole made to the identification, exploitation and 
dissemination of  know-how? 
Third question: 
In what way·have those involved (elected officials, corporate heads, civil 
servants, academics) acted as catalysts? 
Do you feel that these catalysts have brought in their wake "new 
occupations" which build on interfacing and engineering? If  so, attempt 
to define these "new occupations" using examples drawn from your 
technopole. 
Fourth question : 
Does your technopole take advantage of  intra-regional cooperation tools? 
Which ones? Describe them briefly. Do they contribute to the 
development of  inter-regional solidarity? In what way? Describe. 
Fifth question : 
In what ways do you feel that  your techno  pole has benefited the 
development of  your regional economic fabric (employment (type, 
quality), technology transfers, creation of  new enterprises, 
establishments, etc.)? 
Do you feel that  your technopole, thanks to its catalytic effect at the local 
level~ has improved national economic perfonnance? 
We have received replies to this questionnaire from some 15 technopoles. 
Based on their responses, we have undertaken a more detailed study of 
technopolitan innovations in terms of  actions or methods which favour 
endogenous growth. Examples include the network of  start-up nurseries 
coordinated by Promotech at Nancy Brabois and the laser pole at Nantes 
Atlanpole. Later, criteria will be defined, again in collaboration with the 
technopoles, which will allow us to evaluate the effectiveness of their 
interventions in fostering endogenous growth. 
This objective test is based both on pedagogy and evaluation andis both 
feared and welcomed. While some technopoles questioned shared with us 
their difficulty in answering these types of questions, others are 
impatiently waiting for the results, to better position themselves at the 
local level. 
The results of this study will be made available during the next meeting 
of  the French Technopole association, during the month of  May in 
Grenoble. 
57 Conclusion 
Technopoles are a relatively recent phenomena in France. They are 
waiting for their second wind and their present attempts at recovery are 
an indication of their fragility. The phenomenon nevertheless reflects the 
initial glimmers of awareness of the decisive role that local authorities 
and cities can play in the creation of  an environment favorable to 
cooperation between researchers and industry. What began as a simple 
spatial question -parks-, has led to a problem of  quite a different nature, 
that  of  local policies which use an infonnal space, the techno  pole, as a 
starting point in an effort to decompartmentalize institutions, to assemble 
the diverse ingredients, to act as the driving force for technical and 
industrial change and thus finnly anchor the notion of  modernity in the 
economic history of  the locality. 
A true evaluation of this innovative phenomenon requires one to walk in 
step with it, to understand the thinking of  its pioneers and to jointly 
define its points of  reference. 
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1. Tecnopolis CSATA Novus Ortus: general information 
Tecnopolis  CSATA  Nevus  Ortus,  in  short  "TCNO",  is  the  name  given  to  the  first 
technopolis established in Italy. 
It is operational since December 1984, in the area of Valenzano, a 16000 inhabitants 
town ten kilometres far from Bari, on the Adriatic sea, in the south-east of Italy. 
To  promote  the  development  of knowledge  intensive  industrial  activities,  TCNO 
makes "temporary" working areas available to newly located industrial initiatives, so 
that they receive immediate support from specialised services, access to both a well 
equipped  environment  and  various  technological  services,  thus  enhancing  their 
capabilities to reach the level of commercial production in short time. 
After the starting phase, which takes from three to five years, industrial initiatives are 
directed to  relocate from  the  Tecnopolis  site  to  other sites  (industrial  or services 
areas, etc.), i.e. to sites more suitable to their new productive needs, but still related 
61 with  Tecnopolis.  That's  how  conditions  arise  for  the  establishment  of  a 
"technopolitan district",  as the social and technical system networks and surfaces 
from the Park. 
Firms that want to locate knowledge-intensive activities at TCNO must come into co-
operative agreements with it, to receive the advantage of the existing infrastructure. 
TCNO and co-operating firms contract their own activities in the market,  and TCNO 
also uses the existing infrastructure to attain its strategic goals. 
It should be noted that TCNO does not supply any property based service. 
The  physical  infrastructure  (buildings  and  advanced  equipment)  is  co-funded  by 
State and CEC,  and remain  under public  ownership,  but TCNO  is responsible for 
managing and  operating the physical infrastructure, and  assumes  the operational 
risk and maintenance costs. 
TCNO is a no profit Consortium of Universities, Banks and Firms. 
In what follows TCNO experience is summarised either in assessing its own Science 
Park concept, or in recalling some relevant data and information. 
2. Basic concepts 
TCNO is located in an "objective 1" Region: so the basic concepts apply primarily to 
this specific character. 
2.1.  Regionalisation  of RTD  policies  requires  a  continuing  local  development 
observation and specific goals to be attained and criteria to be adopted in impact 
evaluation studies 
A continuing local development observation is required to link : 
- local problems with specific solutions; 
- opportunities for local development with specific exploitation. 
Activities  (either  planned  or  operational)  give  linkages  between  problems  and 
solutions, opportunities and exploitation {see also Gabriel Colletis : "  ...  each territory 
has to be considered as a combination of specific activities  ... "). 
2.2.  When in  the  Planning  phase,  the  ex-ante evaluation  should  emphasise  on 
programme  quality  and  stakeholders  credibility.  In  this  phase,  the  Local 
Development Observation helps in specific goal setting. 
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Science and Technology Park  impact on  Local  Development,  and  should activate 
some  feedback  mechanisms  to  support  the  Guiding  and  Evolving  phases  in  the 
Science  and  Technology  Park  life  cycle.  In  this  phase  the  Local  Development 
Observation helps in comparing planned and actual results. 
From  the  view  point  of  a  Funding  Agency,  mid  course  evaluations  could  give 
decisional  support  to  a "phased"  funding  process,  conditioned  upon  appraisal  of 
results of the Science and Technology Park initiative. 
A continuing local development observation is also useful  as an educational tool for 
STPs Promoters and Managers. Actually, the Local Development Observation could 
induce a "cognitive" approach  into the  Science and Technology Park Organisation 
Management (see also Bob Hodgson: "  ... inputs> activities >outputs  ... "). 
A  continuing  local  development  observation  could  also  be  useful  for  a  Funding 
Agency to set up  local development - oriented RTD policies, providing for incentives 
and  I  or priorities to  RTD  activities to  be  carried  out  in  Science  and  Technology 
Parks.  In  other  words,  awareness  of local  development  problems  I  opportunities 
could help in setting up Science and Technology Park - based RTD packages, such 
to link regional development policies with innovation development policies (see also 
Gabriel  Colletis  :  "  ...  the  technopolis  is  in  the  heart  of  knowledge  investment 
network  ... ")  .. 
2.3. Goals to be attained through the Science and Technology Park initiative could 
be stated in terms of: 
- attraction of exogenous knowledge intensive firms; 
- support to innovation development in local industry; 
- support to new local knowledge intensive firms creation. 
Qualitative  and  quantitative  specifications  in  goal  setting  arise  from  regional 
conditions,  assessed via the  continuing  Local  Development Observation,  either in 
the Planning phase, or in the Operational Phases. 
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Goals in terms of attraction of exogenous knowledge intensive firms should require 
evaluation criteria such as : 
- technology I industry I services specialisation; 
- value of "attracted" industrial production; 
- jobs; 
- impact  on  human  factor  availability  (as  required  by  "attracted" 
activities); 
- business connections with local firms (either existing or to be created); 
- impact on structural shift in local economy; 
- attracted firms Headquarters location (local/ external). 
Goals in terms of support to innovation development in local industry should require 
evaluation criteria such as : 
- technology I industry I services priorities, as arising from local problems 
and opportunities ; 
- impact  on  human  factor  innovation  (as  required  by  innovation 
development in local firms); 
- internationalisation; 
- value of industrial production of local"clients"; 
- business  connections  with  "attracted"  firms  (impact  on  local 
subcontracting); 
- newly created local firms arising from the endogenous entrepreneurial 
basis (impact on local market development). 
64 Goals in  terms of support to  new local  knowledge  intensive firms  creation  should 
require evaluation criteria such as : 
- technology I industry I services priorities (connections with "attraction" 
policies and "support to existing industrial basis" policies); 
- jobs; 
- value of industrial production in newly created local firms; 
- internationalisation; 
- business connections with "attracted" and "existing" local firms. 
2.5. Evaluation criteria induce specific requirements, and then specific activities, 
and then specific results expected from the Science and Technology Park initiative 
(let me recall again Bob Hodgson's suggestion "  .. .inputs > activities > outputs ... "). 
A system view of requirements that characterise the Science and Technology Park 
initiative is provided by a crossed reference to Phases in the Innovation life cycle, 
and to Support Systems, allowing to identify specific Support Factors. 
Phases in the Innovation life cycle can be stated as follows (see also  E.J.  Blakely, 
B.H.  Roberts,  P.  Manidis  - Inducing  high  tech:  Principles  of  designing  support 
systems for the  formation and attraction of advanced technology firms - Int.  Journ. 
Technology Management, Vol. 2,  No. 314,  1987): 
- Research  (Basic,  Applied,  Generic,  Market  - driven,  Technology  -
driven, Invention, Adaptations, ... ); 
- Development (translating  ideas.  research  principles,  inventions  and 
adaptations into a practical product; prototype tests or models building; 
performance, application and feasibility evaluation, ... ); 
- Diffusion  (commercialisation  of  a  new  product  or  process,  joint 
venturing or other production arrangements, ... ); 
- Production. 
65 Support Systems can be detailed as follows: 
- Information and Communication; 
- Strategic relations; 
- Human Resources; 
- University and Research; 
- Quality of Life 
- Entrepreneurial Climate; 
- Government; 
- Financial System; 
- Physical Infrastructures; 
- Urban Services; 
- Specialised Services; 
- Image in the Innovation field. 
66 Specific Support Factors apply to specific Support System I Phase in the Innovation 
Life cycle crossings. For instance: 
- Information  and  Communication  I  Production  >  multimedia  info-com 
facilities and services; 
- Strategic  Relations  I  the  whole  Innovation  Life  cycle  >  formal  and 
informal networking among stakeholders of economical development; 
- Human  Resources  I  Diffusion  >  entrepreneurs,  venture  capitalists, 
business consultants; 
- University-Research I Development> programmes supporting mobility 
and exchange; 
- Quality of Life I the whole Innovation Life cycle > community awareness 
of a global Innovation project ; 
- Entrepreneurial climate I Research and Development> contracts from 
large firms to local knowledge intensive firms; 
- Government I Research > procurement of Strategic RTD Programmes; 
- Financial System I Diffusion> Investors Consortia; 
- Physical Infrastructures I Diffusion and Production > Incubators; 
- Specialised Services I Production > Conformance Testing Services; 
- Urban Services I Production > Good Provision Services; 
- Image  in  the  Innovation  Field  I  Research  >  top  quality  High  Tech 
Private Labs. 
67 3. Tecnopolis CSATA Novus Ortus: some details 
3.1. about the strategy 
TCNO  strategy  is  to  induce  local  development  through  innovation  in  social  and 
economic environment. 
It could be useful to interpret such a strategy through some concepts suggested by 
Michael Luger, Gabriel Colletis and Thierry Bruhat. 
Luger  suggests  that  a  Science  Park  is  a  growth  pole  inducing  endogenous 
development.  This could  be  a relevant  interpretation of TCNO  strategy,  where  the 
growth pole is the Technopolitan District receiving new exogenous locations of top 
level  National  and  Multinational  Firms,  and  the  endogenous  development  is  the 
result of TCNO support to innovation development in existing local firms,  and to new 
firms creation. 
Colletis  suggests  that  a  Science  Park  is  an  actor  in  several  formal  and  informal 
networks.  Actually,  TCNO  is  such  an  actor,  involved  in  several  networks  at  local, 
national  and  international  level,  together  with  similar  Organisations,  Firms, 
University and Research Institutes, Governmental Bodies. 
Bruhat, in assessing the twenty years experience in Sophia Antipolis, concludes that 
the  managerial  competence  in  Sophia  should  pair with  a  new  local  development 
support  competence.  We  can  state  that  TCNO  is  coupling  its  competence  in 
inducing  local  development,  with  the  managerial  competence  in  approaching  the 
market of specialised services to support innovation development. 
3.2. about the physical layout 
TCNO  is  a  company  providing  specialised  services  to  support  innovation 
development. 
Physical  locations of TCNO  activities must be  understood as  a result of this  main 
activity. Therefore today the physical layout of TCNO can be related (see Table 3.2.) 
as a three-level structure: Valenzano, Technopolitan District and Delegations. 
68 table 3.2. : TCNO Layout 
VALENZANO 
TCNO HQ, R & D ACTIVITIES, EDUCATION & TRAINING 
FIRST LANDING OF EXOGENOUS K- I ACTIVITIES, INCUBATION 
OF NEW LOCAL FIRMS 
SPECIALISED Labs 
Bari University new. developments 
National Council of Research Area 
TECHNOPOLITAN DISTRICT (metropolitan area network) 
FINAL LOCATIONS OF EXOGENOUS ACTIVITIES AFTER FIRST LANDING AND 
NEW LOCAL FIRMS AFTER INCUBATION 
BARI INDUSTRIAL ZONE 
BARI TERTIARY POLE 
BARICENTRO BUSINESS PARK 
Valenzano, Capurso, Casamassima industrial zones 
TCNO DELEGATIONS 
INFO - DEMO SERVICES 
BARI ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS (A.L.E.) 
BRINDISI A.L.E. 
FOGGIA A.L.E. 
LECCE A.L.E. 
TARANTO A.L.E. 
CASARANO (LECCE) SHOES INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT 
MATERA 
3.3. about the local development observation 
TCNO  is  developing  in  Puglia  region,  ranking  4th  in  Southern  Italy  in  industrial 
employees per inhabitants ratio (see table 3.3.a.). 
Moreover, the Bari sub-region ranks 3rd in Puglia. 
We can  argue that the  Italian National  Policy of the last decades,  promoting  plant 
locations in Southern Italy through physical infra structuring and financial incentives 
induced  a  weak  industrial  basis,  built  up  on  jobs  rather  than  on  entrepreneurs. 
Actually, innovation development has much to do with entrepreneurial decisions, and 
little to do with industrial branches location. 
69 table 3.3.a. : industrialisation in Southern Italy 
SOUTHERN ITALY (1989) 
EMPLOYEES IN INDUSTRY /INHABITANTS PER REGION 
REGION  INHABIT.  EMPLOY.  EMP/INH. 
ABRUZZO  1262692  68617  5.43% 
CAMPANIA  5773067  180485  3.13% 
MOUSE  335211  10178  3.04% 
PUGLIA  4059309  112370  2.77% 
Taranto  600885  27893  4.64% 
Brindisi  409613  13806  3.37% 
Bari  1530613  40122  2.62% 
Leece  814854  17354  2.13% 
Foggia  703344  13195  1.88% 
BASI LICATA  1530613  40122  2.62% 
SARDEGNA  1655859  32890  1.99% 
SICILIA  5164266  67426  1.31o/o 
CALABRIA  2151357  21614  1.00% 
TOTAL  25991683  646072  2.49% 
70 Table 3.3.b. shows the distribution of industrial production units in Puglia per sector 
and manpower class. 
Evidence is given of a large basis of endogenous Small and Medium Enterprises in 
traditional sectors (food, fashion, building material, metal products, textile, shoes). 
Evidence is given also of two main goals in TCNO strategy: 
- priorities  in  supporting  innovation  development  in  above  mentioned 
sectors; 
- attraction of exogenous activities in high tech sectors (Informatics and 
Telecommunications, Microelectronics, Space Industry). 
table 3.3.b. : industrial units in Puglia per sector and manpower class (  1989) 
SECTOR  MANPOWER CLASS 
0-9  10-19  20-99  100-299  300-999  >= 1000  TOTAL 
FOOD  114  128  90  10  4  4  350 
TEXTILE  6  48  39  6  99 
FASHION  3  99  119  9  230 
SHOES  3  32  48  10  2  3  98 
WOOD  5  30  25  2  62 
WOOD FURNITURE  3  31  18  1  53 
PAPER  9  8  2  1  20 
PRINTING  26  16  3  45 
LEATHER  8  12  2  2  24 
RUBBER AND  1  29  29  2  1  62 
PLASTICS 
CHEMICAL  2  18  12  1  3  36 
PHARMACEUTICAL  2  1  1  4 
PETROLEUM AND  14  8  3  3  28 
COAL 
BUILDING MATERIAL  19  127  100  14  1  1  262 
METALLURGY  3  5  8 
METAL PRODUCTS  7  88  81  19  11  11  217 
MACHINERY  2  24  27  4  2  3  62 
ELECTRIC PRODUCTS  7  8  2  1  1  19 
ELECTRONICS  4  2  2  8 
AUTOMOTIVE  1  14  20  5  6  10  56 
PRECISION TOOLS  1  3  1  5 
OTHERS  1  2  2  5 
TOTAL  167  745  668  91  36  46  1753 
71 Comparison between table 3.3.b. and table 3.3.c. gives evidence of: 
- sectors  where  exogenous  entrepreneurship  rules  local  manpower 
(exogenous investments in Puglia- Metallurgy); 
- sectors where local based firms rule external manpower (endogenous 
investments  in  other  regions  - Food,  Leather,  Pharmaceutical, 
Petroleum and Coal, Building Material, Metal and Electric Products). 
Specific  goals  apply  to  above  mentioned  sectors  :  local  sub-contracting  for 
knowledge intensive activities in Metallurgy; selective business retention policies in 
Food, Leather, Pharmaceutical, Building Material, Metal and Electric Products). 
Actually, TCNO and co-operating firms do cope with difficulties in selling advanced 
services to Metallurgy local  Branches,  which find their main  suppliers in  the same 
areas where their own headquarters are located. 
table 3.3.c. : employees in industrial production in Puglia per sector and manpower 
class (1989) 
SECTOR  MANPOWER CLASS 
0-9  10-19  20-99  100-299  300-999  >= 1000  TOTAL 
FOOD  4229  3156  4152  1606  1646  14789 
TEXTILE  259  655  1468  1159  3541 
FASHION  34  1340  4414  1303  7091 
SHOES  41  478  1740  1427  1000  1030  5716 
WOOD  116  424  875  240  1655 
WOOD FURNITURE  36  405  707  180  1328 
PAPER  142  297  399  2216  3054 
PRINTING  348  661  558  1567 
LEATHER  109  377  885  1371 
RUBBER AND PLASTIC  11  446  1059  337  1100  2953 
CHEMICAL  23  263  560  920  3061  4827 
PHARMACEUTICAL  27  309  336 
PETROLEUM AND  191  267  1167  1625 
COAL 
BUILDING MATERIAL  118  1719  3283  2376  580  8076 
METALLURGY  43  215  2051  20994  23303 
METAL PRODUCTS  53  1212  3220  1073  6532  12090 
MACHINERY  11  313  909  392  814  1768  4207 
ELECTRIC PRODUCTS  88  443  429  462  1422 
ELECTRONICS  50  90  749  889 
AUTOMOTIVE  11  192  671  245  3928  5174  10221 
PRECISION TOOLS  8  50  29  87 
OTHERS  14  1396  1410 
TOTAL  4950  11665  25437  14524  19639  35343  111558 
72 (6) 
Table 3.3.d. gives evidence of geographical priorities in TCNO policies supporting of 
innovation development in local industry: 
- Food in Foggia sub-region; 
- Textile in Putignano (Bari); 
- Fashion in Leece sub-region; 
- Shoes in Barletta (Bari) and Casarano (Leece); 
- Metal Products in Bari and Taranto. 
Table  3. 3. d.  gives  also  evidence  of sectors  where  a  structural  shift  should  be 
supported  (Electronics)  and  a  local  supply  of knowledge  intensive  services  and 
products should be developed (Chemical and  Pharmaceutical  in  Brindisi;  Paper in 
Foggia; Machinery in Leece; Metallurgy in Taranto). 
73 table 3.3.d. :  industrial specialisation per sub-region - Puglia (  1989) 
SECTOR  SUB- REGION 
BAR  I  BRINDISI  FOGG  lA  LECCE  TARANTO 
FOOD  -0.18  0.09  0.30  -0.07  -0.72 
TEXTILE  0.22  -0.03  -0.01  -0.97 
FASHION  0.14  -0.62  -0.98  0.36  -0.42 
SHOES  0.40  -0.76  -0.91  0.78  -0.93 
WOOD  0.21  -0.54  -0.61  -0.57  -0.86 
WOOD FURNITURE  0.03  -0.35  -0.17  0.25  -0.89 
PAPER  -0.05  0.85  -0.75  -0.86 
PRINTING  0.32  -0.23  -0.06  -0.28  -0.66 
LEATHER  -0.32  -0.86  0.60  -0.96 
RUBBER AND PLASTIC  0.14  -0.00  -0.16  -0.47  -0.69 
CHEMICAL  -0.64  0.78  0.28  -0.84  -0.87 
PHARMACEUTICAL  -0.93  0.43 
PETROLEUM AND  -0.56  0.20  -0.52  -0.84  0.19 
COAL 
BUILDING MATERIAL  0.02  -0.45  0.10  -0.16  -0.45 
METALLURGY  -0.94  -0.88  -0.81  -0.91  0.94 
METAL PRODUCTS  0.24  0.23  -0.42  -0.50  0.31 
MACHINERY  0.12  -0.23  -0.72  0.75  -0.03 
ELECTRIC PRODUCTS  -0.14  -0.75  -0.28  -0.88 
ELECTRONICS  -0.61  -0.97  -0.84  -0.97 
AUTOMOTIVE  0.14  0.22  0.18  -0.71  -0.70 
PRECISION TOOLS  -0.32  -0.19  -0.50 
OTHERS  0.17  0.76 
Table  3.3.e.  shows  the  regional  diffusion  (Employees  and  Production  Units)  of 
Services (Financial, R&D,  Quality Assessment,  Marketing, Advertising,  Education & 
Training,  Data  Processing,  Software  Production,  Management)  in  1990,  and  its 
1987 - 1990 variation. 
One can argue that the TCNO initiative belongs to a regional scenario characterised 
by a wealthy Services Supply (87-90 variations : + 38.5% employees and + 27 % 
production  units).  In  this  scenario  Bari  shows  a  "maturity"  character,  where 
employees grow faster than  in  the  whole  region,  and  production  units grow more 
slowly. Brindisi shows a "turbulence" character, where employees grow seven times 
as  fast  as  in  the  whole  region,  and  production  units  grow  twice  the  regional 
percentage. Leece and Taranto show a growth rate very near to the regional one in 
production units, while the growth rate in employees is 50%  less than the regional 
one:  it seems to be a "readjustment" phase.  Foggia shows a "retard", where either 
employees or production units grow more slowly than in the whole region. 
The amazing growth rate of employees in Financial Services (89.8%) and high rates 
in  Education  &  Training  (60%),  Data  processing,  Software  Production  and 
management  Services  (54%)  testify that TCNO  choice  to  specialise  in  Advanced 
Services supporting Innovation is a proper interpretation of the market. 
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 3.4. about the results 
Referring to  its strategic role (see paragraph 2.3.), TCNO induced in the last three 
years'  results  that  are  shown  in  table  3.4.,  in  terms  of "attraction",  "support  to 
endogenous firms' creation" and "support  to innovation development in local firms". 
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 3.5. about the endogenous firm creation 
Firm  creation  in  manufacturing  sectors  in  Puglia  and  in  Bari  sub-region  is 
characterised in tables 3.5.a. and 3.5.b .. 
Evidence  is  given  about  the  appropriateness  of  the  specific  TCNO  initiatives 
providing support to endogenous knowledge intensive firms creation. 
Actually,  Puglia  and  Bari  show  the  existence  of a  structural  opportunity  towards 
enterprise creation. 
Puglia ranks 1Oth out of eighteen Italian Regions, and second out of eight Southern 
Regions (labelled">" in table 3.5.a.}. 
Bari ranks 42nd out of 78 Italian sub-regions, and first in Puglia (Apulian sub-regions 
bold-type in table 3.5.b.}. 
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 Origins of entrepreneurial ideas in TCNO experience are shown in table 3.5.c  .. 
Evidence is given of low impact of University I research personnel in starting up new 
businesses in knowledge intensive fields. 
table 3.5.c. : TCNO - New Businesses Creation Programme -
Sources of Entrepreneurial Ideas (more than 200 ideas submitted in '89 - '91) 
ENTREPRENEURS 
TECHNICIANS 
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS 
BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 
UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 
3.6. about funding 
42o/o 
35% 
9% 
8o/o 
6% 
100% 
Table 3.6. shows a synthesis of capital investments and operations costs in the '83-
'92 time span. 
table 3.6. : TCNO - Capital Investments and Operations ('83 - '92) - Millions ECU 
CAPITAL INVESTMENTS  53.33 
CO - FINANCED BY 
NATIONAL GOVERNM. - CEC : 
LAND  0.00 
BUILDINGS, BASIC INFRASTR.  26.67 
HIGH - TECH INFRASTR.  21.33 
EDUCATION & TRAINING  5.33 
OPERATIONS  166.67 
CO - FINANCED BY 
NATIONAL GOVERNM. - CEC :  66.00 
CONTRACTED WITH 
PUBLIC  AGENCIES I 
PRIVATE FIRMS:  100.67 
TOTAL TURNOVER  220.00 
80 4. conclusions 
TCNO experience has been summarised,  to show how in depth  Impact Evaluation 
could affect strategies and operations in a Science and Technology Park. 
What has been reported in Chapter 2 ( Basic Concepts) arises from the operational 
experience in TCNO, where Self Monitoring is primarily a learning tool to support the 
organisational life cycle of the Science Park company. 
Usually  I  remember  that  the  lower the  local  development  stage,  the  higher  the 
complexity level. of the Science Park initiative should be. 
Continuing  local  development observation,  and related  evaluation  processes,  can 
help in managing such a complexity, either from the view point of the Science Park 
company, or from the view point of the public decision maker. 
81 ,.  __  .· .. :·. EVALUATING CAMBRIDGE SCIENCE PARK: 
METHODS AND RESULTS 
Bob Hodgson 
Segal Quince Wicksteed limited 
economic and management consultants 
83 INTRODUCI10N 
This brief paper  draws on the work of my colleagues at Segal Quince Wicksteed Limited who 
have been observing and analysing  the growth of new technology  based firms  in  the 
Cambridge area since before I became associated with the finn.  In 1984 the field work was 
carried out for  the Cambridge Phenomenon (1)  report, that was published in 1985  and 
reprinted with revisions in 1990.  In between, the finn have been involved in other studies 
of Cambridge (2) as well as analyses that enable comparisons to be made with many other 
places throughout Europe and wider afield (3). 
I have also drawn on work by others who have examined the growth of technology related 
activity in Cambridge (4)  plus work on evaluating science and economic development 
programmes in which I have been involved with SQ.W (5). 
The structure of the paper reflects  the particular experience of the Cambridge area, as 
something of a case study, plus the need to focus on evaluation as an essential policy design 
tool.  Because there are a number of peculiar features about the Cambridge story, as indeed 
there are about any case study, I have sought to draw out general evaluation issues rather 
than to concentrate on the descriptive and anecdotal.  The paper is, therefore, structured 
under the following main headings: 
•  Cambridge: background and history 
•  Cambridge Science Park: contribution and dynamics 
•  Evaluation: approaches, issues and limitations. 
85 CAMBRIDGE: BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
This is a very brief and selective presentation of the background facts about Cambridge and 
the development of science based finns in and around the university town.  Several of the 
references provide a  fuller description for  those with a  deeper interest.  Here only that 
material necessary to understand the role of the Cambridge Science Park (CSP) is presented. 
In essence Cambridge is a small country town.  It has an immediate population of around 
100,000  but a  wider catchment subregional influence over an area  containing a  further 
200,000.  It is located within the fastest growing region of the UK but has historically been 
neither an administrative nor a business centre, indeed, in spite of the clerical origins of its 
colleges, nor has it been a religious centre. 
However, the University and its thirty plus coll•es do differentiate the town.  By European 
standards it is only a medium sized university with around 14,000 students of whom some 
3,000 are postgraduate.  Broadly half the University is science and technology related and 
among its 3,000 or so academics there are many whom their international peers recognise as 
leaders in their field.  It is by the quality and range of its research work (and the research 
work of the many related and unrelated institutes located in and around Cambridge) that it 
is known and it is this which provides the distinctive character of the dty. 
A further important distinguishing characteristic of the Cambridge story is its essentially 
restrictive development climate. The town itself is tightly bounded, as an administrative unit, 
and, with a number of strong but largely unsuccessful opponents, there is a general physical 
planning regime which seeks to restrict further development.  Until recently, there has also 
been a generally weak infrastructure that constrains rather than encourages development 
although it is not simple to distinguish cause from effect.  Within the word infrastructure, 
is included elements that are both hard (road, rail and air transport, for example) and soft 
(business services such as legal, accounting and venture capital, for example). 
86 Within this mixture of positive and negative influences an interesting phenomena has been 
born.  Its origins stretch back over a  century - the first  new technology based firm in 
Cambridge was started by the son of Charles Darwin in 1881 and still survives albeit in a 
radically different form.  The phenomena is the rapidly accelerated growth of NTBFs that has 
been experienced over the last two decades.  From a base of two firms at the tum of the 
century had grown around 200  by 1970,  which doubled again by 1980, and is currently 
estimated to be in excess  of 600  science and technology based  firms.  These firms  are 
estimated to employ around 20,000 which is a smaller proportion of the employed population 
than the number of firms is of the corporate population, reflecting their relatively smaller 
size. 
As suggested earlier, the University and the science base of the area are two of the crucial 
ingredients.  The scale of their effect is enlarged, because of the culture and character of the 
University, as well as its scientific  excellence.  Its structure is ideal to  foster  networks 
(because of multiple allegiances to departments and colleges), its relaxed operating rules (in 
relation to IPR and private activities of academics, for example) and its size as a market for 
instrumentation and specialist science related goods all contribute strongly. This networking 
and neglectful  indirectness is also  reflected  in the source of NfBFs.  Few  (one study 
estimated around 15%) have been direct spin outs from the University or research institutes. 
But, links and indirect origins can be traced for the majority of firms to the various science 
and engineering deparbnents of the University. 
A concurrent improvement in Cambridge's infrastructure and in the national government's 
broad policy stance to new small entrepreneurial firms also played .,.jor roles.  Cambridge 
now has a motorway connection to London, the rail line has been fectrified and London's 
third international airport is developing only 20 miles south of the  d~. The business services 
infrastructure also improved with leading national firms of lawye~ and accountants and 
specialist venture capital organisations all coming to serve the growing Cambridge business 
base.  The Thatcher years also created an importantly positive climate for enterprise and 
sponsored the growth of entrepreneurial new firms.  These then provided the essential\ 
ingredients for the Cambridge Science Park to emerge as a success. 
87 CAMBRIDGE SOENCE PARK: CONTRIBUTION AND DYNAMICS 
Key people in the University began to look at the whole question of relationships between 
their imtitutions and science based  industry (Mott Committee) in response to both local 
interest and national concerns to mobilise technology for economic growth.  The Cambridge 
Science Park emerged from and became the physical representation of this continuing process 
of debate. 
The Park aimed to provide: 
•  a pleasant place, for science based businesses to locate 
•  a means of interaction with the University 
•  a network among tenant firms. 
These are explicit aims of the Park development team and echo the general conclusions of 
the discussions that had been taking place in the University.  The Park itself is located well 
away from  the main University and college buildings so a positive attitude to academic 
liaison  has been taken  from  its  inception.  The  activities  have been led by the Trinity 
development team, but are not limited to them, and include: 
•  organising small gatherings of those with common research interests 
•  providing a fund for joint research- Trinity College made available on a 50/50 basis 
a research fund to demonstrate its commitment to fostering R&tD links 
•  infonnation and newsletters on major events Oectures, seminars etc) and news of 
developments related to companies resident on the park 
•  Society of Applied Research, to give status and a fonnal home for those interested in 
applied research 
•  Wolfson Industrial Unit, to provide a gateway into a wider University network 
•  Industrial  Liaison  Officers  were  identified  in  all  the  laboratories  through  the 
University. 
88 7) 
In addition to these liaison functions the park contributed three crucial elements to the 
acceleration of the phenomena.  These are: 
(a)  land and planning: the site had been in Trinity College's ownership for a century so 
they were willing and able to take a long term view of its development potential The 
particuJarly  flexible  wording  of the development  condition  from  the  planning 
authorities also provided the opportunity to create a different type of landscape and 
premises 
(b)  infrastructure and buildings:  with a  strong  professional  team in  support which 
enabled a rapid start to new businesses or incoming investments that previously had 
not been possible for individual firms to achieve even should they have possessed the 
resources and determination to do so 
(c)  social/  contact centres: a central element of the first phase of the park was the Trinity 
Centre where people could meet socially to enjoy recreation and where firms could 
hire meeting rooms for both business and social meetings. 
Importantly, the flexible planning permission granted to the park marked a positive change 
and gave a  public signal that after long and serious  reflection Cambridge is open for 
business.  The open attitude is still, however, distinctly Cambridge - these facilities are now 
available, are effected largely through personal networks and come without any force or 
compulsion - all in all, very 'laid back'. 
It is worth reflecting on the dynamics of the Science Park and the method through which its 
effects have been realised.  But first the basic facts.  The park was first mooted in 1969, had 
a champion in Dr  John Bradfield, the Senior Bursar of Trinity College, and the first occupants 
arrived in 1973.  The total land area is just over SO hectares and the development has been 
carried out in four broadly similar sized phases.  The largest building on the par~  occupied 
by Knapp Phannaceuticals, is some 15,000 square metres and the smallest is just over SO 
square metres.  This smaller scale of accommodation is found both in independent premises 
and in units within an Innovation Centre located on the park.  This is not to be confused 
with the larger St John's Innovation Centre which lies across the main road on an adjacent 
site. 
89 The Cambridge Science Park is now fully occupied but is still far frOm static.  Around 80 
companies are found on the park (a small proportion of the 600 or  so NTBFs estimated to be 
located within the Cambridge area) and total employment is around the 3,000 mark.  The 
largest employer has over 350 employees and the smallest (of which there are several) only 
five.  In terms of activity the firms fall into the following broad categories:  30CJJ  IT and 
electronics  related;  20%  bio  sciences;  25%  service  activities;  and  25%  engineering 
(predominantly instrumentation) and other activities. 
In addition to the direct activity accommodated on the par~ it has undoubtedly played a 
wider dynamic role.  Its success has certainly contributed to accelerating the development of 
other similar schemes.  A typical and interesting example is the St John's Innovation Centre 
which is located nearby but plays a completely different role.  It has been developed on a 8 
ha plot and provides around 11,000 square metres of space largely for small firms, of whom 
a higher proportion than on the Science Park are direct University spin outs (some 26CJJ). 
Again, as an example of the contribution of the personal networks, there is a group of 13 
advisors available to finns in the Centre who are all Fellows of StJohn's College and are 
drawn from across the relevant deparbnents of the University. 
In a rather less obvious, but still important, way the Cambridge Science Park also became an 
important flagship for the accelerating phenomena. In spite of the fact that about 90% of the 
research rich firms in the Cambridge area are not located on the park they benefit indirectly 
from what it  represents and the way in which its market image has changed both the climate 
for enterprise in the city and the reputation of the dty wider afield. 
The overall conclusion then, is that the Cambridge Science Park has made an important 
contribution to sustaining, and maybe even to accelerating the phenomena.  But it is neither 
the source, nor the whole, nor the cause of the rapid growth of NTBFs in the Cambridge 
area. 
90 EVALUATION: APPROACHES, ISSUES AND LIMITATIONS 
Now to the central purpose of the workshop and the contribution to both understanding and 
method that can be derived from seeking to evaluate the Cambridge case study.  Before 
going on, it is worth reflecting that any evaluation must begin with the  aims of those 
promoting the initiative as the first level of evaluation must relate to the achievement of the 
initiative against tl\ose aims.  In the Cambridge Science Park case the three expUdt aims of 
the development have to a large degree been met, so it should rightly be judged a success. 
A second aspect to remember is the perspective from which the evaluation is being made. 
The CSP is a private initiative, using private money to fund a facility achieving a commercial 
return.  At the simplest evaluation level there is nothing more that needs to be added.  In 
cases where pubUc money is being used to subsidise initiatives then wider concerns of 
evaluation may arise but this does not strictly apply to the Cambridge Science Park, even 
though to an important degree the science foundation upon which the phenomena is based 
is funded by the public sector. 
General approach 
But, not surprisingly, I am not going to Umit my perspective to this narrow view point and 
in the following comments I will draw on some of the lessons we have learned during other 
evaluation studies of both similar and different schemes.  As a  starting point it is often 
helpful to differentiate three levels at which evaluation can take place.  These are: 
•  first, the input level: did we do well whatever we sought to do? 
•  second, the activity level: has what we hoped to stimulate been achieved? 
•  third, the output level: what additional value has been created by the scheme? 
91 Input level 
Here the concern is with the direct developments that have been created and, in the case of 
science parks, these usually include: 
•  investment: how much money has been spent, on what, including infrastructure, 
research and development, training and land and premises 
•  physical development:  what scale of physical development has been undertaken 
including landscaping, premises, offsite infrastructure; and to what quality in relation 
to nearby more standard industrial projects 
•  new institutional fonns: what has been achieved including any new partnerships to 
develop and operate the park, new liaison roles to the academic institution and new 
services that have been attracted such as technical venture capital 
Measures are usually straight forward and scalar in tenns of the investment and physical 
development aspects but more judgemental and descriptive  in  tenns of the degree of 
innovation in institutional form.  Comparisons with other similar developments are also often 
useful to establish relative levels of economy, effectiveness and efficiently. 
Activity level 
Here at the second level the analysis is more concerned with the intermediate output of what 
is happening on or around the park that can be  thought to have been stimulated by its 
provision.  Typically the following aspects will be examined: 
•  return on investment: what financial return has been achieved, is it at a commercial 
level or has it been subsidised and over what length of time 
•  firm's location:  what investments have been attracted to the location, which firms 
have arrived and what new activities have they introduced to the local economy 
92 •  new finn fonnation: has the rate of fonnation been stimulated and is the quality of 
firm or composition of activity changed for the better 
•  stimulated investment and jobs: how much additional investment has been stimulated 
by the offer of land on the park and how many and what quality of new jobs have 
been located there 
•  gross value added: what scale of new business has been brought to the area and 
retained, including multipliers, within the region. 
The emphasis is on gross measures of activity and on the leverage that has been achieved as 
a result of the initial park development. Leverage is usually measured by the ratio of the 
gross totals to the initial input.  Other measures relate to such items as the 'cost per job', 
which is the total public subsidy divided by the numbers of jobs stimulated. This can then 
be compared to similar measures on other development initiatives.  Again, scalar measures 
do not capture all the impacts and judgemental and descriptive measures will need to be 
incorporated. 
Oumut level 
This is the third and final level of evaluation which is concerned with net, rather than gross, 
impacts and which seeks to take account of activity that has been displaced (to reach a true 
net measure) and to discount those actions that would have been expected to happen even 
without the science park scheme and which, therefore, are not genuinely additional. 
The creation of value includes direct (usually measured by economist as the payment for 
factors of production, including wages, profit, rent and interest - but excluding intermediate 
inputs that have been included in the gross value added figures of the activity level) and 
indirect  or multiplier effects.  These  latter  multiplier effects  have  traditionally  been a 
nightmare for regional analysts as they are difficult to identify and it is never clear how 
much is retained within the region being examined and what proportion leaks elsewhere. 
93 Displacement is one of the key ideas in evaluation and for completeness it has both negative 
and positive components.  On the positive side actions can be stimulated that are different 
(occurring earner, being bigger or qualitatively better, are three aspects of this) from what 
would have happened otherwise.  In the Cambridge case the development of the St John's 
Innovation Centre is a good example. On the negative side, the impacts that are relevant are 
those activities that have been 'crowded our by the science park  development The objective 
is to measure net impact and it is important to relate the displacement measure to the right 
geographic level especially if  the science park is seeking to play a regional development role. 
Additionality is the second key idea in evaluation and is especially relevant for publicly 
funded projects.  If the stimulated activity could have been expected to occur without the 
project or incentive then it should not be counted as a  benefit at this third output leveL 
However, it is rarely that simple as the majority of stimulated activities are influenced to 
adapt their plans (bigger, earlier or better, for example) but would probably have done 
something even without the project.  Consequently, establishing the genuine net additional 
benefit of the project quicldy becomes a predominantly judgemental activity in which it is 
usually essential to survey in some detaU those responsible for key decisions. 
Essential issues 
Within  this  three level  framework  there are four essential  issues  that always arise in 
evaluation  exercises.  In the Cambridge case  these  issues  are very evident so I  have 
illustrated them by reference to the Cambridge story.  The four issues are: 
•  impact: where does it start and stop? 
•  causality: in which direction does it work? 
•  impermanence: when is it appropriate to measure? 
•  constraints: how overwhelming are these? 
94 Impact 
I have already alluded to the methodological difficulties surrounding the measurement of 
impact in the previous discussion, but the very practical issues of where does it start and 
where does it stop also becomes important.  For illustration, there are three major aspects: 
•  first, the establishment of a baseline.  In the Cambridge case this was not done, as 
indeed is fiequently the case elsewhere, because data collection is expensive and 
evaluation is not seen as a priority issue at the outset of a project Often recourse has 
to be made to data collected for other purposes than for evaluation, which usually 
means it is incomplete and does not measure exactly what is required.  As a basic 
minimum it is useful to have a systematic feasibility study for the science park which 
can provide much of the information to construct a baseline 
•  second, the definition of geographic limits:  which is often important in regional 
initiatives and which is a  particular issue in Cambridge.  Because of the precious 
historical  core  of the  town  there  are deliberate  policies  to  direct  development 
elsewhere. Should an impact study evaluate business growth in areas which are some 
distance from the CSP but the nearest point where company growth is encouraged 
(eg Peterborough)?  The  fact  that  this  area  is  also  subject  to  additional  policy 
intervention  complicates  matters  further.  In  addition,  many  Cambridge  high 
technology firms have been incorporated into larger companies whose production 
activities are located elsewhere.  The Cambridge base becomes an R&D department, 
but value added through production is created elsewhere (and sometimes outside the 
UK) so what should be included in an impact analysis? 
•  third, the identification of accelerative effects.  These are the additional effects that 
through, for example, demonstration of achievement, have stimulated additional 
activity.  Just to illustrate the point: the report SQW prepared on the Phenomenon 
was used to support a Board paper to commit Data General to locate some of its R&D 
activity in Cambridge. Without the science park, the report would probably not have 
been commissioned, without the report the new R&:D investment might not have been 
made but the influence was very indirect and difficult to identify.  How should it be 
included in an evaluation? 
95 Causality 
The issues here can be  equally complex as the difficulties of proving causal links are 
tremendous. 
At best, the limit of honest analysis is frequently a  demonstration of association: things 
happened in a way that suggests they are linked and through that link causality is infetTed. 
Sometimes where a  clear sequence of events can be identified the balance of probability 
would at least allow claim for a strong influence between the first event and the subsequent 
outcome.  But this is still someway short of causality. 
In most studies we have undertaken there has been a substantial survey of decision makers 
in the population of businessmen (or academics or policy makers) to establish the sequence 
of events, the nature and significance of different influences and the detail of decisions and 
consequences.  Even here, however, there are a  whole range of dangers for the analyst. 
Perhaps the most significant is the danger of the convincing rationalisation of  a decision after 
the event which does not reflect the true influences and is only possible with the benefit of 
complete hindsight  There is no substitute for experienced judgement in sorting out the 
genuine from the plausible. 
Again a  detailed survey of decision makers and other participants can help by shedding 
different perspectives on the same events and by  delving beneath the colourful anecdote that 
often dominates individual recollections. 
Impermanence 
Inevitably, no single time stands out as the best for measuring the impact of a science park 
development.  By its nature, the science park seeks to provide an environment that fosters 
different behaviour in an area of  business where, although shortening all the time (except in 
some R&:D  intensive businesses like phannaceuticals), the elapsed time from research to 
commercial impact can be decades. 
96 Measuring initial impacts can easily be dismissed as too early to allow the new patterns of 
behaviour to even become established let along to bear fruit.  However, this position can 
devalue the benefits of early examination and critical review of what has been learned and 
what can be improved.  The essential perspective must be that of a positive approach to 
identifying how to accelerate the achievement of the science park initiative through improved 
perfonnance. 
Leaving an evaluation to a later date when the longer term changes can be expected to have 
been completed and to have borne fruit may be more reasonable in view of the long term 
nature of science park initiatives.  However, problems of the diffuseness of effects and the 
difficulties of attributing causality can become insuperable.  Besides, evaluations at too late 
a stage can sometimes be sterile exercises in recording events as they are too late to influence 
decisions and lead to improvements in performance. 
The final difficulty which is worth bearing in mind is the impermanence of achievement and 
the essentially dynamic nature of what is being attempted.  In our Cambridge Phenomenon 
(1985)  report we highlighted eight companies that together embodied the positive and 
successful business characteristics of the story.  Within a further five years an analysis of the 
same companies would have revealed a different tale.  Of the eight: one had ceased trading, 
five had been taken over by other finns (some as positive acquisitions, some because the 
finns had become non viable as independent units) and of the two that survived only one 
remained genuinely independent in broadly the same form as found in the initial evaluation 
exercise.  How then should success have been measured? 
Other constraints 
The final issues of any evaluation exercise concern the impact of other constraints that may 
be beyond the influence of the science park initiative but nevertheless condition its impact. 
The most obvious of these, and this is evident in the example of what has happened to the 
star companies mentioned earlier, is the effect of the economic cycle.  This has been an 
overwhelming influence on business achievement over the last five years (both accelerative 
and depressive) in Britain as it has elsewhere. 
97 An interesting additional aspect of the Cambridge story has been the concurrent impact of 
the Phenomenon, and  the CSP as  a  flagship  of it,  in both tightening and slackening 
constraints.  The growth of demand for sophisticated business services bought a  major 
expansion  of  supply  in  qualitative  ard  quantitative  terms  which  itself  removed  a 
development constraint ard helped accelerate the impact of the initial growth impetus. 
Concurrently, the rapid growth led to congestion on the physical infrastructure of the region 
and a massive escalation in operating (and living) costs which was particularly evident in the 
purchase price of private housing, for example.  This in tum tightened a constraint, in the 
short to medium term, on further growth until new stocks of dwellings ard infrastructure 
could be developed. 
Some wider aspects of the Cambridge case study 
To finish this brief paper I would like to raise three wider aspects of the Cambridge case 
study which suggest that even the relatively sophisticated evaluation described in the earlier 
paragraphs is incomplete. 
The first, relates to the wider costs of accelerated growth.  I have already alluded to the 
overcrowding and congestion effects that emerged at various stages.  These at one level 
threatened to choke off the Phenomenon but an even more fundamental imbalance also 
became manifest in that at one point there arose considerable concern for the  negative 
consequences of accelerated science based business growth on the viability of the University. 
Competition from the new firms, and higher wages, for a limited stock of technical support 
staff began to threaten the quality of support within the academic research establishment. 
Escalating costs began to undermine the ability of the publicly funded University to maintain 
its excellence with a  budget not expanding at a  commensurate rate and increased  the 
problem of attracting good junior academics who could not afford an attractive standard of 
living on low academic salaries. · And, finally, there were some concerns ·with the deflection 
effect of encouraging entrepreneurial research staff to pursue commercial goals and core 
academic staff to compete for· funds for directed research  to the neglect of interesting 
fundamental research topics.  The University has reacted to some of these effects and there 
are hopeful signs that they are not proving damaging. The fundamental dilemma, however, 
remains. 
98 The second, wider aspect, relates to a broader regional and subsequently national pollcy 
perspective.  This has two distinct parts.  The first relates to the possible specialist role of 
Cambridge (and Oxford) as technopoles for the wider metropolitan region of  Greater London. 
This is not necessarily a  perspective that the  university cities would either recognise or 
embrace but at a  wider regional and national perspective there is considerable merit in 
continuing to foster these specialist roles for the overall national good. 
The role of new technology based  firms,  the epitome of the Cambridge Phenomenon, in 
fostering  the accelerated  and flexible  adoption of scientific and technological  advances 
introduces a second national (and EC wide) policy dilemma.  UK public R&:D execution and 
public subsidies provided to  businesses for  R&cD  are predominantly captured by large 
corporate entities, as indeed at an aggregate level is the conduct of R&:D funded by private 
firms.  How can the new smaller entities break into this restricted circle and how can public 
R&:D programmes be made more accessible, are both essential aspects of the same problem. 
True, a  number of Cambridge SMEs do participate but in spite of their dynamism and 
technical excellence they have completely failed to lead to a change in the large company 
mould. 
The third and final broader aspect that emerges from the Cambridge Phenomenon relates to 
the absence of a new large technology based finn in the story.  Will one emerge, and when? 
Is the Phenomenon destined to be limited to producing a series of small niche businesses 
with only minor employment and wealth generating impacts?  Does a large company need 
a completely different corporate culture to that found in Cambridge and can such a large firm 
be accommodated within the Cambridge mould? 
These are all topical questions that have been deflected by the short term concentration on 
survival during the present deep UK recession but have certainly not gone away.  However, 
a more balanced perspective is provided from an examination of the composition of firms in 
California's Silicon Valley.  Some 70%  of firms  located in··the Valley have less than··to 
employees and only 50 firms have more than 1,000 employees. Also, the large and successful 
Hewlett Packard company that dominates the Stamford Research Park reached its 20th 
birthday before its employee size exceeded 1,000.  So perhaps Cambridge is not so different 
in essential composition and timeframe, albeit on a much smaller overall scale. 
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Science parks have become a common phenomenon at many western universities. At the 
heart of the science padc movement was the belief that science parks would act as nuclei 
of regional technical enterpreneurship. The proximity of academic and industrial research 
would create a climate of symbiosis where multiple synergies for innovation would be 
present. In this way, both academic research and industrial innovation would benefit. 
Recently, however, criticisms have come to attack this point of view. Geographical 
proximity has been overemphasized, to the detriment of professional proximity, it has 
been argued. 
The paper starts with a brief overview of the enthusiasm surrounding the initial 
development of science parks. It then goes on reviewing some of the findings from the 
field of technology management and R&D management. These fmdings allow for a more 
thorough explanation of recent criticisms on the relevance of science parks in inducing 
industrial innovation. Finally, the major issues emerging from this discussion will be 
illustrated through a swvey of the company population on Belgian and Dutch science 
parks. 
ll. FROM EN1HUSIASM TO SCEPTICISM? 
In order to keep abreast of  scientific and technological developments, external sourcing of 
scientific and technological information becomes increasingly important to the modem 
corporation. Along  with  a growing awareness of the  need  for  extra-organizational 
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103 scientific and technological linkages, the belief that universities constitute a significant 
underutilized source of technological innovation has  gained  wide acceptance.  For 
instance, a National Science Foundation study (1982) states that "direct links between 
universities and corporations currently constitute only a miniscule portion Oess than one-
half of  one percent) of the national R&D-effort." Nonetheless, there exists a fmn belief 
that universities could play a crucial role in promoting technological change. First of all, 
they make their contributions indirectly by advancing the frontiers of  science, by critically 
reviewing and systematizing the accumulated technical knowledge, and,  especially 
through the training of  students and researchers. But, at the same time, universities can be 
viewed as pools of technical expertise and creativity to be tapped directly through the 
involvement of academic scientists and engineers in the process of industrial innovation. 
Stankiewicz (1984) argues that the emphasis on such direct links is growing. Jaffe (1989) 
demonstrates the existence of a significant effect of university research on corporate 
patents in  such  areas as drugs, medical technology, electronics, optics, and  nuclear 
technology. In addition, he argues that university research acts indirectly on innovation 
through inducing industrial R&D spending. It is not astonishing then that governments, 
universities as well as  industry have engaged in  a wide spectrum of organizational 
experiments aimed at strengthening the links between  the  academic and  industrial 
environment. 
One experiment has been the creation of  science and technology parks. According 
to the United Kingdom Science Park Association, a science park is a propeny based 
initiative which includes the following features: 
- Has formal and operational links with a University, other Higher Education 
Institution or Research Center; 
- Is designed to encourage the formation and growth of knowledge-based 
businesses and other organizations normally resident on site; 
104 (I) 
- Has a management function which is actively engaged in the transfer of 
technology and business skills· to the organizations on site. (see Monck et al., 
1988) 
This definition reflects the concern of universities and other technical institutions 
to encourage the transfer of technology and business skills among the tenants of the park. 
It thus excludes those instances where there is no organizational commitment to stimulate 
or facilitate access to technology. 
It is not astonishing  then  that  the role models  provided by  Silicon  Valley, 
Boston's Route 128, and Cambridge-UK have led to numerous attempts to imitate the 
emergence of high-technology clusters.  These  success  stories convinced regional 
development planners that a scenario existed to create regional enterpreneurial technology 
clusters.  The local  university  would  act  as  a growth  pole,  being  a locus of high 
technology information to established industrial firms  and, at the same time, being a 
source of  new technology based fmns. The presence of a science park would facilitate the 
transition of academic scientists to become academic entrepreneurs. Physical proximity 
would ease the flow of scientific/technological infonnation and the creation of a network 
of collaborations among different science park tenants. Resident companies would gain 
privileged access to highly specialized manpower in the fonn of graduate students and 
university researchers. Thus, one of the fundamental premises in the justification for the 
growing number of science parks is that high-technology industry gains competitive 
advantage through location alongside a university because of the enhanced infonnation, 
collaboration and recruitment opponunities, see Stankiewicz (1984) and Monck et al. 
(1988). 
The enthusiasm of government planners, university officials and industrialists has 
led to the creation of numerous science parks: Engstrom (1987) describes the existence of 
more than 150 US science parks; a 1988 Financial Times survey announced the presence 
105 of 38 operational parks in the UK, while 9 more were planned; Belgium nowadays has 
10 university science parks, the Netherlands 3. The list is still growing and this growth is 
not likely to come to an end in the near future. 
Notwithstanding this enthusiasm, research studies have become increasingly 
sceptic. The NSF-study on university-industry relationships (1982) found that over 50 
percent of the US-par~s never approached their initial expectations and that they are 
generally not significant stimuli to technology transfer. Miller and COte (1987) reach the 
same conclusion in their recent book, "Growing the Next Silicon Valley". Macdonald 
(1987) pretends that much of the enthusiasm surrounding British science parks is a 
product of  self-interest and is in stark contrast to the (dark) reality that will eventually face 
many of them.  Monck et al.  (1988) concluded their survey (sponsored by the UK-
Science Park Association) with the following statement: 
"These results suggest the need to reappraise the comparative advantage of a 
science park location. They indicate two alternatives. The frrst is that less 
emphasis should be placed upon  direct or indirect links with the local 
university, since that can apparently be cultivated by fliDlS located elsewhere. 
Alternatively, the results indicate that the level of university linkage developed 
by off-park firms has not significantly been bettered by science park fmns." 
ill. SCIENCE PARKS: A 1HEORETICAL EVALUATION 
A. I  nterorganizational R&D-linkages 
Research on corporate technology strategy points to the increasing imponance of 
external R&D linkages, see Fusfeld (1985) and Perlmutter and Heenan (1986). At the 
same time, however, Haklisch's (1986) systematic review of technical alliances in the 
semiconductor industry shows that such collaborations are not confined to a specific 
geographical context. Daly ( 1985} demonstrates the same world-wide network of R&D 
cooperations and information  flows  in  his  strategic analysis of the  biotechnology 
industry. Thus, the explanation of science park advocates that geographical proximity will 
106 stimulate interorganizational information networks among science park occupants may be 
based on a  biased  understanding  of the relation  between  physical  distance  and 
communication.  Allen  (1984)  indeed demonstrates  that  physical  distance  has an 
overwhelming influence on internal corporate communications. However, his major 
finding is that beyond a distance of 30 metres the probability of infonnal information 
exchange  reaches  aq  asymptotic  level.  Thus,  as  far  as  informal,  face-to-face 
communication is concerned, it does not matter whether you are in two separate buildings 
on the same science park or in two buildings 250 kilometers apan. As a further example, 
the worldwide membership affiliation of MITs Industrial Liaison Program shows that 
geographical proximity may only be of secondary importance. This can be explained by 
the  fact  that  person-to-person  networks  basically  are of two  types:  spatial  and 
professional. Spatial networks are based on a social and/or physical propinquity such as 
exists within the industrial research laboratories studied by Allen. Professional networks 
are networks such as the classical invisible college of academic science which links 
specialists of a particular discipline or profession and have no boundaries per se. Some 
professional networks are also spatial. Silicon Valley is a leading center of microchip 
design. With such centers one must stay in touch. Those in the same profession but 
located elsewhere must still be part of the spatial professional network of such centers and 
hence must by frequent contact maintain this membership. Geographical, or physical, 
proximity is not a necessary condition when task-related communications are considered. 
Evans et al. (1974) found that the number of  communications did drop off considerably 
with distance, but work-related professional contacts override the distance factor. Van 
Dierdonck and Van der Poonen in a study of the diffusion of artificial intelligence in 
Belgium (1987) found frequent contacts of Belgian enterpreneurs with MIT and other 
107 Route 128 enterprises. The professional network clearly has no specific geographical 
boundaries. What really matters is to become part of the broader professional network. 
Social proximity is yet another factor which overrides geographical proximity. 
Corsten (1985) found that a majority of the companies in his sample contacted a particular 
university because either (  1) graduates of that particular university  worked at  that 
company (44 percent) or (2) company representatives knew university scientists from 
contacts at conferences or seminars (23 percent). Thus, one may  wonder whether the 
justifications given for the stimulation of  science parks are over-emphasizing the benefits 
of geographical proximity to the neglect of professional and social proximity variables. 
Although these three types of proximity variables can occur simultaneously, this need not 
be the case. 
B. The interaction between science and technology 
According to  Price  (1965)  science and  technology each  have  their own,  separate 
cumulating structures. Only in special and traumatic cases involving the breaking of a 
paradigm, see Kuhn (1962) and Dosi (1982), can there be a direct flow from the research 
front of science to that of technology or vice versa. Allen ( 1984) basically agrees with this 
point  of view,  although  he  recognizes  the  possibility  of a  gap-filling  science: 
"Occasionally, technology is forced to forfeit some of its independence. This happens 
when its advance is impeded by a lack of understanding of the scientific basis of the 
phenomena with which it is dealing. The call then goes out for help." This call for help 
may cause a temporary, intense interaction between science and technology. Another 
remark  on  Price's  thesis  is  that  nowadays,  technologies  have  emerged  (e.g. 
biotechnology, artificial intelligence) which are much more rooted into academic science. 
Although conflicting views exist on the intensity of the link between (academic) science 
108 and (industrial) technology, one may wonder whether advocates of science parks are 
overrating the degree of coupling between science and technology. This coupling is uue 
for certain technologies, but there is no proof that it holds ~cross all technologies. To 
summarize, Allen et al. 's ( 1980) studies of the different types of  communication along the 
R&D activity spectrum suggest the following conclusions with respect to science parks as 
facilitators of  R&D cortununications: 
research tasks are universal. The external world is the universal, invisible 
college.  The nearby presence of a particular university will not be a decisive 
factor, except perhaps if  the organization's research has particular links with a 
specific laboratory of  the local science park university. 
development tasks rely heavily on internal communications while external 
communications are managed by the emergence of  technological gatekeepers. 
Moreover, locally oriented tasks such as development work are hypothesized 
to benefit more from  outside operational (e.g.  customers and  vendors) 
contacts than from outside professional (e.g. R&D community as a whole, 
professional associations) contacts. 
technical service tasks  consist mainly of  cost/benefit analyses and incremental 
product/process improvements. These tasks  rely  heavily on  hierarchical 
management control and there is little need for external interactions. Thus, we 
may wonder  whether much  input  from  science-based  organizations  is 
necessary at all. 
Moreover, when referring to the science/technology interactions occurring in 
Silicon Valley or along Route  128, Dorfman (1983) reminds us  that uthe  academic 
institutions that provided much of the momentum are steeped in a tradition of research at 
the frontiers of developments in electronics, computer science and instrumentation and 
compete with a handful of other universities for top ranking in graduate programs in these 
fields. It remains to be seen whether institutions of lesser rank can provide the same 
stimulus to innovation." 
109 C. Labor supply factors 
Labor supply opportunities have often been considered a critical location factor in high-
technology industry, see Oakey (1981) and Dorfman (1983). For several reasons, which 
are discussed below, this labor supply factor is another hypothesized advantage of the 
science park environment 
First of all, the symbiosis of university and industry is believed to enhance 
recruitment opportunities for industrial R&D. Through eollaborations with academia, 
industry gains access to high-talented engineers and scientists.  Recent studies on 
manpower flows in anificial intelligence, see Van Dierdonck and Van der Poonen (1987), 
and biotechnology, see Faulkner (1986), show the omni-presence of manpower flows 
between academic and industrial R&D-laboratories in nascent, science-based industties. 
However, when focusing on science parks, Sirbu et al. (1976) found that "virtually no 
interchange of personnel was reponed between government laboratories and industry at 
any of the sites. There is a modest flow of personnel from university laboratories to 
industry, but very little in the reverse direction." As far as the recruitment of university 
graduates is concerned, those authors reached the following conclusions: "Most of the 
US  fums we interviewed recruited on a nationwide basis and none felt they drew 
disproportionally from local universities. They reponed hiring 16.5% of their staff on 
average from local schools." Monck et al. (1988), in their study of British science parks, 
repon similar findings. They were cenainly unable to detect significant differences in 
recruitment patterns between off-park and on-park companies. 
Second, science parks are believed to act as a catalyst for academic enterpreneurial 
behavior. The presence of a  nunuring science park environment should facilitate. 
researcher transitions from the safe academic world to the risky, uncenain business 
world. Robens and Wainer (1968, 1971, 1988) provide us with an overwhelming data-
110 base of MIT-entrepreneurs who clustered around Route 128. Segal et al. (1985) identified 
a family tree of  244 companies which directly or indirectly originated from 14 Cambridge 
University departments. However,  when  referring  to those success  stories,  a  few 
remarks should be kept in mind. First of all, in none of these two examples is there a 
clear proof that a local science park enhanced this spin-off phenomenon. Even in the case 
of  Stanford lndusoial park, not everyone agrees on its causal link to the high-tech spin-
off phenomenon of Silicon Valley. Macdonald (1987) even goes as far as to argue: 
''While the University certainly did establish the park, it did so primarily because the 
industrial growth of the region had increased Leland Stanford's bequest so much that the 
University could no longer afford its retention as farmland. Unable to sell the land, the 
University was forced to make it pay for itself. Stanford Industrial Park is very much the 
product of  Silicon Valley's industrial prosperity rather than vice versa." Second, although 
more and more universities acknowledge the potential of new venture creation as  a 
technology transfer mechanism, academic entrepreneurs are still a curiosity at most 
academic institutions. Miller and Cote (1987) suggest that a majority of science parks 
have not been able to stimulate massive spin-off creation. To summarize, although it may 
be advantageous to an  academic  spin-off to  locate on  a  science  park  (since  the 
enterpreneurs then remain close to their nucleus) the extent as to which this happens in 
reality is rather ambiguous.-Monck et al.'s (1988) study of British science parks suggests 
a similar ambiguity. 
Third, it is often argued that proximity to a university offers opportunities for 
continuing education of company staff. Participation in  such programs on behalf of 
science park tenants might offer a first step in forging  more intense links between 
organizations on the park (including the university). This might then overcome some of 
the scepticisms described earlier. Indeed, it is often argued that informal linkages are a 
Ill fust and a highly necessary step in establishing more fonnalized R&D collaborations, see 
Stankiewicz (1984) and Faulkner (1986). Panicipation in continuing education programs 
may thus influence the social proximity factor discussed earlier. However, even when a 
technicaVsocial  network of contacts among science park occupants should occur, 
Macdonald (1987) suggests that it will only be a "miniature network" in comparison to 
the global scientific  ·and technological network relevant to the different science park 
tenants. 
D. Benefits to regional development 
Regional development policies also had a major impact on the decision to create 
university science parks. For instance, Japanese science parks were not so much 
developed to foster interorganizational collaborations as to decrease the pressure on 
already heavily industrialized areas like Yokohama, Osaka, Kobe and Kyoto. 
Dorfman (1983) funher refers to agglomeration externalities as another advantage 
of a high-technology cluster location. For some fmns in some industries and at some 
stages of development  there  are  indeed  important  advantages  to  locate  near  to 
complementary and competitive enterprises as well as to customers. Segal et al. (1985) 
reach the same conclusion in their study of  the Cambridge Phenomenon. However, when 
considering Silicon Valley, Route 128 or the Cambridge Phenomenon, we are confronted 
with phenomena involving a region's (multiple) universities. Typically, the new high-tech 
businesses became embedded in an existing business and technological infrastructure in a 
rather spontaneous manner. Most European (and American) science parks, on the 
contrary, are rather anificially created around a single university which is then believed to 
act as a  growth pole. They are often isolated, with little or no local business texture 
present. Segal et al. clearly demonstrated the role of the inner Cambridge town in the 
112 growth of  the Cambridge high-tech cluster. For the majority of science parks, it is rather 
difficult to speak of external economies of scale. At best, one can hope that they will 
evolve over a longer period of time. Thus, the advantages offered by the rich business 
environment on the park as described by Monck (1983) may well  be  an illusion at 
present. 
Finally,  environmental  factors  such  as  attractive  parkland  surroundings, 
residential neighbourhoods, cultural amenities, and easy access to transportation seem to 
be important only up  to a certain treshold level (see Sirbu et al.(l976) and Galbraith 
( 1985) and Monck et al. ( 1988)  ). 
E. The need for empirical investigation 
The previous discussion focused on a number of general issues facing the development of 
university science parks as they appear from the literature. The next section of the paper 
will investigate a number of those issues for the fmns located on Belgian and Dutch 
science parks. This will enable us to assess the situation in Belgium and the Netherlands 
in particular, since the literature is rather general in nature and intercountry differences 
among science parks may account for the fact that the previous remarks have limited 
external validity. 
IV. SURVEY OF BELGIAN AND DUTCH SCIENCE PARK TENANTS 
This section describes the results from a survey of 208 firms located on Belgian and 
Dutch science parks. It starts with a brief description of the sample characteristics before 
focusing on the major issues as they appeared from the literature survey. 
113 A. The sample 
At the moment of the survey (fall 1988), 8 Belgian and 3 Dutch science parks were fully 
operational. All of them became possible through government intervention. Regional 
Development Agencies are heavily involved in the exploitation of the parks. The role of 
most universities is at least a consultative one. They all assist in the screening of  candidate 
applications, while their involvement in the daily management of  the science park varies. 
TABLE 1 
Sample and response rate 
Sites  First year of  operations  SampleN  Valid responses 
Bel~um 
Haasrode  1972-73  32  16 (50'J,) 
San-Tilman  1976  23  8(35%) 
Louvain (lLN)  1976  34  20(59%) 
E\Ue  1978  28  11 (39%) 
Heembeek  1980  7  6(86%) 
Anderlecht  1985  1  I (100%) 
Nivelles  1985  2  2(100%) 
Zellik  1985  10  4 (40CJ,) 
Total  137  68 (50%) 
Nedlerlands 
Twente  1983  49  29(59%) 
Groningen  1984  9  5  (56~) 
Leiden  1985  13  7 (S4fl) 
Total  71  41 (58%) 
Each science park is linked to a single university. Some universities can have up to 3 
affiliated science parks. Some.of the parks are adjacent to the university, others are up to 
15 kilometers distant from the patronizing academic institution. Half of the science parks 
in the sample are less than 5 years old (table 1  ). Of course, the age of most science parks 
114 may be a biasing factor in swveys investigating this phenomenon. Indeed, science park 
advocates claim that it may take at least a decade for a cluster to be formed. For instance, 
strong useful links between academia and industty develop over many years through the 
gradual growth of experience and trust among individuals. However, the results of this 
and other swveys (see Sirbu et al. (1976) and Monck et al. (1988}) can at least provide 
some impressions of the science park potential. Moreover, there exist at the moment 
several science parks which are more than a decade old. This makes some predictions 
even less ambiguous. 
In the Belgian case,  15  science park tenants were not included in the sample 
because of their activities (hotel, garage, tennis court, university laboratories, etc.). Thus, 
we were only interested in companies which might somehow benefit from interactions 
with academia or other high-tech fmns. In the course of the survey, we learned that 7 of 
the 137 Belgian companies had left the science park in 1988. This reduced the Belgian 
subset from 75 to 68 useful responses, since the companies who left the science park did 
not fill out the questionnaire. Most of them declared that the science park location had 
only been a temporary solution  to them and thus showed a rather low commitment 
towards the local science park environment. As far as the Netherlands are concerned, 
Twente is somewhat different from the other science parks. This science park is in fact an 
incubator facility:  the  Business Technology Center. It was established through  the 
involvement of Control Data, a Regional Development Agency and the University of 
Twente. Sunman ( 1986) ascribes the rapid growth of BTC Twente to the commercial 
orientation of its founders (especially Control Data). According to the definition of the 
UK-Science Park Association, BTC can be considered as a science park development. 
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However, the emphasis on being an incubator may introduce a bias in the Dutch results 
115 (e.g., companies in the incubator will usually be small). However, BTC equally stresses 
the importance of  its scientific/technological environment to potential candidates. 
The questionnaires were mailed out to the general managers of the science park 
companies. All returned questionnaires were eventually filled out by senior managers. 
Thus, we can be confident that the respondents had a broad view on the companies' 
activities as well as on the decision to locate on the site. The results then offer a frrst 
impression of  what happens on Belgian and Dutch science parks. 
B. Company characteristics 
This section describes the characteristics of  the respondent ftnns. After discussing the age 
and employment characteristics of the tenants, we investigate how many tenants belong to 
a multinational group for both countries. As one imponant objective of many science 
parks is to stimulate enterpreneurial behavior, we were panicularly interested in  the 
presence of spin-off companies on the science parks studied. We defined a spin-off as "A 
company created by employees who leave their employer (e.g. a university laboratory, an 
industrial laboratory) to start their proper fmn in order to commercialize technological 
know-how acquired on their previous job." 
As could be expected, the presence of the majority of respondents on each site 
studied is rather recent (see table 2). 
TABLE2 
Age characteristics of  responding tenant firms (mean age, median age and age range) 
Mean  Median  Range 
Belgium (n=67)  31(2  2  0-12 
Nethttlands (n=40)  21/3  2  0-6 
116 Thus, although 4 Belgian science parks were created in the 1970's, their growth 
really started in the 80's. Only 10 respondents were established between 1976 and 1979. 
The take-off of  Dutch science parks was much faster than in the Belgian case. The role of 
BTC Twente, which accounts for the majority of the Dutch sample and the Dutch 
respondents, is obvious. The other Dutch sites may develop more at the rate of their 
Belgian counterparts. Although Belgium showed considerable enthusiasm in the early 
70's, there has been a period of stagnation between 1977 and 1985. Since 1985, the 
interest of regional developers and universities seems to be increasing once again. The 
number of new tenants on Belgian sites may reflect this policy change (median age=2 
years). 
Total employment for the Belgian respondents (n=68) amounts to 3856. In the 
Dutch case this figure is 480 (n=41 ).  In both instances, the majority of tenants is small 
(see  table  3).  Belgian  science  parks,  however,  were  able  to  attract  some  major 
multinational  companies  (mainly  in  the  sphere  of electronics,  informatics,  and 
phannaceuticals). Blue collar workers are a minority among science park employees. This 
is obvious since all science parks formally forbid traditional manufacturing activities. As 
we will see, a lot of respondents actually have production facilities, though, in terms of 
employment, these activities are of secondary importance. Science park authorities also 
appear to be rather flexible with respect to the application of the admission rules. In some 
instances, the policies of regional developers have aroused irritation on the academic side. 
Regional Development Agencies have sometimes been accused of attaching too much 
importance to employment statistics, to the neglect of the creation of a technology-
oriented business texture. 
A  total of 9  companies  on Dutch  science  parks  (n=41,  22%)  belong  to  a 
multinational group. This number is much higher in Belgium: 33 out of 68 tenants (49%). 
117 This is reflective of the policy of Belgian science park authorities to attract foreign 
investments,  whereas  Dutch  science parks are more  geared  towards stimulating 
indigeneous growth. This is further exemplified by  the presence of spin-offs on the 
science parks studied. In the Dutch case, 15 out of  41  (37%) respondents acknowledged 
to be a spin-off. Six of them originated from a local university laboratory, two from 
another science park organization. The remaining 7 had no such relationship with other 
science park tenants. In Belgium, only 11 (n=68, 16%) spin-offs were detected among 
the respondents. Two of them originated from the local science park university. In the 
remaining cases, no apparent links with another science park parent were found. From 
those results, one may conclude that Belgian science parks have not been significant spin-
off generators till  now. This does not mean  that  academic spin-offs are absent in 
Belgium. We were able to detect the existence of at  least 42 spin-offs at Belgian 
universities, see Van Dierdonck and Debackere (1988). The majority of them were less 
than 5 years old. Only, they do not seem to have a preference for a science park location. 
TABLE3 
Employment characteristics of  responding tenants 
Belg:ium (n=68)  Netherlands (n=411 
TotaJ employment 
Mean  56.7  11.7 
Median  23.5  4 
Range  0.380  0-50 
Blue collar employment 
Mean  5.4  1.7 
Median  0  0 
Range  0-50  ()..30 
118 One should also recognize that the Belgian academic community has long been, 
and in some cases still is, sceptical towards academic entrepreneurs. Moreover, not all 
scientists display the same degree of enterpreneurial behavior, see Roberts and Peters 
(1981) and McMullan and Melnyk (1988). The difference between Belgium and the 
Netherlands concerning spin-offs may also be a reflection of the different degree of 
involvement on behalf* of the parent university in the management of the science park. 
Although regional developers play a crucial role in both countries, Dutch universities 
pursue their consultative role in a much more active manner.  In  Belgium only one 
university has been really actively involved in the promotion and management of its 
science park from the very beginning. Other universities have started following this 
example now, after they were rather passive in the past. Although it is dangerous to make 
causal inferences, it appears as if active university  involve~ent·{preferably beyond a 
consultative role) exerts a positive influence on the development of the science park. 
Only a minority of respondents provided financial results. Some of them were 
unable to do so for various reasons (establishment on the site too recent; being part of a 
larger industrial group makes it impossible to sort out the results of the science park 
entity; the activities of the tenant are not profit-oriented), while others were simply 
unwilling to provide financial information. For those who did provide financial results, 
we can only say that the figures provided reflect the small-sized nature of the businesses 
present on most science parks. 
C. Company activities 
The broad range of activities undertaken by the respondents in this survey makes it hard 
to categorize them. In an attempt at classification, table 4 presents 7 main categories. In 
classifying fmns in this way, it must be remembered that the same firm may undertake a 
119 number of  activities at the particular location and that it can, in some cases, be difficult to 
identify a single main activity. This classification should then only be taken as broadly 
indicative of the activities of  the surveyed finns. 
TABLE4 
Respondents' activities 
Belgium (n=68)  Netherlands (n=41) 
Electronics  and  data  processing  12  4 
equipment 
Medicine.  biotechnology  and  8  7 
phannaceuticals 
Telecommunications  4  2 
Informatics  7  6 
Consultancy  10  14 
Teaching and training  s  1 
Other  22  7 
Those activities are not only very diverse. At the level of the individual science 
parks, they even do not always match with the university's specialization. So there is the 
example of  a university which has a good reputation in biotechnology, while the majority 
of fmns on its science park are well established micro-electronics firms. Moreover, the 
broad range of  activities present on each park makes one wonder at the effecti\ieness of 
science parks in creating an atmosphere where ideas flow freely among researchers at 
different organizations present on the park. It is our belief that openness is indeed 
beneficial to technology development. However, this openness should prevail within the 
community of  researchers working on a certain related set of  scientific and technological 
problems. This R&D community is, however, not confined to the narrow geographic 
boundaries of a science park. Instead, it is a global phenomenon. The local environment 
on the science park is at best a miniscule node in the communication and collaboration 
120 network relevant to each researcher. The diversity of activities present on most science 
parks cenainly questions their potential in bringing together a critical mass of  researchers 
on one particular spot. 
Finally, each respondent described the different functional activities present at his 
company: 13 Dutch respondents (32%) and 39 Belgian respondents (57%) reponed 
internal  R&D activities. However,  the  absence of internal  R&D  does not  prevent 
companies from having contacts and even research contracts with the local university (cfr. 
infra). Small companies may actually use the local university as a kind of  external R&D 
department. Moreover, 24 Dutch respondents (59%) and 44 Belgian respondents (65%) 
had marketing activities at the site, while 19 Dutch respondents (46%) and 34 Belgian 
respondents (50%) had production activities at the site. The presence of production 
activities in nearly half of the companies surveyed, and the absence of internal R&D in 
about half of the companies surveyed, are rather striking findings if one keeps in mind the 
missions of a science park. 
D. Reasons to locate on the park 
Respondents were asked to rank-order the three most important reasons for their choice to 
locate on the site. It is somewhat surprising that 20 Dutch (  49%) and 35 Belgian (51%) 
do not mention the availability of  external scientific/technological resources at all when 
discussing their location decision. About half of the survey respondents do not perceive 
the linkage potential with the local university and/or other high-tech neighbours an 
important factor in  their location decision. Table 5 shows that  only a minority of 
respondents mention such factors as crucial decision variables. 
121 TABLES 
External scientific and technological resources as factors influencing loaction decision 
Availability of scientific/  Belgiwn (n=68)  Netherlands (n=41) 
rechnological ~urces 
rank-ordered as ••• 
1st most important  7  8 
2nd most important  14  9 
3rd most imPOrtant  12  4 
Other factors influencing the location decision were: image of  the site, easy access 
to  highways or airports,  financial  incentives by  public agencies (tax deductions, 
subventions), convenience of the site, available office space and services provided to 
young entrepreneurs (BTC Twente, Incubator Facility Leuven), etc. Only one respondent 
explicitly stated that recruitment opportunities were a motivating factor. Quite similar to 
the Monck et al.'s (1988) finding for the British situation, "it was the prestige and image 
of the site which  was the most frequently  mentioned factor influencing choice of 
location." 
E. I  nterorganizationallinkages among respondents 
1. Contacts with the local university 
A total of 34 (83%) Dutch respondents and 46 (68%) Belgian respondents confmned the 
existence of  contacts with the local university. Table 6 summarizes the types of  linkages. 
Each respondent could check more than one category. 
As already mentioned, tenants do not need internal R&D capabilities to become 
involved in cooperations with the local university. For instance, only 7 out of 12 Dutch 
tenants involved in collaborative R&D with the local university have in-house R&D-
122 capabilities. Thus, S Dutch respondents (sec table 6) without internal R&D do have 
collaborative R&D with the local university. 
TABLE6 
Number of respondents per type of  lin/cage 
Type of  linkage  Belgium (n=68)  Neaherlands (n=41) 
Collaborative R&.D  17  12 
Academic consulting  14  12 
Service (e.g. routine 
leSIS and analyses)  8  4 
lnfonnal CORiaCIS  18  16 
Olhet  12  12 
Other linkages include such activities as: organizing seminars together with a 
university department; the founder of the company was a student or researcher at the 
university; the company is a university supplier (e.g. medical equipment); key scientists 
of the tenant lecture at the university; the tenant suppons the university's computer 
facilities etc. In many of  those instances, the university benefits more from the presence 
of the tenant company than vice versa. This finding was also reponed by Sirbu et al. 
(1976). 
To conclude, although a majority of respondents has some type of linkage with 
the local university, only a minority of these linkages involves collaborative R&D. Our 
research at this phase was only intended to _get  an overall impression of the R&D 
environment on Belgian and Dutch science parks and, as a consequence, did not include a 
control group of off-park fmns. Nevenheless, it is interesting to quote Monck et al. 's 
( 1988) results here: "The most obvious and perhaps surprising observation is how 
apparently .similar off-park firms' responses were to those of on-park fums. This is 
panicularly clear in the R&D and persoMellinks. Park-based fmns clearly place a greater 
123 emphasis on informal contacts with academics. In  the more formal links such as the 
employment of academics, sponsoring trials, student project links and the employment of 
graduates, off-park finns have an equal or greater number of links." 
2. Labor supply 
Labor supply was one of the critical factors in  the Dorfman study (1983). Table 7 
summarizes the number of local university graduates employed at the respondents' 
facilities. 
TABLE? 
Employment of  local university graduates 
Nwnber of local university graduates  Belgium (n=68)  Netherlands (n=41) 
employed 
0  35  24 
1-5  25  15 
6-10  2  2 
11-15  4  0 
20  1  0 
30  1  0 
The total number of  local university graduates employed at Belgian respondents is 
179 (total employment=3856). In the Dutch case-we find 611ocal university graduates 
(total employment=480). Given the scope of this preliminary survey, comparison with 
off-park frrms  is impossible. We also lack information on the  relative number of 
graduates from other universities employed at the respondents. This makes intetpretation 
of table 7 a bit ambiguous. However, the fact that more than half of the respondents do 
not employ local university graduates at all questions the imJ>onance of the labor supply 
124 factor within the micro-environment of the parks. This finding confirms Sirbu's  (1976) 
suggestion that science park tenants recruit on a nation-wide basis. 
Another potential advantage of a science park location is  the easy access of 
tenants' employees to continuing education programs at the local university. Ten Dutch 
respondents (24%) and 18 Belgian respondents (26%) acknowledge to make use of this 
opponunity. This situation may well be subject to change in coming years as more and 
more universities start offering post-experience courses. However,  at the  moment, 
continuing education appears to be a rather limited phenomenon. 
3. R&D projects 
The 13 Dutch and 39 Belgian respondents who mentioned the presence of  internal R&D 
capabilities, also specified the actual number of R&D projects in progress, the fraction of 
those projects carried out without external collaboration, and the distribution of projects 
involving external panners. Table 8 summarizes some of the results. 
TABLES 
Number of internal/external R&D  projects  at respondents  having  internal R&D 
capabilities 
Bel~ium  {n=39)  Netherlands {n=l3) 
Total number of  projects in progress  321  65 
Fraction  D.Q1  involving  external  168 (52%)  25 (38%) 
partnerS 
Fraction involving external partners  153 (48%)  40(62%) 
-local university as partner  35  12 
-other science park J)3I1Jler  3  2 
125 Although fonnal, external R&D linkages are imponant, they are not really biased 
towards the local science park environment. In  Belgium, 38 (out of 153, 25%) R&D 
projects  were  directed  towards  local  science park  organizations.  For the  Dutch 
respondents, this amounted to to 35%, or 14 projects. Of  course, this does not yet tell us 
very  much  about  the characteristics of the projects (content,  duration, degree of 
innovativeness, etc.). Bpt we must not forget that over half of our respondents did not 
have internal R&D-activities. We are confident that the respondents without internal R&D 
who are involved in collaborative projects together with the local university will not alter 
the obtained percentages much. We arrive at this assumption by looking at the individual 
respondents. The respondents in table 8 are without doubt the most imponant R&D-
oriented tenants on  the sites studied. The respondents who have  no internal R&D 
capabilities, though  are involved with  the local  university, are  all  very small and 
production or marketing oriented. 
Table 8 also demonstrates that collaborative R&D effons are not confined to a 
physical locus. The collaborative R&D-effons reponed in  table 8 do not only have a 
national dimension (as well in Belgium as in the Netherlands, a lot of respondents having 
collaborations with the local university also have collaborations with a major pan of the 
nations' other universities), but they take on international dimensions as well  (e.g. 
projects together with other European and even U.S. universities). 
The small f1rn1s reponing collaborative R&D have a strong bias towards the local 
university. Thus, this type of company might actually gain easier access to the R&D 
community by locating near a particular university. But even here, Macdonald (1987) 
warns us:  " The notion that any single university department contains even- all-the 
technical information required by a high-technology finn, while evident in much of the 
justification given  for  science parks,  would  alann most academics.  Only a  weak 
126 department can pretend to be self-contained: the strongest department is more likely to be 
but a node of  an academic information network to which high-technology fmns may seek 
access." 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This discussion was a  first attempt at providing some insight into the potential role of 
science parks in the process of technological innovation. It was argued that we should at 
least be offered some empirical insight into potential advantages and misconceptions 
related to this new development, since the number of science parks keeps growing and 
since those science parks are often claimed to offer a competitive advantage to tenant 
fmns in terms of access to the R&D community. One key conclusion is that a science 
park location may indeed ease access to a single university, although our fmdings and the 
findings of similar foreign studies question the degree to which  this really happens. 
Moreover, the university affiliated With the science park is at best one node in the global 
R&D community of interest to the high-technology firm. Scientific and technological 
developments occur within the context of broader R&D communities. Such communities 
are global in nature, encompassing researchers in organizations in the private as well as in 
the public sector. Macdonatd•s warning that a science park can create at most a "miniature 
network" among tenants is highly relevant in this respect and seems to be borne out by 
our findings on collaborative R&D at science park finns. 
This leads to another remark. Given the ambiguous performance of most science 
parks, we believe it is time for a clear assessment of their mission. Our findings on some 
of)b~  ol4c;~  Q~lgiag  R~~-cl~~y,  de~n.strate  th~t  _they  hav~  beeJ! su~~~ful  in  -~~~~~g 
tenant fmns. However, in terms of fostering extra-organizational R&D linkages the 
situation looks a little different. There do exist linkages towards the local science park 
127 environment, though  they arc rather sparse.  Nowadays, each university believes an 
affiliated science park is an absolute necessity in order to become an accepted player in the 
newly emerging arena of  enterpreneurial science. They should remember, though, that a 
science park is not necessary the most effective way to become involved in industrial 
science and technology. A multitude of  other mechanisms exist. At the same time, the 
discussion of the role models (Silicon Valley, Route 128 and Cambridge-UK) places their 
spontaneous development in sharp contrast with the artificial push experienced on most 
science parks. In these instances, science parks were consequences rather than causes of 
regional technological development. 
To summarize, we have focused on a number of topics which may help explain 
the current differences between the expectations and the realities facing the development 
of science parks. Although it may sound rather sceptical, we should keep in  mind the 
recent character of many science parks (a majority of them are less than 10 years old). 
This may necessitate a review of some of the statements made earlier as time goes by. 
However, at least some of the problems are unlikely to change with time (e.g., the issue 
of professional proximity versus physical proximity). 
A final remark can be made, especially with respect to many European science 
parks, namely the shon distances on the continent. For instance, the vast majority of 
Belgian universities lays within a radius of about 50 kilometers of the capital of Brussels. 
The same remark holds for the Netherlands, and even for the industrialized pans of the 
UK. Thus, do we really need to emphasize physical proximity in  instances where 
everything is already so close? 
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Before  considering  the  phenomenon  of  the  technopol is  itself,  I  propose  to 
reflect  for  a  moment  on  the way  space  and  technology  are  represented, 
r~ferring extensively  to  the existing economic  literature  in  these  two 
areas.  In  fact  the  term  'technopol is'  Itself prompts  such  an  exercise,  as 
it made  up  of  two  elements:  technology  and  'pol is' -or city- which  is an 
elementary  form  of structured space. 
What  we  would  I ike  to show,  before placing the  technopol Is  In  Its  logical 
position at  the  intersection of  Its  two  constituent  dimensions,  technology 
and  space,  is  that  successive economic  analyses of  space  have  sought  to 
incorporate  innovation,  just  as studies of  innovation  and  technological 
change  have  placed  increasing emphasis on  the spatial/territorial 
dimension. 
Although  the  technopolis  takes many- perhaps  too many- different  forms, 
it  is nonetheless an  appropriate concept  on  which  to bases an  analysis, 
because  it  is  the  result of  the  convergence of  the  these  two  movements. 
The  plan  for  this paper  is  therefore as  follows: 
1.  Representation of  space  and  innovation 
2.  Technological  change  and  the  territorial  dimension 
3.  The  technopol is as  the cradle of  technology. 
1.  Representation of space and  innovation 
As  R.  Gordonl  explains,  the  traditional  theories  regard space,  I ike 
innovation,  as an  exogenous  datum;  business  location decisions are  taken 
within  the  rigid framework  of  a  set of existing factors. 
In  these  theories economic  calculations are based on  distance,  although  a 
distinction should  be  made  between  the  analyses based on  the work  of 
A.  Weber2  which  stress transport  costs and  those  based on  the work  of 
A.  Losch3  which  emphasize  spatial  competition,  that  is to say  competition 
R.  Gordon  "Systems de production.  rfsune  tndustriela et  re9ions.  lea transformation dana 
l'or9anlaatlon aoclale et apatlale de  l'lnnovation".  Revue  d'Economle  lnduatrielle.  No  51. 
ler  trlmeatre 1990. 
2  A.  Weber  "Theory of  the location of  lnduatry".  University of Chlca90 Preas,  1929. 
3  A.  l6ach "the Economics  of location". Yale University Preas,  1954. 
133 between  producers whose  aim  Is  to maximize  their market  catchment  area.4 
If  we  reduce  the  interdependent  relationships between  firms  to commercial 
movements  in  the context of  competition  for  goods  and  services  (GORDON,  op. 
cit.),  it  is as  If  the  location of  these  Interdependencies offsets the 
frictional  cost of  distance.  As  GORDON  puts  It,  "allowing  for  a  given cost 
and  transport  structure and  the variable dependence  of supply on  the 
ability to move  products,  manufacturing  Industry will  locate  Itself close 
to  Its market  at  the  lowest  cost,  unless  It  needs  to be  sited closer  to the 
source of  supply  because of  a  relatively greater proportion of  local 
Inputs". 
The  traditional  aPProaches  thus  consider  sPace either as a  point or  as a 
surface,  but  do  not  Include  Innovation or  technologY  in  the analYsis. 
It  Is  the GermanS  and  Scandinavian&  geographical  schools which  have 
started to  think more  In  terms  of  innovation  (theory of contagion by  waves 
In  a  homogeneous  space7),  drawing  In  part on  the  theories of  industrial 
and  urban  polarization.  However,  as A.  RALLETB  points out,  the  theory of 
Industrial  polarization based on  the work  of  F.  PERROUX  is  in  fact  a-
spatial.  Although  the ability of  Inter-Industry relations to create 
regional  economic  poles  Is emphasized,  the aspect of  territorial 
competition between  these poles  is not  considered. 
Moving  the polarization factor  from  Industry  to  the city,  the  theory of 
urban  polarization revolves around  concepts such  as  the economy  of 
urbanization and  urban  hierarchy.  However,  these  two  concepts seem  to us 
to be  descriptive or statistical  concepts  (HALLET,  op.  cit.). 
The  work  of  the European  research grouping on  Innovatory  environments 
(GREMI)  has  taken  this a  stage further,  using comparative  empirical 
research  and  the concept  of  the  'innovatory environment',  in  an  attempt  to 
combine  the spatial  approach  and  the  industrial  approach  Into one. 
4  For  a  conclae account  of  the difference• between  the  theorlea of A.  WEBER  and  A.  LOScH. 
aee v.  JACQUIER-ROUX  "Approach  to  location with a  view  to atudylng  the apatlal 
organization of multinational  companlea  in  high denalty RID  induatrlea,  IREPD.  Auguat 
1991. 
5  Cf.  w.  CRISTALLER  "Die Centrale Orte  In  Suddeutachland'',  Engllah  tranalatlon:  "Central 
Place•  In  Southern  Get"MCCny",  Prentice Hall,  New  York,  1933. 
6  T.  HAGERSTRAN)  "IMovatlon dlffualon aa a  apatlal  proceaa".  Unlveralty of Chlc"o,  1H7. 
7  Th.  SAINT-JULIEN  "La  dlffualon apatlale dee  Innovation•"•  Reclua,  1985. 
8  Cf.  A.  RALLET  "Th4orle de  Ia polarlaatlon et technopolea",  Econamlea  et Socl4t4a,  aerlea F 
(32)  "Progrta et Crolaaance",  No  8/1991,  PUG. 
134 This work,  however,  Is more  in  the  way  of  an  attempt  to renew  the spatial 
or  regional  economy  than  a  cross-linking of  the  regional  and  the  industrial 
economy9 
2.  Technological  change  and  the territorial dimension 
Before  looking  at whether  a  territorial  dimension  has  any  relevance  to the 
process of  Innovation.  we  should  spend  some  time  considering  the 
representations of  technological  change  in  the  light of  some  recent  work 
based on  the evolutionist or  neo-Schumpeterian  approach.  We  shall  see that 
these  representations  lead  us  to take  a  differing view  of  space  In  the 
process of  innovation. 
The  basic concept,  from  the neo-Keynesian  to  the neo-classical  schools of 
thought.  Is  technical  progress.  This  Is defined as  the substitution of  a 
set of  superior  techniques  for  a  set of existing or  currently used 
techniques.  This  definition refers not  to a  development  or  a  process of 
innovation  but  to a  process of  adoption.  The  technical  parameters are 
external  constraints on  economic  choices,  and  the only question  is which  of 
the various available  techniques  to choose. 
Under  the standard theories technological  advance  is perfectly defined 
(ex-ante).  Innovation- generally a  new  production process- is absorbed 
by  a  structure which  Is  Itself a  datum.  Consequently,  the starting and 
finishing posts are  fixed  in  advance.  It  is assumed  that  the economy  will 
adapt  to  the  technology. 
Under  the evolutionist approach,  developed  Inter  alia by  G.  Dosi,10  the 
environment  not  only alters the conditions of  technological  change;  tt  also 
changes  Itself as  the process unfolds.  Innovations are  the  result of  a 
cumulative  process,  hence  the emphasis  on  a  sequence of  choices creating an 
Irreversible momentum.  We  have  thus moved  from  an  exogenous  representation 
of  technical  progress  to an  endogenous  representation of  Innovation. 
Technology  Is no  longer  a  resource  but  a  result.  A number  of conclusions 
drawn  from  this approach  have  an  impact  on  the  relationship between 
Innovation  and  territory. 
(i)  Since  It  is the result of  a  process.  technology  is non-
transferable.  This means  that  a  technology  cannot  be  transferred 
from  one  space  to another  or  within  the  same  territory. 
9  Except  for certain work,  particularly the writings of  J.C.  PERRIN.  By  way  of example  the 
same  author has alao written "lnduatrlal  organization:  the territorial  component",  Revue 
d'Economle  lnduatrlelle,  No  51,  1at quarter 1990. 
10  G.  Ooal  "Technological  Paradigm  and  Technological  Trajectoriea:  a  auggested  Interpretation 
of  the Oetenninanta and  Direction• of  Technical  Change",  Research Polley,  No  11/1982. 
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capital), only specific resources.  This means  that  there  Is  no 
optimum  form  or  mode  of  territorial organization but  simply 
different  forms  of effectiveness and  coherence which  are  the result 
of  the combination of  assets specific to each  territory. 
( i i I )  Location  Is  becoming  a  factor  in  the creation of  technology  to the 
extent  that  it  represents an  opportunity  to develop  certain types 
of  relations between  businesses or  productive phases.11 
Clearly,  we  are very  close here  to  the  ideas of Marshall  In  relation to the 
''lndustr Ia I distr let  .. ,  a  theory which  revolves  around  the concepts of 
proximity and  externality.  It  Is  these  two  concepts which,  taken  together, 
define a  technopol is  in  our  view. 
3.  The  technopolls as the cradle of technology 
As  we  have  seen above,  technology  must  be  represented not  as a  resource but 
as  the  result of  an  innovation  process.  The  technopolls  Is one  of  the 
places  in  which  such  a  process can  be  created and  develop.  It  can 
therefore be  regarded  as  •organizational  innovation of  the  territorial 
type"  (Rallet,  op cit.).  The  assumption  underlying  the  technopolls  Is  that 
proximity  reduces  the organizational  distance which  prevents  the various 
players  Involved  In  the process of  technological  creation from  coming 
together  (Rallet,  op cit.).  It  Is  therefore  Instrumental  in  reducing  a 
number  of costs, mostly  related to  the movement  of  information.  The 
technopol is therefore enables us  to reduce  what  have  come  to be  known  as 
"transaction costs".  The  higher  these costs and  the greater  the obstacles 
to development  of  technology,  the  stronger  the case  for  the  technopolis. 
We  can  thus assume  that  depending  on  the country or  region,  which  can  be 
characterized  for  a  particular  form  of organization,  a  technopolls  Is 
necessary  to a  greater or  lesser extent  in  order  to  reduce  transaction 
costs:  the cost of  looking  for  contacts,  the cost of  decompartmentallzlng 
the  firm's organization,  the cost of moving  information  (monitoring)  and  so 
on. 
The  purpose of  the  technopolis  Is  to generate what  one  might  call  visible 
effects of organization.  Through  appropriate territorial  organization  It 
Is  possible  to give  tangible  form  to the results,  in  this  Instance  to 
11  J.L.  GAFFARD.  The  creation of  technology.  Business  strate9ies and  public policies. 
University of Nice.  1987. 
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create  technology,  something  which  measures  taken  independently of each 
other or within traditional  (market)  mechanisms  could not  have  done.  The 
characteristic feature of  the  technopolis  is therefore  that  its visible 
achievements  are determined  by  the proximity of  those  Involved. 
Conclusion 
In  conclusion we  would  like to make  three comments: 
(I)  the first  attempts  to reflect  the diversity of  the  types of 
technopo I is, 
(ii)  the second  seeks to define  the concept  of specific asset more 
closely,  and 
( i i i)  the  third concerns  the players  involved  in  what  one  might  call  a 
'knowledge  investment  network'. 
(I)  As  we  know,  the  term  technopolis covers  a  very  wide  range  of different 
situations;  so much  so that  some,  conscious of  the  paradox,  have  referred 
to  It as  a  "non-reproducible mode1••.12  There  are numerous  typologies of  a 
technopolis which  we  cannot  go  Into here.  One  of  the questions  raised at  a 
recent  colloquium on  technopollses13 was  the matter  of  their  territorial 
status.  In  the  light of  recent  work  carried out  for  the  European 
Communlty14  we  believe that  a  Important  distinction,  and  one  which  has  an 
Impact  on  the evaluation of  the  technopolls,  has  to be  made  between 
technopolises which  belongs  to a  broader  territorialized system of 
innovation and -technopolises which  constitute a  localized  innovation  and 
production system  in  their own  right. 
(II)  While  certain areas may  compete  with  each  other  In  terms of  their 
ability to supply certain quantitative factors,  other  territories are not 
subJect  to such  a  constraint  imposed  by  commercial  relationships because 
what  they  have  to offer  Is  their  uniqueness. 
12  J. Perrin ''Le•  technop&le•:  ml rage• ou  nouvelle• pha•e• de  Ia  dlvi•ian du  travail?". 
Culture  technique,  No  18,  Narch  1988. 
13  Re•earch colloquium  'Technopoll•e• and  other territorial mea•ure•  to promote  technology 
tran•fer•  Nancy.  France,  16-18 October  1991. 
14  MUST.  'Coherence or dlver•lty of  Innovation  •y•tem•  In  Europe'.  Report  for  the FAST 
progrCIIIH,  CEC,  1991. 
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'  '· ..  ~.  .  ... This supply  depends  on  the ability of  the territories  In  question  to 
combine  internal  and/or  external  resources  in  an  original  form  of 
coordination geared  to  the production of  visible results from  the network 
(see above).  One  of  the key  features of  these  territories  is their ability 
to  reduce  firms'  propensity  for  volati I ity,  particularly  In  the case of 
large-scale  firms. 
Another  aspect of  the uniqueness of  a  technopol is  is  the density of 
material  and  immaterial,  formal  and  informal  relationships which  create an 
irreversible momentum  for  those  involved  in  the  process of  innovation. 
Since  they benefit  from  the proximity effects of  the  network,  firms  In  a 
technopol is cannot  leave  the  network  without  suffering significant 
diseconomies. 
The  need  to acquire  new  skills related  to  the  technopolis,  which  Is an 
essential  component  of  a  permanent  and  incremental  process of  innovation, 
highlights  the essential  role of  training.  In  common  with  J.  PERRIN  (op. 
cit.) we  believe  that one  of  the main  functions of  the  technopolis  Is  to 
promote  a  catchment  area of  specialized employment  in  the scientific, 
technical  and  sociological  fields. 
As  the structure of  the  technopolis  is  in  part  determined  by  the  local 
labour  market,  in  its turn  the  technopol is must  impart  a  structure to that 
market  in  order  to  increase  the supply of specialist skills. 
iii.  The  third and  last  remark  concerns  the players  involved  in  a 
technopol is as a  'knowledge  investment  network'.  Despite  the many 
different  types of  technopol is,  they  al 1  contain  firms  specialized  in 
engineering,  engineering consultancy,  software design,  training and  so on, 
as wei I  as university  research  laboratories and  other  types of  research 
laboratory.  As  far  as  the  firms  are concerned,  certain technopolises 
consist  almost  exclusively of  small  and  medium-sized  businesses,  while 
others are structured around  larger  firms.  I  should  like  to echo  the point 
made  by  J.P.  de  GAUDEMAR,15  that  the supply of  technology  from  a 
technopolis would  have  hardly any  local  impact  unless  there was  at  least  a 
potential  or  latent  demand,  or  even  a  potentially receptive base of small 
and  medium-sized  firms  I ikely  to derive benefit  from  the facilities offered 
by  the  technopol is either  through  subcontracting or  through  technological 
consultancy,  or  in  R&D  or  training.  This  approach  places  the  technopolls 
at  the  hear.t  of  a  I  oca I or  reg i  ona I  know I  edge  investment  network. 
15  J.P.  de GA~  "Technopolea et pol itiquea  rfgionolea  lea  riaquea d'un dfvelopp-.nt 
"hore aol"",  Economies  et Sociftfa,  afrie F  (32)  "Progr~a et Crofaaonce",  No  8/1991,  PUG. 
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Abstract 
The  paper  describes  the  experience  of  a  sma I I  consu I tancy  company 
which  moved  to  the  Brunei  Science  Park  in  1990.  Because  the  company 
offices  are  on  the  edge  of  the  university  campus,  many  interactions 
with  the  university  are  possible.  They  depend  a  lot  on  the  needs  and 
interests of  individual  staff  members.  They  include  the  employment  of 
university staff  and  students,  mostly  on  a  casual  basis  for  short-term 
assignments,  but  sometimes  undergraduates  for  a  few  months  as  part  of 
their  "industry  placement"  experience.  Some  university  facilities are 
ava I I  ab I  e  on  repayments  terms,  such  as  printing  and  I i brary  on-I i ne 
services.  Others  are  available  free,  such  as  use  of  the  I ibrary  and 
attendance  at  lectures.  The  university also provides  a  pleasant  park-
1  i fe  environment  and  sports  fac iIi ties  which  staff  enjoy.  F ina II y, 
there  is discussions of  the benefits  to  the university  from  the  company 
over  and  above  the  rent  paid as  a  tenant. 
1.  Introduction 
This  paper  gives a  rather  personal  view of  the benefits we  as a  company 
have  derived  from  our  situation  on  a  science  park  on  the  edge  of  a 
university  campus  in  west  London  The  intention  is  to  suggest  factors 
that evaluators of science parks should explore.  The  most  often  touted 
theoretical  benefit  of  a  university-based  science  park,  nam~ly 
technology  transfer  from  the  university  to  the  world  of  commerce,  is 
hardly  relevant  for  us  and  I  suspect  that  it  is  not  that  important  for 
tenants  other  than  small  spin-off  companies~  But  we,  or  at  least  I, 
derive  real  benefit  in  many  other  ways.  Some  can  be  characterized  in 
time  or  financial  terms,  others are  less  readily quantified. 
our  company  was  founded  in  1973  and  for  most  of  its existence operated 
in  rented  accommodation  off  the  High  Street  in  Brentford.  This  is  a 
somewhat  down-market  urban  area  whose  main  advantage  is  good 
communications.  It  is near  Heathrow  Airport  and  has  easy access  to  two 
motorways  to  the  west  of  London  and  the  inner  peripheral  highway.  The 
company  was  founded  to  provide  consulting  services  in  the  technologies 
of  space,  aircraft,  electronics  and  telecommunications,  and  their 
management.  It  operates  in  the  field of  the  management  of  technology, 
often for  national  governments  and  Intergovernmental  organizations such 
as  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities.  Currently  it  has  some 
12 Directors and  ful 1-time consultants,  6  support  staff,  and  a  variable 
number  of associates. 
141 The  university  Is  named  for  one  of  Britain's great  nineteenth  century 
engineers  who  laid  out  the  Great  Western  Railway  from  Paddlngton  to 
South  Wales  and  Cornwa II.  ThIs  ra II way  line  passes  close  the  sIte  to 
which  the  former  Acton  Technical  College moved  In  1967-8,  shortly after 
It  received  Its Royal  Charter.  Brunei  was  one  of  the  new  universities 
founded  In  the  1960s  to  provide  for  an  expansion  in  higher  education, 
particularly  In  science  and  technology.  It  shares  with  the  University 
of surrey a  commitment  to "thin sandwich"  undergraduate courses.  These 
give  four  six-month  "industrial  placements".  The  students are employed 
by  Industrial  or  commercial  firms,  or  other  organizations  such  as 
Government  laboratories,  In  order  to  gain  practical  experience  - and, 
Incidentally,  earn money.  It  Is  an  effective form  of education and  one 
result  Is  that  Brunei  graduates  are  among  the  most  employable  In  the 
country,  despite  the  recession.  However  the  university  has  been 
finding  It  Increasingly difficult  to place  the students during  the  last 
years.  The  total  numbers  - 3260  undergraduates,  1170  graduates  - are 
small  by  the standards of  UK  universities but  they  are  Increasing quite 
rapidly. 
The  science  park  occupies  a  small  part  of  the  Uxbr ldge  site,  2.5 
hectares  at  the  south-east  corner  of  the  60  hectare  campus.  It  has 
three  two-storey  brick  buildings,  of  which  two  are  for  general  letting 
and  one  is  used  exclusively  by  a  non-profit  distributing  Research 
Association,  the  International  Tin  Research  Institute.  It  also 
consists  of  a  number  of  small  units  contained  within  university 
departments which  start-up companies  can  rent  In  their  first months  and 
years.  There  are  also  a  few  units  on  the  Runnymede  campus  of  the 
university,  18  km  distant.  Altogether  there  is  7000  m2  available  for 
rent  and  there  are  22  tenant  companies  and  some  152  employees  work 
there.  Firms  are  In  principle  engaged  In  scientific  research 
associated with  industrial  production,  preferably  In  collaboration with 
Brunei  University. 
2.  Employment  of staff and  students 
our  company  is  not  a  spin-off  from  the  university  and  so  none  of  our 
staff  have  any  particular  connection  with  a  department  or  faculty. 
Nevertheless,  several  faculty  members  are  regarded  as  "associates"  who 
can  be  retained  by  the  company  to  work  on  individual  assignments  as 
occasion  arises.  The  posslbll ity  of  the  inclusion  of  their  names  and 
rather  impressive  academic  credentials  in  our  proposal  documents  Is 
helpful,  although  within  the  context  of  bids  for  work  from  the 
Commission  of  the  EC  it would  sometimes  be  better  to offer  the services 
of  academics  in  a  different  Member  State.  We  ha.ve  't.n;~act. ased Bran .. 
academic  staff  on  several  occasions  for  commercial  assignments  for 
which  they are paid by  the day. 
Another  use  of  Brunei  faculty  Is  to give quick  and  Informal  scientific 
advice,  normally  over  the  telephone.  Our  location on  the  Science  Park 
makes  us  "part  of  the  family".  This  emboldens  me  to  ring  up,  say,  a 
chemist  to check  the  spelling of  some  esoteric chemical  substance  In  a 
scientific report  that  I  am  editing,  or  a  physicist  to check  whether  a 
particular abbreviation should  be  In  upper  or  lower  case. 
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However  my  principal  employment  so  far  has  been  of  research  students. 
They  are  permIt ted  to  take  tIme  off  from  theIr  three-year  PhD  stud.ies 
to  earn  money  on  ••casual ..  work.  We  pay  them  at  the  rate  paid  by  the 
unIversity  for  demonstration  work,  which  is  their  main  a I ternat i ve 
employment  if  they  can  get  it.  Currently  this  is about  17  ECU  per  hour 
which  is  quite  high  for  casual  work.  But  for  this  we  get  highly 
skilled  and  motivated  people  who  are  sometimes  literally  at  five 
minutes•  notice  (the  time  taken  to  walk  up  from  their  lab  to  our 
offices),  and  to whom  we  have  no  commitment  other  than  the  job-in-hand. 
Currently  I  have  two  such  students.  One  does  computer  analysis of  the 
data  from  post  a 1  quest lonna ires;  the  other  does  bib I iometr i c  work. 
Both  have  become  rather  expert  in  their  respective  tasks  and  they  are 
now  regarded  as  ''junior  associates"  who  can  feature  in  project 
proposa Is.  The  work  is  not  comp I  ete  I  y  i r reI evant  to  the  students • 
research  and  the  money  (mostly  tax-free)  is  a  welcome  supplement  to 
their  grant,  which  has  failed signally  to  keep  up  with  the  rise  in  the 
cost  o-f  I i v i ng  s i nee  the  1960s . 
I  am  shortly  about  to  hire  two  undergraduates  to  work  on  a  full-time 
basis  for  a  few  months.  This  work  will  be  part  of  their  industrial 
placements  discussed  earlier.  GTS  will  use.  them  to  carry  out 
Intelligent  clerical  work,  such  as  coding  of  questionnaires  and  very 
detailed work  on  bibtiome-trics.  The  undergraduates should be  ideal  for 
t~is purpose  and  they  are  rather  cheap  (about  6  ECU  per  hour).  Again, 
we  have  only  a  I imited  commitment  and  they  earn  money  in  a  location 
(:lose  to  their  residence  (they  can  stay  in  student  accommodation  on 
,ampus,  for  which  there  Is  much  less demand  after  the end  of  term). 
Another  possible  use  of  students  is  to  employ  foreigners  because  of 
their  language  skills.  Brunei  has  a  register  of  foreign  students  and 
has  identified ones  from,  for  example,  each  of  the  countries of eastern 
Europe.  I  am  planning  to use one  of  them  for  a  few  days  on  a  clerical 
task  Involving  a  good  knowledge  of  an  eastern European  language. 
3.  Use  of university facilities for  work  purposes 
Our  use  of  the  university  faci I ities  can  be  divided  into  two  parts, 
those  for  which  we  pay  an  economic  charge  and  those  provided 
essentially  free  as  part  of  our  agreement  to  rent  space  in  the  Science 
Park.  The  major  use  in  the  former  category  is of  the university print-
shop.  They  can  do  colour  printing  and  all  the  normal  activities 
associated  with  publ ishlng  such  as  collating,  folding  and  binding.  I 
have  used  them  to  prInt  a.  20-page  quest lonna ire  and  to  do  sever  a I 
fR'JJ ler  job_s ..  Not  only_ .are.  t.hei.r  charges  very  reasonable  but  they  are 
Jt4,tb·iA  live  llinates·.~alk.-~''  .s~r;:::.  ~~.,:·,·>,)i-.i  ·.-,;· tl  _  _  -.-·'·,;_;-::.,  -:-. 
T~e  library  is,  of  course,  a  major  resource  in  any  university  and  many 
Qf  my  co I I  eagues  and  I  have  used  the  Brune I  I i br ary  on  numerous 
Qccaslons.  We  use  principally  the  reference  section  but  from  time  to 
time  we  consult  periodicals,  borrow  books,  order  articles  form  the 
pritish  Library  through  the  Inter-Library  Loan  scheme,  or  arrange  for 
on-1 lne  scanning of  databases.  In  particular,  I  use  the  CD-ROM  version 
of  the  Science  Citation  Index,  as  well  as  the  printed  volumes,  for 
bibllometric studies. 
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computer  hardware  and  software,  and  in  principle  we  could  use  their 
malnf~ame computer  although  the  need  has  not  arisen  so  far.  Nor  have 
we  needed  to commission  tests from  the university  laboratories although 
1 understand some  other  Science  Park  companies  have  done  so. 
However  we  do  use  the  university  catering  facti it ies,  such  as  the 
Senior  Common  Room  dining  room,  for  the  entertainment  of  visitors.  We 
are  also  planning  to  receive  a  young  Italian  visitor  for  a  few  weeks 
during  the  summer,  and  may  then  make  use  of  the  student  accommodation 
on  campus  some  of  which  will  be  of  unoccupied  and  available  for  rent. 
The  Science Park. Itself has  conference  facilities,  including both  small 
and  large meeting  rooms,  which  are often useful  for  meetings  If our  own 
space  is not  suitable or  used  for  other  purposes. 
Finally  in  this context  It  is worth  mentioning  that  the  University  and 
the  Science  Park  quite  often  receive  foreign  visitors  and  delegations 
some  of  whom  are  taken  to our  offices  to  see  a  "typical"  tenant.  The 
links  we  are  thereby  enabled  to  make  provide  us  with  a  somewhat  wider 
network  of  people  and  contacts  in  distant  countries  and  thereby 
reinforce company  marketing. 
4.  Use  of associated and  leisure facilities 
Science  parks  are  we I I  known  for  providing  their  occupants  wIth  a 
pI easant,  park-I ike,  environment  and  Brune I  is  no  exception.  We  are 
surrounded  by  lawns  and  beds  of  flowering  shrubs,  with  spring  bulbs, 
roses  and  foliage  plants.  The  restful  atmosphere  is  a  welcome  change 
from  the  noise  and  smells  of  a  city  and  I  was  myself  attracted  by  it 
when  I  attended  an  interview  prior  to  joining  the  company.  It  more 
than  compensated  for  the  extra  journey  time  compared  with  their 
previous  location. 
The  university  amenities  such  as  the  sports  center  are  made  available 
to science park  tenants on  the  same  terms  as  they  are  to members  of  the 
university.  We  have  played  badminton  and  squash,  and  attended  aerobic 
classes.  There  are  also  tennis  courts  nearby  for  those  who  feel 
competent  to  appear  on  them.  We  are  also  able  to  attend  concerts  and 
I  ectures  on  the  campus,  and  sever  a I  of  us  go  regu I  ar I  y  to  the  free 
monthly  recitals  of  chamber  music.  The  I ibrary  holds  exhibitions  of 
art and  crafts from  time  to  time  and  we  have  visited some  of  them. 
Since  the  site of  the  university  Is  somewhat  remote  from  the  nearest 
town  (2-3  km),  there  are  shops  and  a  bank  on  the  campus,  as  well  as  a 
student  cafetaria  and  a  mobile  food  shop.  The  presence  of  the 
university  has  also  created  a  demand  for  pub I ic  transport  and  In 
consequence  there  is  a  rather  better  bus  service  than  one  would  expect 
in  the  outer  London  suburbs.  Altogether,  the  science  park  enjoys  a 
high  level  of  amenities  and  services which  make  life  rather  agreeable. 
At  present  the only  real  lack  is of  bicycle shed! 
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The  decision  by  the university  to  reserve  a  small  part  of  the site for 
a  science  park  was  made  some  time  after  the  move  to  Uxbr ldge.  The 
university obtains rent  as a  return on  Its members  and  departments  earn 
money  for  their  services.  But  I  suggest  the  main  benefits  are  of  two 
kinds  and  ones  not  easily  measured  in  money  terms.First,  the  science 
park  acts  as  an  advertisement  for  the  university  through  the 
International  and  national  activities  of  its  tenants.  Sometimes  this 
Is overt  as  when  proposals  are made  for  joint  projects  between  GTS  and 
associates  form  the  university.  More  commonly  it  appears  as  an 
attitude of  open~ess to commercial  relationships. 
The  second  benefit  is  the  intellectual  stimulation to both  students and 
faculty  members  provided  by  contacts with  GTS  and  other  companies,  who 
are  working  on  rea I  prob I  ems  for  c I i  ents  and  can  therefore  inject  a 
sense of  commercial  reality  into academic  life.  For  example,  a  member 
of  staff  of  GTS  acted  as  a  tutor  for  a  summer  school  project  on  the 
operation  of  a  space  station.  This  may  also  extend  to  the  written 
word.  GTS  subscribes  to  a  number  of  specialist  journals  in  its fields 
of  interest which  are not  carried by  the university  I ibrary:  members  of 
the university  are  welcome  to  come  and  consult  them.  With  one  journal 
we  have  agreed  to  circulate  it  to  and  store  it  in  a  university 
specialist unit  after  it  has  been  read  within  the company. 
6.  Conclusions 
This  short  paper  has  Indicated most  of  the  ways  in  which  GTS  Interacts 
with  Brunei  University  through  the  Science  Park.  The  interactions  are 
very  much  at  the  behest  of  particular  individuals  rather  than  the 
result of  a  formal  company  policy,  and  indeed  some  of  them  are not  very 
well  known.  As  we  spend  more  time  on  campus,  we  confidently  expect  to 
make  Increasing use of  the  resource on  our  doorstep.  But  it would  have 
been  very  hard  to  foresee  all  these  interactions  when  the  decision  to 
relocate  here  was  made.  If  our  experience  is  at  all  typical,  science 
parks  may  have  an  advantage  for  their  tenants  much  greater  than 
conventional  ex  ante analysis would  suggest. 
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Munich,  Germany 
F.  Dietrich 
Planning,  construction  and  operation  of  a  technology  centre  are  the 
first  steps  toward  encouraging  the  growth  of  small  and  medium  sized 
enterprises.  The  opening  of  a  technology  centre or  science park  makes 
It  possible  for  major  regional  development  goals  to  be  met  In  the 
medium  to  long  term.  These  aims  are  : 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Technology  transfer 
Innovation 
New  job  creation 
Improved  competitiveness 
Increase  in  productivity 
Greater  attractiveness of  location 
New  business creation 
Better  image  for  the  region 
Relocation of  businesses  to  the  region 
The  greatest  advantage  to combining  a  technology  centre with  a  science 
park  Is  the  fact  that  businesses  which  have  "outgrown"  the  technology 
centre  after  three  to  five  years  can  be  persuaded  to  stay  on  the 
region,  often  without  even  a  change  of  address.  The  creation  of 
synergetic  effects  and  the  development  of  the  local  area  to  an 
innovative  and  business-oriented  location  are  pre-conditions  for 
attracting out-of-town or out-of-state companies  to  the science park. 
Of  course,  none  of  this  is  possible  without  a  targeted  development  of 
the  "hard"  and  "so1't"  locatlonal  factors,  for  example  road  connections, 
public  transportation,  environmental  protection,  adequate  housing-and 
quality  of  life.  The  success  of  a  science  park  Is  particularly 
dep~ndent on  a  high-quality  Infrastructure.  A few  examples  follow: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Good  transportation connections  (near  highway) 
Available public transportation 
Intelligent,  space-saving solutions  to parking problem 
Slgnposting with  company  logos  to direct  visitor  traffic 
Small  shopping  area  for  daily necessities 
Bank/post  office 
Park  benches  in  open  green  areas 
Restaurants/cafes 
Hotel  (two  to four  star) 
Recreational  possibl I ities 
Environmental  planning 
Link  between  open  spaces and  functional  areas 
Tree-lined streets 
Landscaping 
Open  spaces  planned  with  sport  and  recreational  possiblllt ies  In 
mind. 
149 The  success  of  a  technology  centre  or  science  park  Is  of  course 
measured  against  the  Impact  made  on  employment. 
A direct  Impact  on  employment  Is made  by  : 
*  Founders  of  the  firms  located  In  the  technology  centre  and  their 
for  the most  part  highly qualified employees 
*  Members  of management  of  the  technology  centre or  science park 
An  Indirect  Impact  on  employment  can  be  achieved  through  : 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
COnstructlon.of  the  technology  centre or  science park 
The  supply network  between  tenants and  local  manufactures/suppliers 
COntracts given  by  tenants to  local  manufacturers  for  pilot or mass 
production 
Impulses  sent  out  by  the  technology  centre  and  its  tenants 
encouraging  Innovative  activity  In  the  region  and  as a  consequence 
Improving  the competitiveness of established corporations 
The  prospect  of  Improved  Image,  synergetic effects and  the  promise 
of  advantages  held out  by  location  In  the  proximity of  the  science 
park,  which  can  Influence national  or  International  corporations  to 
relocate near  the science park. 
For  example,  In  1990  the  Dortmund  Technology  Centre,  a  part  of  the 
Dortmund  Science  Park,  had  the  following  documented  effects  on  job 
creation  : 
1.  Direct effects 
A  few  br lef  comments  on  the  type  of  employment  are  of  Interest 
here:  Of  the  persons  working  for  firms  located  In  the  technology 
centre,  roughly  one-third  are  Independent  contractors  or  students 
and  only  231  are  regular  employees.  Amongst  businesses  that  have 
left  the  technology  centre  and  moved  into  the  science  park, 
however,  only  101  are  Independent  contractors or  students  and  401 
are  regular  employees.  The  number  of  part-time  employees  (331  In 
the  technology  centre)  Is  reduced  to 101  in  the science park. 
2.  I  nd·l rect effects 
* 
* 
* 
Here  are  just  a  few  ways  In  which  so-called  indirect  effects were 
made  on  employment  : 
Construction  industry  (cost of  technology .centre  DM  65  million) 
Advantage  of proximity  to  technology centre and  Improved  Image 
relocation to science park 
approximately  1,200  jobs 
Multiplier effects 
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 Invited  conm.ents tollowingworkshop 
discussions: 
J.  Cmnpos  Rodrigues,  Challenge 
L.  J.  Tsipouri, University of ~hens. 
Corrrnents  by G.  Colletls,  IREPD, 
Corrrnents  by G.  Lewison,  Brunel  Science Park 
Conment s  by D.  AkQueen,  l!HI' Zentrwn 
159 (12) 
Impact  and  Evaluation of Science Parks- Some  Ra.arks 
Challenge-lnovacio e  Tecnologia,  Lisbon,  Portugal. 
J.  Campos  Rodrigues 
1.  The  indicators  for  Science  Park  evaluation  are  necessarily  related 
to  those  that  define  the  scientific  and  technology  strength  of  an 
economy,  such  as: 
- Jobs  created,  using  S&T  ski I Is 
- Intensity of  the relations between  University and  Industry 
-Evolution of  the specialisation pattern of  the  industry,  and  of 
the weight  of  the  technology-intensive activities 
- Number  of  patents  registered 
-Evolution of  business expenditure on  R&D. 
If  they  succeed,  Science  Parks  wi  II  contribute  positively  to  all  these 
indicators,  but  only  in  a  long  term. 
The  successful  cases  that  we  have  been  talked  about  in  this Workshop 
took  between  10-15  years  to  have  visible  results  on  those  indicators. 
In  this context  evaluation seems  to be  an  impossible mission. 
2.  The  objectives  of  a  Science  Park  broadly  defined  are  to  create  an 
environment  favorab I  e  to  the  estab I i  shment  of  a  cr it i ca I  mass  of 
scientific  institutions  and  technology-oriented  business,  that 
induces  a  chain  reaction  that  will  promote  the  "explosion"  of  the 
economy  of  the  region. 
Three major  issues  come  out  of  this concept 
-The critical  mass 
-The "reactivity",  greater  than  1,  needed  to naturally  feed  the 
chain  reaction 
The  detonator  to start  the  reaction. 
We  still  don't  know  how  to  monitor  all  these  issues  in  order  to 
forecast  whether  or  not  the  Science  Park  will  succeed.  What  we  can 
learn  from  the different  experiences  is  that  the  level  of  excel lance of 
the  Research  Institutions  plays  a  fundamental  role  in  the  process, 
acting as  the  detonator  of  it. 
This  is,  it  seems,  clearly  assumed  in  Bari  strategy.  First  they 
develop  some  centres  of  expertise  (seeking  excellence)  so  that  in  a· 
second  phase  (10  years  later),  they  may  be  able  to  feed  the  science. 
park or  to be  an  attraction pole  for  outside companies. 
But  we  are  not  able  to  define  the  needed  critical  mass,  and  we  don't 
know  how  to measure  the  "reactivity"  of  the  process,  which  will- depend 
on  different  parameters  related  to  the global  environment  of  the  region 
(soc i a I,  poI it i ca I,  economic)  and  of  the  project  i tse If  (management 
capabi 1 ities,  leadership,  believe,  credibility,  business  plan, 
marketing,  etc.). 
161 3.  In  the·short  term,  we  are  restricted to  two  perspectives  : 
project  monitoring  concerning  its  accomplishment  in  regard  to 
the  initial  business  plan  (goals,  objectives  and  strategic 
plan). 
economic  and  financial  evaluation  of  the  project  (but  treating 
it as  a  business,  has  the  threat  of  reducing  the Science  Park 
to a  real  estate development  more  or  less  technology-oriented). 
4.  In  order  to  replicate  in  a  top  down  approach  the  proven  bottom  up 
sequential  developments,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to be  aware  that: 
Science  Parks  are  an  element  of  a  global  scientific  and 
technology  policy,  but  are  not  the  magic  measure  to  solve  the 
scientific  and  technological  gap  existing  between  regions. 
Isolated  they  wi  I I  be  no  more  than  "cathedrals  in  the  desert". 
This  brings us  to  the  issue of  measurement  of  the  aditional  impact  of 
Science  Parks  on  the  economic  development  of  a  region.  All  we  know 
is  that  emp i rica I  evIdence  exists  on  the  reI at ionsh i p  between  the 
level  of  R&D  expenditure  of  an  economy  and  its  development.  The 
strengthening  of  R&D  capabi I ity of  a  region means  getting  synergies 
among  different  measures  and  initiatives.  In  order  to  perform  an 
evaluation  of  the  efficiency  of  a  given  situation,  it  wi  I I  be 
necessary  to perform  an  extensive exercise  in  order  to define  the  input 
output  matrix  that  correlates  these  different  measures  with  the 
relevant  indicators.  But  I  doubt  that  this  is  a  practical  and  useful 
exercise. 
5.  Another  issue  will  be  how  to  evaluate  alternative  measures  to  the 
launching  of  a  Science  Park,  that  could  have  in  the  short/medium 
term  a  better  cost/benefit  relation. 
But  this  evaluation  depends  on  one  hand  on  the  dimension  of  the 
budgetary  restrictions  and  on  the  other  hand  on  the  concept  (or  the 
model)  upon  which  the  Science  Park  is  intended  to be  built. 
6.  A final  remark  relates  to  the  fact  that  Science  Park  impacts  and 
evaluation are  being  reduced  to  the  regional/local  level. 
With  this  remark  I  would  like  to  put  emphasis  on  the  fact  that  we  ara 
facing  a  global  economy  in  an  open  market,  and  that  the 
international isation of  the  economies  is  a  reality  that  should  not  be 
forgotten. 
The  indicators  to be  uti I ised,  even  in  a  long  term  perspective,  need  to 
consider  these  new  realities,  mainly  the  markets  in  which  the  R&D 
centres  and  firms  created  are  competing  and  their  capab i 1 it i es  and 
strengths  to  develop  themselves  in  an  international  context. 
162 EVALUATION  OF  SCIENCE  PARKS,  SOME  REMARKS  ON  THE  EXPERIENCES 
IN  MORE  ADVANCED  COUNTRIES 
Lena  J. Tsipouri,  University of Athens,  Greece 
The  "fashion"  for  the  creation  of  Science  Parks  has  gone  through  two 
phases  in  the  technologically  advanced  countries  (AC),  a  first  in  the 
late  50's  and  early  60's  starting  in  the  u.s.,  and  a  second  with 
widespread  experiences  after  the  mid  SO's.  Our ing  the  latter  Less 
Favoured  Region~  (LFRs)  in  the  EC  have  promoted  initiatives  for 
creating  their  own  parks.  This  had  implied  a  recent  need  for  improving 
tools  (indicators,  knowledge  on  best  practices)  for  both  ex  ante  and  ex 
post  evaluation of  Science  Parks  initiatives. 
Up  to  now  evaluation  experiences  come  exclusively  from  technologically 
advanced  countries,  where  the  role of market  forces  and  private capital 
is  more  pronounced,  due  mainly  to  a  higher  demand  for  entrepreneurial 
estate  and  to  a  longer  established  I inkage  between  academia  and  the 
productive sector.  In  LFRs  this gap  is expected  to be  fi I led  by  public 
support  (EC,  national,  local).  Thus,  specific  problems  arise  when 
trying  to  apply  the  same  methodologies  for  LFRs,  which  are  briefly 
discussed  below  in  terms  of  issues,  possible  indicators  and  pol icy 
imp I i cat ions. 
a)  Existing  evaluations  in  advanced  countries  converge  to  the 
conclusions  that  the  creation  of  Science  Parks  is  a  long  term 
exercise  and  as  a  consequence  ex  post  evaluation  needs  a  lengthy 
time  horizon.  Besides  the  role of  personal  commitment  as  a  factor 
of  success  is  stressed.  Thus  an  effective  administration,  speed 
and  continuity,  appear  to  be  the  most  important  prerequisites  of 
success.  It  can  be  argued  that  these  are  qualities  that  can  be 
taken  for  granted  in  AC,  but  less  so  in  LFRs.  Besides  these 
concepts  are  not  measurable  and  no  clear  or  generally  valid 
indicators  can  be  used.  One  can  take  as  proxies  the  share  of 
private  capital  participating  in  the  founding  capital  of  the  Park, 
the  frequency  of  changes  of  high  rank  administrators  and  the  time 
table.  But  each  one  of  these  proxies  can  also  prove  to  have 
adverse  effects,  as  private  investors  expect  a  faster  return  on 
investment,  than  the  average  time  needed  for  the  success of  a  park, 
changes  may  be  necessary  to  improve  the  institutions  etc.  Pol icy 
imp I icat ions  for  a  success  strategy  may  lead  to  suggest ions  very 
difficult  to  materialise  when  public  funds  are  at  stake,  like  the 
justification  of  extra-funding  to  specific  individuals,  shortcuts 
in  administrative procedures,  etc. 
b)  The  evaluation  has  to  be  related  to  the goal  of  the creation of  the 
Park,  which  may  be  regional  development,  technological  development, 
image  boosting  or  pecuniary  goals.  These  primary  goals  are  not 
self-evident  for  every  park.  Besides  they  may  be  complementary  or 
competitive  to each other. 
163 Regional  development  issues,  are  the  most  easy  to  measure  with 
indicators  I ike  Job-creation  and  turnover,  number  of  new  businesses 
established,  their  life  cycles  etc.  The  real  problem  here  is  that  of 
additional ity,  namely  how  to  isolate  the  events  that  would  have 
occurred  anyway  from  those  that  are  purely  due  to  the  existence of  the 
park  and  the  incentives  it  offers.  The  methodology  used  is  to 
investigate on  a  personal  basis on  the  likelihood  of  establishment  of 
the  company  in  the  region,  would  the  park  not  exist.  In  LFRs  the 
additionality  issue  is  of  particular  relevance,  since  many  parks  are 
announced  to  be  created  in  order  to  host  spin  offs,  extended  campus 
facilities or  semi-public organisations. 
Technology  creation  due  to  the  agglomeration  functIon  of  the  Park  is 
another  typical  goal,  based  on  the  I inkages  with  R&D  faci I ities. 
Nevertheless  it  has  not  been  confirmed  from  empirical  evidence  that 
phys i ca I  proximity  is  a  motive  force,  s i nee  profess iona I  or  soc i a I 
proximity  appear  more  important.  Technology  creation  can  be  measured 
with  the  usual  R&D  output  indicators,  although  the  additional ity 
barrier  appears  here  even  more  pronounced  than  before.  As  a  poI icy 
issue  for  LFRs,  it  is  important  to  make  explicit  from  the  very 
beginning  the  relation  of  the  regional  versus  technology  creation 
goals:  the  latter  may  be  easier  to  achieve,  within  the  framework  of  a 
supply  push  pol icy  in  specific  endowed  disciplines,  but  the  former  is 
usually  the  cover  for  public support. 
Image  boost lng  of  the  core  university,  the  loca I  authorities,  the 
funding  authorities or  the  companies  establishing  in  the  park  may  also 
be  a  primary  goal  of  the  initiators,  although  not  usually explicit. 
Profit making  for  the  investors. 
In  LFRs  experience  unti I  now  shows  that  all  four  goals  are  proposed  as 
equally  important  and  highly  promising,  while  evaluation  in  advanced 
countries  shows  that  success  in  one  goal  can  be  clearly  contradictory 
to  others.  For  ex amp I  e  cases  were  reported  where  .. Deve I  oping 
technology  versus  developing  jobs  ..  was  in  a  ful I  antinomy. 
c)  Evaluations  in  AC  tend  to show  that  there  is no  correlation between 
size  and  success.  Several  experiences  show  that  there  is  no 
threshold  which  guarantees  success  or  increases  the  likelihood  of 
failure.  If  any  indication on  the size,  it  is  rather  that  there  is 
a  tendency  to go  bigger  than  necessary  and  due  to  this  approach  to 
jeopardise  the  whole  undertaking.  Thus  indicators  on  the  size  of 
the  park  are  only  necessary  in  order  to  I ink  them  with  its 
environment  and  funding  poss i b i I it i es  rather  than  its  I i Ice I i hood 
for  success. 
d)  In  the  US  it  was  found  that  success  is  highly  correlated  to  the 
specialisation  of  parks,  which  has  sometimes  been  planned  and 
sometimes  resulted  during  the  implementation  phase.  There  is  no 
indication  that  alternative  results  should  be  expected  in  LFRs,  so 
indicators  on  the  planned  and  achieved  concentration  by  discipline 
should  be  an  important  measure  for  park  evaluations. 
164 Nevertheless,  as  a  pol icy  issue,  it  is expected  that  LFRs  wi  I I  have 
a  more  general istic approach  to  their  parks  in  order  to  be  able  to 
address  a  broader  range of  clientele.  This  issue  has  to be  treated 
cautiously  in  business plans. 
e)  The  capital  versus  technology  base  of 
diversified  between  countries.  It  seems  that 
tenants  is  strongly 
in  the  US  and  the  UK 
Science  Parks  host  more  productive  enterprises,  whereas  in  Sweden  and 
in  France  the  majority  of  tenant  is  in  the  tertiary.  While  this  is 
connected  to  the  general  economic  environment,  local  fiscal  policy, 
etc.  and  it  cannot  be  linked  to  the  success of  the  park  itself,  it  has 
a  significant  il]lpact  on  the  environment  and  can  be  I inked  to  the 
additionality  issues.  Again  this  is  an  important  goal  to  clarify  and 
measure,  in  order  to  know  what  to expect  in  each  park. 
The  above  mentioned  remarks  are  only  to  prove  that  experiences  from  AC 
may  offer  some  techniQues  for  ex  ante  and  ex  post  evaluation,  but  do 
not  prescribe  genera 1  recipes.  It  is  suggested  that  LFRs  shou I d  not 
only  learn  from  the success stories,  but  it  is equally  important  to get 
indications  on  failures  in  order  to  avoid  already  committed  errors, 
because  the  ultimate  goal,  when  evaluating  the  creation or  the  success 
of  a  park  in  a  LFR  is  not  to  imitate  institutions  that  succeeded  in 
another  environment,  but  to  create  success  stories  in  the  own 
environment.  Finally  it  is  important  not  to use  the  notion of  the  Park 
in  order  to  create  an  excuse  function,  i.e.  create  something  else  and 
name  it  a  Technology  Park,  which  gives  high  prestige  to  the  initiators. 
An  extended  campus  or  an  industrial  zone  should  be  called  by  its  name 
and  not  a  Science Park. 
Lena  J.  Tsipouri 
Apr i I  2,  1992. 
165 Some  brief  comments  G.  Col let is  (IREPD) 
1.  The  difference  between  technology  considered  as  a  resource  and 
technology  considered  as  a  result  is neither  semantic  nor  imagined. 
Presenting  technology  as  a  result,  i.e.  the  result  of  an  innovation 
process,  makes  it easier  to grasp  the  nature of  this process. 
Innovation  is  an  iterative  and  incremental  process,  in  other  woids  one 
based one  irreversible choices . 
. 
Technology  is  the  result  of  this  process  and  can  therefore  by 
interpreted only  in  terms  of  a  learning/creation process. 
The  not ion  of  "technology  transfer"  stems  ·from  an  incorrect 
representation  of  technology,  which  rejects  the  concept  of 
technological  creation  and  presuppose  the  ·existence  of  ready-made 
technologies  which  are  simply  transferred  with  a  few  adjustments  here 
and  there.  This  explains  the  disastrous  failure  of  policies  based  on 
technology  transfer. 
2.  Assuming  the  existence of  a  process  of  technology  creation,  we 
can  further  assume  that  a  technopol is  can  constitute  a  space  for 
"creative  communication",  facilitating  innovatory  learning.  The 
reI evant  intermediate concepts are  ••networks''  and  "cooper at ion". 
3.  There  are  numerous  typologies of  the  technopol is.  However,  not 
enough  emphasis  is  pI aced  on  the  precise  conditions  governing  their 
location.  How  do  technopol ises  integrate  within  the  regional 
techno I  og i ca I  infrastructure?  How  does  the  "country  effect"  come  into 
play? 
4.  The  disadvantage  of  prior  evaluation  is  that  it evaluates  that 
which  does  not  yet  exist.  Post-hoc  evaluation  assesses  that  which  no 
longer  exists.  We  ought  therefore  to  concentrate  on  endoformative 
evaluation  (that  is  to  say  a  simultaneous  assessment  with  interaction 
between  the evaluator  and  the subject). 
167 Comments  by Grant  Lewison 
My  impression  is  that  the  eva I  ua t ion  that  have  been  presented  here, 
while  very  inter~sting and  quite varied,  may  have  missed  some  important 
aspects  of  "life  on  a  science  pari<"  through  their  focus  on  macro-
economic  data  and  indicators.  It  is  often  necessary  to  tall<  (not 
circulate  a  questionnaire)  and  to  address  ordinary  professionals  and 
not  just  the  top  manager  to  learn  about  the  company-university 
interactions.  One  of  the most  important  may  be  the  academic  environment 
as  an  inducement  to  prospective  employees  who  might  seek  greater 
security  in  a  large  company  instead of  in  the  small  science  pari<  firm. 
Another  might  be  the  use  of  University  facilities  such  as  library  or 
the  abi I ity  to  hire  students  on  a  part  time  or  casual  basis.  High 
academic  quality  in  the  university  may  contribute  individually  to  a 
science  park's  success  through  the  quality  of  its  environment, 
reputation,  faci I ities and  students. 
169 Connents  by McQueen 
The  following  is some  suggestion  for  possible  indicators  for  evaluating 
science  and  technology  parks.  The  idea-is' not  that  each  ~ark  be  able 
to provide all  indicators,  but  rather,  that  each  park  should be  able  to 
provide  at  least  some  of  them.  The  indicators  should  cover  a  wide 
enough  spectrum of activities and  situations that  every  park  be  able  to 
express  itself  through  them,  and  perhaps  get  some  ideas  of  what  more 
could be  done  through  studying  the  indicators which  they  cannot  respond 
to satisfactorily at  the present  time. 
Employment  created  (inside and  especially outside  the  park): 
by  industrial  sector 
locally,  nationally,  internationally 
rate of  employment  growth 
Number  of contracts 
national,  international 
local 
concerning  inputs  to  the  park 
commercially oriented 
academically oriented 
Identifiable  interactions 
R&D  contract,  etc 
personnel  exchanges,  etc 
cooperation  agreements 
Cultural  changes  induced  by  the  park 
in  financial  institutions (attitude toward  smal I  companies,  etc) 
at  political  levels 
within  the  associated  university  (is  commercial  activity 
acceptable) 
in  the  community  at  large 
Identifiable outputs 
R&D  contracts 
patents  I i censed 
spin-off  companies  formed 
companies  attracted 
Identified strengths 
University departments 
regional  characteristics 
Present  activities 
what  are  you  doing  now  ? 
what  will  you  be  doing  in  two  (five)  years? 
171 On  another  level,  I  should  I ike  to  see  the  concept  of  science  or 
technology  park  widened  to  include  other  professional  and  non-
professional  area  represented  in  universities.  The  sociologists, 
linguists,  pharmacists,  business  students,  etc,  should  not  feel 
excluded  from  "technology• parks  in  my  opinion.  There  are good  examples 
of  spin-off  compani~~  from,.these  areas  which  contribute  at  least  as 
much  to employments,  etc, .as  do  the companies  producing  hard  products. 
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